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REGULATING THE REGULATORS: LIMITATIONS





The activities of American corporations frequently contact numerous
states. For example, a corporation may conduct business and have share-
holders, employees, and creditors in many states. For this reason, more than
one state could be said to have an interest' in regulating the affairs of a
corporation. It has generally been agreed, however, that certain corporate
activities should be governed by one uniform set of rules, as opposed to mul-
tiple regulation by all interested states. Courts, therefore, have to select the
law of one of the interested states to govern corporate "internal affairs,"
those activities that require one uniform set of rules. Because a corporation
historically has been viewed in American law as the creation of the state of
incorporation, and because a corporation would therefore be certain what
law governed its internal affairs, American courts have normally applied the
law of the state of incorporation to questions pertaining to corporate "inter-
nal affairs." This has been referred to as the "internal affairs doctrine."
This doctrine was initially regarded as a limit upon a forum's jurisdiction;
the only courts deemed to have jurisdiction over a corporation were the
courts of the state of incorporation, the state in which the entity was cre-
ated.
2
The internal affairs doctrine is no longer regarded as a limit upon juris-
diction; it is now considered a choice of law rule. Some courts recently have
exhibited a tendency to reject this doctrine even as a choice of law rule if the
subject corporation has much more substantial contacts with the forum than
with the state of incorporation or if the subject matter is one which logically
permits the application of multiple regulatory schemes.
3
The vast majority of courts, however, continue to apply the law of the
state of incorporation to internal affairs, regardless of the level of contacts
the corporation has with the forum or the state of incorporation, since it is
* B.A., 1970, Denison University; J.D., 1974, U.C.L.A. Associated with Barovick,
Konecky, Braun, Schwartz & Kay, Beverly Hills, California. The author wishes to thank David
Gubman of the California Bar for his comments regarding this article and Veronica Burnett for
her extensive secretarial help.
1. The term state interest is generally used in this article to refer to the level of contacts
between the state and the corporation. Apologies to Brainerd Currie.
2. See Latty, Pseudo-Foreqn Corporattins, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 143 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
Latty]; Oldham, Caliornia Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations-Trampling Upon the Tramp?, 17
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 85, 92 n.34 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Oldham].
3. See generally Oldham, supra note 2, at 93-98.
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considered vital that a corporation know in advance what law governs its
internal affairs. No other corporate choice of law approach heretofore ad-
vanced provides the same degree of certainty to a corporation regarding
what law will govern its internal affairs as does the internal affairs doctrine.
The problem which results from this policy is that frequently corporations
are governed by the law of a state with which the corporation has had mini-
mal contacts. Corporations are able to avoid the corporate law of its com-
mercial domicile by incorporating or reincorporating elsewhere.
A number of states have recently adopted statutes, such as "pseudo-
foreign" corporation laws and tender offer rules, which purport to regulate
various activities of foreign corporations that have significant contacts with
the state. Many of these regulated activities could be considered questions
pertaining to corporate internal affairs. This article will discuss the wisdom
and constitutionality of these attempts by states to regulate various activities
of foreign corporations, as well as potential problems which could result
from such statutes. It will then be suggested that "pseudo-foreign" corpora-
tion laws offer a means by which certainty can be retained in corporate
choice of law while allowing the commercial domicile to regulate the inter-
nal affairs of corporations in more instances.
II. HISTORY OF REGULATION OF CORPORATIONS WITH MULTI-STATE
CONTACTS
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the corporate laws of
many states were quite restrictive.' For example, many such corporate laws
limited the amount of assets a corporation could own. Many significant cor-
porate transactions required the approval of all directors and shareholders.
States then began to modify their statutes and make them less restrictive. 5
(Such less restrictive corporate statutes have been termed "enabling" statutes
or "pro-management" statutes, depending upon one's point of view.) Profes-
sor Hurst noted that at the beginning of the twentieth century our attitude
toward economic regulation was laissez faire; a societal judgment was made
that corporations should be unfettered in their attempt to spur economic
growth. 6 The depression in the 1930's, the abuses by corporate management
after the second world war, and a prolonged period of prosperity have cata-
lyzed another change in attitude toward corporate regulation. Many com-
mentators now contend that state corporate laws should be made more
4. See generally J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORA-
TIONS 16-18 (1917); J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 13-57 (1970); N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
175 [1971); Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before /786, AM. HIST. REV. 449 (1903).
5. See generall Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Cary]; Cary, Summary ofArticle on Federalism and Corporate Law, 31
Bus. LAW. 105 (1976); Folk, Does State Corporation Law Have a Future?, 8 GA. ST. B. J. 311 (1972);
Henning, Federal Corporate Chartering for Big Business: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DE PAUL
L. REV. 915 (1972); Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 193 (1958); Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "En-
ahhng"?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599 (1965).
6. See HURST, supra note 4, at xii.
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restrictive.
7
One obstacle to a state's attempt to make its corporate law more restric-
tive has been the internal affairs doctrine. This doctrine has been applied in
Anglo-American courts so that the internal affairs8 of a corporation are gov-
erned by the law of the state of incorporation, regardless of the contacts, if
any, the corporation has with the state of incorporation. 9 What has fre-
quently occurred is that corporations have incorporated (or reincorporated)
in jurisdictions with the least restrictive corporate law then in existence.l° A
state is obviously, therefore, not encouraged to make its corporate law more
7. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
(1976); Cary, supra note 5; Folk, supra note 5; Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act-Invitation
to Irresponsibility, 50 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1955); Jennings, Federa/iration of Corporation Law. Part Way
or All the Way, 31 Bus. LAW. 991 (1976); Latty, Some General Observations on the New Busness
Corporation Law of New York, II BUFFALO L. REV. 591 (1962); Schwartz, Federal Charterig of
Corporations. An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 71 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
8. Internal affairs have been defined as follows: "A corporation's internal affairs are in-
volved whenever the issue concerns the relations inter se of the corporation, its stockholders,
directors, officers or agents." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 313, Com-
ment a at 347 (1971). North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 154, 20 A.
1039, 1040 (1885) suggested the following definition: "[wihere the act complained of affects the
complainant solely in his capacity as a member of the corporation, whether it be as stockholder,
director, president or other officer, and is the act of the corporation, whether acting in stock-
holders' meeting, or through its agents, the board of directors, then such action is the manage-
ment of the internal affairs of the corporation .... "
Examples of corporate internal affairs include the rules pertaining to when dividends may
be declared, the duties and liabilities of officers and directors, the standards for indemnification
of directors and officers, the proper procedure for electing directors, and the standards for the
level of approval required for mergers and other types of reorganizations. The exact scope of
what constitutes a question pertaining to an internal affair of a corporation is somewhat impre-
cise; a court wishing to apply local law to a question involving a foreign corporation may find
that the issue does not pertain to the internal affairs of the corporation. See, e.g., Toklan Roy-
alty Corp. v. Tiffany, 193 Okla. 120, 141 P.2d 571 (1943).
Matters which clearly do not constitute corporate internal affairs include matters relating
to the execution of contracts by a corporation, the commission of torts by a corporation or its
agents, and the conveyance of property. See general y Baraf, The Foreign Corporation--A Problem in
Choice of Law Doctrine, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV. 219, 235 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Barafl; Reese
& Kaufman, The Law Governig Corporate Afairs. Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and
Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1124 (1958).
9. No distinction is generally made between a foreign corporation with substantial con-
tacts with its state of incorporation and a foreign corporation which has almost all of its contacts
with the forum. The law of the state of incorporation traditionally has been applied to all
foreign corporations. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Amsterdam Improvement Co., 140 N.Y. 576, 35
N.E. 964 (1894); Demarest v. Grant, 128 N.Y. 205, 28 N.E. 645 (1891); Nicholson v. Franklin
Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St. 94, 91 N.E. 991 (1910); Cochran v. Shetler, 286 Pa. 226, 133 A. 232
(1926); see generally Latty, supra note 5, at 145-48.
10. Charles A. Beard made these findings regarding attempts by New Jersey to make its
corporations code more restrictive:
Under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson, after he was challenged by Theodore
Roosevelt to reform his own state, the legislature of New Jersey passed a series of laws
doing away with corporate abuses and applying high standards to corporations. What
was the result? The revenues of the state from taxes on corporations fell. Malefactors
moved over into other states. In time the New Jersey legislature repealed its strict and
prudent legislation, and went back, not quite, but almost to old ways ....
Hearings on S. 10 before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judicia, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 326
(1937).
Similar frustration is reflected in this portion of the report of the Corporation Law Revision
Commission of New Jersey:
It is clear that the major protections to investors, creditors, employees, customers, and
the general public have come, and must continue to come, from federal legislation and
not from state corporation acts . . . any attempt to provide such regulations in the
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restrictive; domestic corporations may then reincorporate out of the state
and new corporations will become incorporated in another state rather than
being formed in the state. States will thereby lose charter fees" and lose any
power to regulate the internal affairs of such corporations. Most states have
attempted to make their corporation laws approximately as enabling as the
least restrictive state law then extant; if one state has adopted a new type of
enabling provision or amended the corporation code in some way to make it
less restrictive, other states commonly follow suit.1 2 This trend during the
twentieth century toward decreasingly restrictive corporate law has been
termed the "Gresham's law" of corporate law.
13
California and New York have attempted to rectify the more extreme
abuses of state corporate law shopping (and stem the "Greshman's law" of
corporation codes) by enacting laws which purport to regulate the internal
affairs of technically foreign corporations whose "commercial domicile" or
"social seat" is located in California or New York, respectively.' 4 These stat-
utes address a significant problem in contemporary corporate choice of
law-the regulation of a corporation with minimal contacts with the state of
incorporation and a majority of its contacts with another state.
III. LAW GOVERNING CORPORATIONS WITH MULTI-STATE CONTACTS
A. General Choice of Law Rules
California and New York have adopted statutes which expressly require
the application of certain sections of the law of the forum to the activities of
foreign corporations which have a certain level of contacts with the state.' 5
Absent such a statute, courts generally apply the law of the state of incorpo-
ration to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, even if the corporation
had substantial contacts with the forum and minimal contacts with the state
public interest through state incorporation acts and similar legislation would only
drive corporations out of the state to more hospitable jurisdictions.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14a (West 1969) (Report of the Corporation Law Revision Commission, at
XI). See generally Schwartz, A Casefor Federal Charterng of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Schwartz]; Schwartz, supra note 7; Comment, Lawfor Sale: A Study of the
Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969).
11. The importance of charter fees to states such as Delaware is discussed in Oldham, supra
note 2, at 105 n.78.
12. See Oldham, Book Review, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 335, 338 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Oldham, Book Review].
13. Gresham's law has been generalized to stand for any situation where the cheap drives
out the valuable or the good. See Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND.
L. REV. 433, 437 (1968); see generally Oldham, supra note 2, at 104-110. Another term used to
describe this trend has been corporate "charter mongering." See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1977,
at 14, col. 6 (remarks by Professor Neil Jacoby).
For a general discussion of examples of Gresham's law of state corporations codes, see Cary,
supra note 5; Schwartz, supra note 10. Examples of the increasingly "enabling" and pro-man-
agement profile of state corporate law can be seen both in the chronology of the enactment of
state law provisions sanctioning broader indemnification rights of corporate insiders (see Old-
ham, supra note 2, at 108) and the enactment of state takeover laws. In both instances, a few
states adopted such laws and then a number of other states quickly adopted similar provisions.
14. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW §§ 1315-1320 (Mc-
Kinney 1968).
15. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §§ 1315-1320 (Mc-
Kinney 1968).
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of incorporation. 6 If, however, the law of the state of incorporation conflicts
with an important policy of the state,' 7 or if the foreign corporation con-
ducts all or almost all of its business in the forum, 8 a court might apply the
law of the forum.
The internal affairs doctrine is a legacy of the "vested rights" approach
to choice of law questions.' 9 This approach geographically conceptualizes
the rights of parties resulting from a transaction or occurrence with multi-
state contacts. The rights of parties are said to "vest" in the place where
they are "created"; the law of the vesting state must then be applied to gov-
ern those rights, regardless of where an action upon them is brought.
20
Under the vested rights approach, the general nature of the action is first
"characterized" (as a torts or contract action, for example). 2 1 A choice of
16. See generally Latty, supra note 2, at 145-48.
17. See, e.g., Paper Products Co. v. Doggrell, 195 Tenn. 581, 261 S.W.2d 127, 129 (1953).
Pursuant to the vested rights approach to the choice of law questions, a court might not apply
the law of the state of incorporation if that law is deemed to violate a "fundamental policy" of
the forum. See, e.g., Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1962). See generally Nussbaum,
Public Policy and Political Crtsis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027, 1031 (1940); Paulsen &
Sovern, "ublic Polig" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 981 (1956).
18. See, e.g., Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959)
(applied Louisiana law to determine the duty of insiders of a Delaware corporation where the
corporation transacted almost all of its business in Louisiana); Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139
(10th Cir. 1952) (applied Kansas law to determine the duty owed by an officer of an Illinois
corporation which did substantially all of its business in Kansas); International Ticket Scale
Corp. v. United States, 165 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1948) (applied the law of New York to the ques-
tion of legality of a dividend by a Delaware corporation); State v. Iowa S. Util. Co., 231 Iowa
784, 2 N.W.2d 372 (1942), affdsub nom. State v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298, 31 N.W.2d 853 (1948),
cert. denied sub nom. Bechtel v. Thatcher, 337 U.S. 918 (1949) (applied Iowa law to govern the
recapitalization of a Delaware corporation which did substantially all of its business in Iowa);
German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915) (applied New York
law to the legality of a dividend to be paid by a New Jersey corporation whose principal place
of business was New York); McQuade v. Stoneham, 230 App. Div. 57, 242 N.Y.S. 548 (1930),
rev'd on othergrounds, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934) (New York law was applied to a question
regarding the removal of an officer of a New Jersey corporation whose principal place of busi-
ness was New York).
These cases sometime refer to "equal treatment" legislation enacted by the various states as
an additional reason for the application of forum law. Such equal treatment statutes generally
provide that foreign and domestic corporations shall be treated equally and that foreign corpo-
rations shall bear the same burdens and responsibilities as domestic corporations. See, e.g., TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.02 (Vernon 1968). If taken literally, it could be argued that these
provisions require foreign corporations to be governed by local corporation law. See Latty,
Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 157 (1955). See generally Coleman, Corporate Dii-
dends and the Conflict ofLaws, 63 HARV. L. REV. 433, 444 (1950); Kaplan, supra note 13, at 470-
71. Such equal treatment statutes have rarely been construed by courts.
In some cases involving local creditors of foreign corporations, courts have held that certain
creditor protection provisions contained in the local corporations code (such as the liability of
shareholders for certain types of corporate debts) applied to all foreign corporations licensed to
do business in the state. See, e.g., Joncas v. Krueger, 61 Wis.2d 529, 213 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
19. See generaly Note, Forum Non Conveniens as a Substitute for the Internal Affais Rule, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 234 (1958); Note, The Development ofthe "Internal Affairs" Rule in the Federal Courts
and Its Future Under Erie v. Thompkins, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 413 (1946); Note, The "Internal
Affairs" Doctrine in State Courts, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 666 (1949).
20. See, e.g., Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527, 203
N.E.2d 210 (1964); H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 11, 14 (4th ed. 1964).
21. Characterization consists of classifying a matter within one of the established categories
of cases. See A. ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1940); Cook,
"Charactertzation"in the Conflict ofLaws, 51 YALE L.J. 191 (1941); Morse, Characterization: Shadow
or Substance, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1027 (1949).
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law rule (connecting factor) has evolved for each general type of action; all
choice of law questions of the same type are treated similarly. Once the
action is characterized, the application of the appropriate connecting factor
leads to the state where the rights of the parties vest, and the laws of that
state govern substantive questions presented by the action. For example, all
tort questions are said to be governed by the law of the state where the al-
leged wrong occurred. Similarly, questions concerning the internal affairs of
a corporation have traditionally been decided by reference to the corporate
code of the state of incorporation, since the rights and duties regarding such
affairs were said to vest there.
Because the law selected pursuant to the vested rights approach fre-
quently is that of a state with little or no interest in regulating the parties or
transaction involved, recent choice of law decisions in many subject areas
have exhibited a growing dissatisfaction with the vested rights approach; a
number of courts now consider the various state policies underlying the laws
of the states with contacts with the matter2 2 or the contacts between the
parties involved and the various states.23 These governmental interest anal-
yses and Second Restatement approaches have generally not been applied to
questions pertaining to the internal affairs of corporations, however. Courts
have generally continued to apply the internal affairs doctrine. 24 This is
because there is general agreement that a corporation must be certain what
corporate law governs its internal affairs.
The internal affairs doctrine provides this desired certainty. If the gov-
erning corporate law was determined on an ad hoc basis based upon which
state had the most significant contacts with the corporation or upon which
state's policy would be advanced by the application of its law in each situa-
tion, corporations would not be sure which law governed their behavior,
thereby severely burdening commerce. The question addressed by this arti-
cle is whether certainty in corporate choice of law could be maintained while
attempting to insure that the state with the most significant contacts with a
corporation could regulate it.
B. Statutory Choice of Law Rules
It was mentioned above that California and New York have adopted
certain choice of law rules regarding the application of local law to foreign
corporations with certain contacts with the state. California's law provides
that its law shall apply to such corporations "to the exclusion of the law of
the state of incorporation."' 25 In contrast, other states have statutorily en-
acted the internal affairs doctrine. For example, Delaware's corporations
22. This is referred to as governmental interest analysis. See, e.g., Mazza v. Mazza, 475
F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727 (1967); Horowitz, The
Law of Choice of Law in Californa-A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 719 (1974); Milhollin, The
Newr Choice of Laew in the District of Columbia, 24 CATH. L. REV. 448 (1975).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, at 10 (1971).
24. Some courts have expressly or impliedly not followed the internal affairs doctrine in
some situations. See cases cited at note 18 supra. For a discussion of these cases, see Oldham,
supra note 2, at 93-98.
25. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a) (West 1977).
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code provides that its law shall govern the internal affairs of all Delaware
corporations.
26
Such statutes normally must be adhered to by local courts, unless the
enforcement of such a statute would be unconstitutional. 27 Of course, such
choice of law statutes are not binding on foreign courts; they would apply
normal conflict of laws rules.
IV. FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW
Although Congress has enacted securities laws which regulate the issu-
ance and trading of securities and the dissemination of information by cor-
porations, the internal affairs of American corporations are generally
regulated by state corporate law.2 8 It has been suggested that, regarding
large, truly national corporations, it seems somewhat absurd from a policy
standpoint that such corporations would be governed by the corporate law
of the state where the charter documents are filed rather than a federal cor-
poration law.29 Such an argument is persuasive from a policy standpoint;
however, there are competing considerations.
State corporate law-has a rich body of precedent and most statutory
sections of the corporate law of commercial states (such as Delaware, New
York and California) have been construed in numerous court decisions; the
meaning of such statutes is now relatively clear. A new federal corporation
law would obviously be a composite of state corporate law. The statutory
sections probably would not be enacted by Congress in a form identical to a
state code section; it is likely that Congress would revise the section in some
manner or combine two or more sections. The result would be, at least in
the short run, that the meaning of such sections would be unclear. The obvi-
ous counter-argument is that in a short period of time (after such sections
had been construed by courts) they too would then be clear in their mean-
ing.
A more fundamental reason exists for not enacting a federal corporation
law. It is submitted that there is no necessity for federal pre-emption of cor-
porate law applicable to national corporations. Concern relating to state
corporate law abuse generally focuses upon relatively few statutory sec-
tions.30 Such concerns could be addressed in a federal act which would ad-
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 121(b) (1975).
27. See generally Halloran & Hammer, Section 2115 ofthe New California General Corporation
Law--The Application of California Corporation Law to Foreign Corporations, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1282, 1289, n.18 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Halloran & Hammer]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971).
28. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Certain stock exchanges also
regulate certain internal affairs matters of companies with shares listed on the exchange.
29. See generally R. NADER, supra note 7; Henning, Federal Corporate Charters for Big Busiess:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 915 (1972); Schwartz, supra note 7;
Schwartz, supra note 10; Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations. A Proposal, 61 GEO. L. J. 89
(1972).
30. See generally Cary, supra note 5. For example, reform proposals generally propose that
corporate management (i) should be required to satisfy a higher standard of care and (ii) should
not be indemnified by the corporation or company insurance in a larger number of instances.
Other reforms proposed pertain to requiring more disclosure by large corporations and permit-
ting a "public" representative to sit on the board of directors of large corporations. Ways to
19801
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dress only these primary concerns. State corporate law not in conflict with
these sections could continue to apply to such national corporations. 3' Na-
tional corporations could continue to avail themselves of the relative cer-
tainty now existing in state corporate law, and federal policy could be
furthered by the enactment of any statutes deemed to reflect an important
federal policy.
32
Another practical concern militates against any proposal for a federal
corporation law. As the drafters of California's new general corporation law
recently discovered, drafting a corporate code is a terrifically difficult and
complex task. Rather than require congressmen and their staffs to become
mired in the technicalities of corporate law drafting, it would seem prefera-
ble to focus their attention and energy upon the relatively small number of
issues which are cause for public concern.
Although for a short period of time it appeared that the adoption of
some sort of a federal corporation law was a political possibility,33 it now
appears that there are few members of Congress who actively support such a
proposal. For this reason, even a proposed federal minimum standards act is
probably not a realistic proposal at the present time. Because of this, and
because the Supreme Court has recently narrowly construed the federal se-
curities law, 34 it appears clear that in the near future corporate internal af-
fairs matters will be governed by state corporation law.
increase the independence of the company's auditors and board of directors from company
management have also been suggested. Means of facilitating public disclosure of questionable
corporate behavior have also been advanced, such as attempting to protect employees that
"blow the whistle" regarding a problem of the corporation and creating an office of corporate
ombudsman. See generally Oldham, Book Review, supra note 12.
It has also been suggested, however, that state court judges tend to be more pro-manage-
ment than federal court judges. Gary, supra note 5. Creating a federal corporation law would
result in disputes being adjudicated in federal court rather than state court.
31. Proponents of federal chartering criticize such a plan, since they believe state legislators
would attempt to undermine the federal law. See, e.g., Henning, Federalism and Corporate Law:
The Chaos Inherent in the Cary Proposal, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 362 (1976).
32. See Cary, supra note 5; Folk, State Statutes: Their Role in Prescribing Norms of Responsible
Management Conduct, 31 Bus. LAW. 1031, 1080 (1976); Hurst, Remarks, 31 Bus. LAW. 1185, 1191
(1976); Loss, Wrap Up, 31 Bus. LAW. 1193, 1199 (1976); Henning, supra note 31: Schwartz, supra
note 10. But see Aranson, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Idea Well Worth Forgetting, Bus. &
Soc'Y REV./INNOVATION 59 (Winter 1973-74); Arsht, Reply to Professor Cagr, 31 Bus. LAW. 1131
(1976); Drexler, Federalism and Corporate Law: A Misguided Missile, 3 SEc. REG. L.J. 374 (1976).
See generally Oldham, Book Review, supra note 12.
33. For example, the 1972 Democratic Party platform proposed the establishment of a
commission to study federal chartering of large corporations. See 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
1728 (1972). Although federal chartering has been proposed sporadically during this century
(see, e.g., Brabner-Smith, Federal Incorporation of Business, 24 VA. L. REV. 159 (1937); Snapp,
National Incorporation, 5 ILL. L. REV. 414 (1911)), the idea received a great deal of attention in
the early 1970's. See generally R. Nader, supra note 7; Henning, supra note 5; Jennings, supra note
7; Note, Federal Chartering ofCorporations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89 (1972).
34. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (a plaintiff in an
action pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 must have "purchased"
or "sold" a security); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (an action for damages
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act must establish "scienter"-and intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud-on the part of the defendant); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (4 breach of fiduciary duty, absent any deception, misrepresentation
or nondisclosure, does not establish a cause of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act).
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The "Gresham's law" effect which the internal affairs doctrine has had
upon state corporation law has been outlined above. This pro-management
drift in state corporate law has resulted because the law of the state of incor-
poration has generally been applied to a corporation's internal affairs, re-
gardless of the contacts the corporation has with the various interested states.
States have perceived that their corporate law should not be made too re-
strictive or the corporation would reincorporate elsewhere.
This "Gresham's law" effect could be reduced if states would adopt
pseudo-foreign corporation statutes, which provide that important sections
of the state corporate law would govern corporations whose commercial
domicile was clearly in the state even though the charter documents were
filed elsewhere. This would give states additional power to regulate corpora-
tions commercially domiciled there, thereby diminishing the need for a fed-
eral corporation law.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS: STATE REGULATION OF CORPORATIONS
WITH MULTI-STATE CONTACTS
No one contends that the corporate law of a state other than the state of
incorporation should apply to a corporation whose principal contacts are
with the state of incorporation (such a corporation will be referred to herein
as a "domestic" corporation). The matter is less clear regarding corporations
with less substantial contacts with the state of incorporation. For example,
commentators frequently advocate that the law of the state of incorporation
should not apply to a corporation which has approximately eighty percent
or more of its contacts with a foreign state (such a corporation will be re-
ferred to herein as a "technically foreign" corporation).3 5 A number of com-
mentators also advocate the application of foreign corporate law to a
corporation with fifty to eighty percent of their contacts with a state other
than the state of its incorporation (such a corporation will be referred to
herein as an "arguably foreign" corporation). 36 Corporations which do not
have fifty percent of their contacts with any one state will be referred to
herein as "national" corporations.
The application of the law other than the state of incorporation to tech-
nically foreign and arguably foreign corporations raises certain constitu-
tional questions. One could argue that this would violate the due process
clause or the full faith and credit clause, or that, because a corporation will
not be certain what law governs its internal affairs, an impermissible burden
35. See Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27, at 1329; Horowitz, supra note 22, at 819-20;
Leflar, Constiutional Ltmils on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 706, 715 n.45
(1963). The Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws expresses no opinion regarding the
law applicable to foreign corporations with substantially all of their contacts with another state.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302, Comment g (1971).
Former Chief Justice Roger Traynor has stated that "courts have a creative job to do when
they find that a rule has lost its touch with reality and should be abandoned or reformulated to
meet conditions and new moral values." Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Socity,
1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230, 232. It is submitted that applying the internal affairs doctrine to techni-
cally foreign corporations in some situations is a rule which has "lost its touch with reality."
36. See generally Baraf, supra note 8.
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on interstate commerce would result. These constitutional questions will be
addressed below.
A. Due Process Clause
Early Supreme Court cases, discussing the limitations imposed by the
Constitution upon choice of law decisions, suggested that the due process
clause 3 7 required the application of the vested rights choice of law ap-
proach. 38 Later cases made it clear that it is constitutionally permissible
under the due process clause for a state to apply the law of any state that has
a reasonable connection with the matters in controversy. 39 Recent Supreme
Court cases hold that the due process clause only proscribes a state from
applying its law to a matter in which it has no signficant contacts.
40
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... "
38. See, e.g., Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143
(1934); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
39. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Watson v. Employers Liab.
Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943);
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
40. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S.
397 (1930); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Reese & Kaufman, supra note 8,
at 1129.
In Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962) the Supreme Court stated that:
Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in
question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by the States involved,
could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one or another state
having such an interest in the multi-state activity.
Similarly, Clay sanctioned the application of forum law, emphasizing that the forum had "am-
ple contacts with the present transaction." 377 U.S. at 183.
In some instances the application of forum law has been deemed a violation of due process
even though the state had a significant contact with the parties or the transaction involved. See
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924). In these cases, the contacts between the
state and the transaction occurred late in the chronology of the transaction, and it has been
considered unfair to the party resisting the application of the forum law to apply the forum law.
One commentator noted that these cases stand for the rule that, if the contact between the state
and the transaction was "so late in the history of the transaction in dispute that to apply its law
would result in a serious disregard of the justifiable expectations of one of the parties," due
process forbids the application of forum law. See Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
Lbmiations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IOWA L. REV. 449, 457 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Weintraub]. Similarly, Professor Kirgis contends that these cases stand for the rule that forum
law may not be applied if it would be "manifestly unfair to the party resisting it." See Kirgis,
The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94, 103
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Kirgis]. This due process limit upon state choice of law would not
affect the regulation of corporations with multi-state contacts.
Professor Weintraub has suggested that these cases stand for the rule that:
it is a violation of due process for a forum having no substantial connection with the
parties or the facts to affect the result . . . through the device of 'procedural' charac-
terization if application of the forum rule will serve no significant local policy and if
application of the foreign rule will not involve scrutiny of the intricacies of foreign
procedure.
44 IOWA L. REV. at 490. This aspect of the due process limit upon state choice of law could
affect multi-state regulation of corporations. Some courts attempt to circumvent the internal
affairs doctrine by deeming an issue a matter of "procedure" or for some other reason not one
pertaining to the internal affairs of a corporation. See Oldham, supra note 2, at 93-98. Often,
the matter could not seriously be characterized as procedural and its characterization as such is
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The Court's more flexible approach to choice of law decisions is re-
flected in Watson o. Employers Liabith Assurance Corp. 4' The plaintiff, a resi-
dent of the forum, brought an action against the insurer of the manufacturer
of a product which had injured her. A clause in the insurance policy barred
a direct action by the injured party against the insurance company. This
clause was valid under Massachusetts law, the state where the insurance con-
tract was executed, and the law of Illinois, the principal place of business of
the manufacturer, but invalid under the law of the forum. The forum ap-
plied its law and held the clause to be invalid. The insurer argued that this
violated due process. The Supreme Court deemed this choice of law deter-
mination constitutional since "more states than one may seize hold of local
activities which are part of multi-state transactions and may regulate to pro-
tect interests of its own people."'42 The Court noted that the forum had an
interest in protecting its injured residents.
Clay v. Sun Insurance Oftce, Lid 43 evidences a similar approach. In Clay,
a forum resident brought suit against a foreign insurance company under a
policy which the plaintiff had purchased when he resided in another state. A
provision in the policy limited the period (after an insured loss) during
which actions under the policy could be brought. This limitation was valid
in the state where the contract was executed but invalid under the law of the
forum. The forum applied its law. The Supreme Court held that this was
constitutional, since the forum had "ample contacts with the transaction.
4 4
The discussion above shows that the application of the corporate law of
the state of commercial domicile45 would not violate the due process clause,
since the state of commercial domicile would have significant contacts with
the corporation.
It is unclear what actually constitutes sufficient contacts to justify the
application of the forum's law under the due process clause. 46 Arguably for-
generally a fairly obvious means of circumventing normal choice of law results. Such matters,
however, frequently involve situations in which the forum has a substantial connection with the
parties or the transaction or a local interest will be served by applying forum law. These cases,
therefore, probably do not violate due process, at least according to the Weintraub formulation
of its requirements.
41. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
42. d at 72.
43. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
44. Id. at 183.
45. The term "commercial domicile" will be used herein as a shorthand reference to the
state with which a corporation has a majority of its contacts. It is not suggested that the concept
of "domicile" is otherwise useful in discussing corporate choice of law. See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11, Comment 1 (197 1).
46. It apparently does not constitute a sufficient contact if one of the parties to an action is
a nonresident domiciliary of the forum. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
One thing which confuses due process analysis is the cavalier way in which courts inter-
changeably employ the terms "contact" and "state interest." These obviously are two different
concepts-a contact refers to a connection with the transaction, while an interest refers to the
fact that a state policy will be advanced by the application of its law to the transaction. Certain
due process cases repeatedly refer to the fact that due process requires a state to have an interest
in the application of its law. See, e.g., Aldens Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976). Most cases and commentators agree, however, that the appropriate
test for due process should be phrased in terms of "contacts" rather than an interest. See gener-
ally Weintraub, supra note 40, at 490.
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eign and technically foreign corporations frequently have minimal contacts
with the state of incorporation. The most significant contact may be an
agent for service of process and a post office box. Such corporations may
have no employees, do no business, and have no stockholders which reside in
the state of incorporation; if so, it may be a violation of the due process
clause to apply the law of the state of incorporation to such corporations.
47
It has been suggested that the state tender offer laws may, to the extent
that they purport to govern offers made by an out-of-state offeror to share-
holders residing outside the state, violate due process. 48 The regulating state
obviously has no contact between the out-of-state offer made to the non-
resident shareholder. As a result of the contacts between the corporation
and the state, however, the state might have sufficient contacts with the cor-
poration to render constitutional its regulation of activities affecting the cor-
poration which occur outside the state. Such a determination would be best
made under the full faith and credit standard set forth below. 49 It would
appear that, unless the extraterritorial application of state tender offer laws
would be required by the full faith and credit standard, an attempt by a
state to regulate tender offers made outside the state to non-resident share-
holders of foreign corporations should be deemed to violate due process.
B. Full Faith and Credit Clause
The full faith and credit clause provides that a state must give full faith
and credit to the "public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every
other State."'5  Although the phrase "public Acts, Records and judicial Pro-
ceedings" has been construed to include statutes5 as well as judicial deci-
sions, 52 the Supreme Court has rarely held that full faith and credit requires
the application of the law of one state in the courts of another, and the Court
has become increasingly reluctant to so hold. Supreme Court cases have
held choice of law determinations violative of full faith and credit in three
subject areas: workmen's compensation laws, shareholder assessments, and
fraternal benefit insurance associations.
53
47. One reason for the requirement that a state have some contact with the matter in
dispute is so that the parties are not unfairly surprised by the application of the law of a state
with no connection with the traisaction. Since it could hardly be said that the application of
the law of the state of incorporation would result in unfair surprise, this suggests that a court
would not deem this a violation of due process.
48. Set Note, Securities Law and the Constitution.- State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88
YALE L.J. 510, 528 (1979).
49. See notes 101-19 and accompanying text infra.
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof."
51. See, e.g., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
52. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
53. In addition to these three subject areas, the Supreme Court has sometimes held that it
is a violation of the full faith and credit clause for a state to refuse to provide a forum for a suit
based upon a foreign wrongful death statute. See First Nat'l Bank v.. United Airlines, Inc., 342
U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
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1. Workmen's Compensation
The Supreme Court held that full faith and credit required the applica-
tion of the workmen's compensation act of the state where the employment
contract was entered into if the law of that state attempted to provide an
exclusive remedy.54 The Court has since retreated from this approach and
has more recently ruled, in a number of cases, that even if the employment
contract was executed outside the forum, it is constitutionally permissible for
the forum to apply its law if the forum had a substantial interest in the
transaction.
55
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 56 Pacf Employers Insurance Co. v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm'n, 57 and Carroll v. Lanza58 considered full faith and
credit limitations upon choice of law in workmen's compensation cases. In
Clapper, the employee normally worked and resided in Vermont. He was
sent on a short assignment to New Hampshire where he was killed in an
accident; the employee had no contacts with New Hampshire, other than his
brief work assignment. 59 Suit was brought in New Hampshire, and New
Hampshire applied its law. The Supreme Court decided that this was a
denial of full faith and credit to the law of Vermont.
In Pacific Employers, a resident of Massachusetts, who customarily
worked in Massachusetts, was temporarily transferred to California. After
being in California for a short time, the employee was injured. The em-
ployee was treated in California and incurred medical bills from California
doctors. Suit was later brought in California regarding the injury and the
California court applied California's workmen's compensation law and not
the law of Massachusetts. The Supreme Court held that this application of
California law did not violate the full faith and credit clause. Since the em-
ployee had been working in California a significant period of time, and since
there were California creditors of the employee, California had a significant
interest in applying its law.
60
Carroll involved an injury to an employee who normally resided and
worked in Missouri. The employee was sent to Arkansas to do some work
and was injured during the course of that work. Mr. Carroll was taken to a
hospital in Missouri; presumably there were no medical creditors in Arkan-
sas (other than possibly for ambulance service). Mr. Carroll had been ac-
tively involved in the Arkansas project for at least two months prior to the
date of injury.6 1 Carroll later filed suit in Arkansas court regarding his in-
jury and the court applied Arkansas law and not the workmen's compensa-
54. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
55. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
294 U.S. 532 (1935). See generally Kirgis, supra note 40, at 95-110.
56. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
57. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
58. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
59. The facts of this case are more fully set forth in Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 51
F.2d 992 (1st Cir. 1931).
60. See generaly Kirgis, supra note 40, at 113.
61. 116 F. Supp. 491, 494-99 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
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tion law of Missouri. The Supreme Court determined that the application
of Arkansas law did not violate the full faith and credit clause, since Arkan-
sas had "a legitimate interest" in regulating the matter.6 2 The Court stated
that "[t]he State where the tort occurs certainly has a concern in the
problems following in the wake of the injury. The problems of medical care
and of possible dependants are among these, as . . .[Paciftc Employers] em-
phasizes."
'63
Two commentators have made two different attempts to reconcile Clap-
per, Pacift Employers and Carroll. Professor Weintraub suggests that Carroll
and Pacific Employers substantially limited Clapper and possibly overruled it
sub silentio. 64 Professor Kirgis argues that the cases are reconcilable. He
contends that in Clapper the state of injury had minimal interest in applying
its law to compensate wrongful death victims, since the injured employee left
no dependants and did not reside in the state.65 Kirgis claims that in Pacqic
Employers and Carroll the state of injury had a greater interest in the applica-
tion of its law. In Pactfc Employers, the injured employee incurred medical
bills and apparently resided in California, while Mr. Clapper did not reside
in New Hampshire and apparently did not receive any medical care there.
66
Similarly, Kirgis argues that in Carroll the injured employee had resided in
Arkansas and generally had more substantial contacts there than Mr. Clap-
per had with New Hampshire.
67
Regardless of whether Clapper is viewed as being essentially overruled
by Carroll and Pacir Employers or whether Clapper is still considered to re-
quire that a forum must have some interest in regulating a transaction
before it may apply its law to the transaction, no full faith and credit prob-
lem would result from the application of the law of the commercial domicile
of a technically foreign or arguably foreign corporation to its internal affairs,
since that state would clearly have such an interest.
2. Shareholder Assessments
Three Supreme Court cases involving shareholder assessments are more
difficult to reconcile. Broderick v. Rosner68 involved a bank which was incor-
porated in New York, and which had all of its business offices located in New
York. A majority of its depositors, creditors, and stockholders probably were
residents of New York; only 557 of the over 20,000 bank shareholders lived in
New Jersey.69 New York law at that time permitted a corporation's share-
holders to be subject to assessment. An administrative determination was
62. See 349 U.S. at 413.
63. Id.
64. See Weintraub, supra note 40, at 471-73. The Court in Carroll stated that Pacfic Employ-
ers "departed from" (meaning that it severely limited) Clapper.
65. See Kirgis, supra note 40, at 213. Professor Kirgis does not discuss the fact that Mr.
Clapper was killed in New Hampshire and that certain expenses could have resulted therefrom,
such as ambulance or mortician fees. See generally Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Covernmental Interests and heJudicial Functions, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 26-27 (1958).
66. See Kirgis, supra note 40, at 123.
67. Id. at 124.
68. 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
69. Id. at 638, 640.
[Vol. 57:3
REGULA TING THE REGULA TORS
made in New York that the corporation's shareholders were subject to assess-
ment. New Jersey had enacted a law which barred suits based on foreign
assessment statutes, and pursuant to that law, a New Jersey court refused to
hear a suit based on the New York assessment determination. The Supreme
Court held that full faith and credit required the New Jersey court to allow
the suit.
70
Broderzck could be explained on the basis that in personam jurisdiction
existed over the New Jersey resident in the New York proceeding due to the
shareholder's relationship to the corporation (an implied consent notion),
and that full faith and credit should be given to the New York administra-
tive determination. It also could be argued that the case stands for the
broad rule that full faith and credit requires the application of the law of the
state of incorporation to questions pertaining to the internal affairs of a cor-
poration (or at least shareholder assessments). A third interpretation is that
this represents a situation in which New Jersey had a minimal interest in the
application of its law and New York had an overwhelming interest in the
application of its law. The language of the Broderick decision is unclear
which is the correct interpretation. The Court ruled that the matter was so
"peculiarly within the regulatory power of . . . the State of incorporation
• . . that no other State properly can be said to have any public policy
thereon."
71
The full faith and credit clause might require, as some suggest, 72 the
application of the law of one state where it is clear that uniform national
regulation of an issue is required. Accordingly, Broderick could stand for the
proposition that questions pertaining to shareholder assessments require uni-
form national regulation and, therefore, the application of the law of the
state of incorporation.
The Supreme Court decided in Pinney v. Nelson 73 and Thomas v. Malthtes-
sen 74 that a court may apply local law which sanctions assessment of share-
holders of foreign corporations, although the law of the state of
incorporation proscribes such an assessment. These cases both involved suits
in California by California creditors against shareholders of foreign corpora-
tions, both of whose charters expressly authorized the corporation to do busi-
ness in California. The Court reasoned that since the charters of both
corporations expressly referred to the corporation doing business in Califor-
nia, the shareholders had somehow contracted to follow California corporate
law. 75 Although the corporations were incorporated elsewhere and con-
ducted a significant amount of business outside of California, this was not
mentioned by the Court. It is unclear whether Pinney and Thomas are lim-
ited to situations in which a corporation expressly refers in its charter to
doing business in states other than the state of incorporation.
It is difficult to reconcile Broderik with Thomas and Pznney. Unless Brod-
70. Accord, Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912).
71. 294 U.S. at 643 (quoting Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 260 (1912)).
72. See generaly Kirgis, supra note 40, at 120; Weintraub, supra note 40, at 455.
73. 183 U.S. 144 (1901).
74. 232 U.S. 221 (1914).
75. 183 U.S. at 151; 232 U.S. at 234-35.
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erick inferentially overruled Thomas and Pinney, or unless Pney and Thomas
are limited to situations where the charter expressly authorizes corporate
business outside the state of incorporation, it appears that Broderick must be
limited to its facts. Professor Currie has suggested that Broderick resulted
from New York's clear interest in the application of its law to protect credi-
tors of New York banks, while New Jersey had no legitimate interest in the
application of its law. 7 6 Another commentator has argued that BroderIck
holds "that a state may not deny recovery on foreign facts when its own
domestic law would award recovery on parallel facts occurring within its
own borders." 77 Professor Currie has asserted that Broderick's teaching is
that if one state has a substantial interest in the application of its law and the
forum has no legitimate interest in the application of its law, the full faith
and credit clause requires the application of the former state's law. 78 Profes-
sor Baraf, however, has maintained that the implication of Broderzck, Thomas,
and Pnney is that a state can regulate-consistently with full faith and
credit-the internal affairs of a foreign corporation with which the state has
a substantial connection.
79
The application of the law of a state other than the state of incorpora-
tion to a question pertaining to the internal affairs of an arguably foreign or
technically foreign corporation would not violate the rule of Broderck,
Thomas, and Pinney as set forth in the preceding paragraph. The law of that
state could be applied to a foreign corporation with substantial contacts with
the forum, since the forum would have a legitimate interest in the applica-
tion of its law.
3. Fraternal Benefit Insurance Associations
Certain cases involving fraternal benefit insurance associations have
held that the law of the state where an organization was formed must be
applied to questions regarding the organization.8 ° One commentator has
argued that these cases stand for the proposition that where uniform na-
tional regulation is needed, full faith and credit requires the application of
the law of a certain state.8 ' The question which obviously arises is whether
the rationale of these cases would extend to the internal affairs doctrine.
While not clear, it is generally thought that the reasoning of these cases
would not extend to the internal affairs doctrine.82 In any event, these cases
76. See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 347 (1963).
77. Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal System, 20 MINN. L. REV. 140, 178 (1936). See
generaly Hilpert & Cooley, The Federal Constitution and he Choice of Law, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 27, 35-
36 (1939); Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Pub/ic Poicy, 19 U. CHI. L. REV.
339, 342-43 (1952).
78. See Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause ofActon, 73 HARV. L. REV. 268,
290 (1959).
79. See Baraf, supra note 8, at 245-47.
80. See Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947);
Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); Supreme Council of the Royal
Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
81. See Weintraub, supra note 40, at 478-79.
82. Some commentators have attempted to distinguish full faith and credit requirements
applicable to fraternal benefit societies from those applicable to corporations. Fraternal benefit
society cases could have resulted from attempts by the Supreme Court to protect the solvency of
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have been severely limited, if not overruled sub silentio, by subsequent deci-
sions.
8 3
Professor Kirgis has proposed the following formulation of the full faith
and credit limitation upon choice of law by a forum: A forum shall be able
to apply its law to a transaction or occurrence unless (a) another state has an
interest in applying its law that is overwhelming in comparison with the
interest of the forum, or (b) there is an overwhelming reason to decide all
similar cases according to one legal system, and a state other than the forum
clearly should be the "bellwether."8a 4 This standard seems both workable
and consistent with precedent. According to the first standard, a forum
could apply its law to arguably foreign or technically foreign corporations,
since another state would not have a greater interest in applying its law than
the forum. The second standard proposed by Kirgis may apply to the regu-
lation of corporations with multi-state contacts. A number of questions per-
taining to corporate internal affairs probably require uniformity of
regulation.8 5 Most commentators who adhere to this view assume that the
law governing such questions should always be the law of the state of incor-
poration .86
Certain internal matters, however, do not seem to require uniform na-
tional regulation. States frequently regulate matters such as the ability of
forum shareholders to review the shareholder list pertaining to foreign corpo-
rations or the type of reports and other information which must be given by
a foreign corporation to shareholders residing in the state. In addition, New
York enacted a statutory scheme in the early 1960s which provided that cer-
tain sections of the New York law would govern pseudo-foreign corpora-
the financially unstable fraternal benefit organizations. See Note, Full Faith and Credit. Preferen-
tial Treatment of Fraternal Insurers, 57 YALE L.J. 139, 141 (1947). Professor Baraf contends that
these organizations are distinguishable from regular corporations due (a) to their "prerequisites
for entry into membership (b) the multifarious purposes for which organized (c) the pecuniary
policies it must pursue and (d) the 'non-fraternal' procedures of'corporate democracy.' " Baraf,
supra note 8, at 244.
83. See Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Duncan, 221 F.2d 703 (6th
Cir. 1955). See generally Baraf, supra note 8, at 244; Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6
VAND. L. REV. 581, 596 (1953); Harper, The Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 883, 895-97 (1947); Kaplan, supra note 13, at 446; Reese & Kaufman, supra note 8, at 1131
n.5 3 .
The Court in Clay referred to W1l4"e, the most recent fraternal benefit society case, as a
"highly specialized decision dealing with unique facts." Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S.
179, 183 (1964).
84. Kirgis, supra note 40, at 120.
85. See Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws, 63 HARV. L. REV. 433, 466
(1950); Cowett, Reorgamzations, Consolidations, Mergers and Related Corporate Events under the Blue Sky
Laws, 13 Bus. LAw. 760 (1958); Gibson & Freeman, A Decade of the Model Business Corporation Act
in iiginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 1396 (1967); Horowitz, The Commerce Clause As a Limitation on State
Choice of Law Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REV. 806, 817-18 (1971); Kirgis, supra note 40, at 120; Reese
& Kaufman, supra note 8.
86. See, e.g., Cary, Federahm and Corporate Law. Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
669 (1974). Other commentators, however, suggest that it might be possible to apply the law of
the commercial domicile of a foreign corporation if it has few contacts with its state of incorpo-
ration and substantial contacts with one state. See Coleman, supra note 85, at 466; Horowitz,




tions. 87 Among the areas regulated are the liability of directors, the
enforcement of dissenters' rights, the indemnification of directors, and the
merger of domestic and foreign corporations. a8 This scheme does not seem
to have generated any significant problems; no cases have been brought
under the statute.
A number of commentators have argued that chaos would result if cer-
tain other internal affairs of corporations with multi-state contacts were gov-
erned by the laws of more than one state.89 Particularly troublesome are
distributions to shareholders, the issuance of shares, the stockholders' voting
rights, the minimum percentage of votes required to approve a reorganiza-
tion, and the transactions in which dissenters' rights arise; a significant bur-
den would be placed upon corporate activity if the standards for such
actions were unclear. The states' corporate laws provide different standards
for the same corporate acts.
For example, many state statutes provide that "distributions" (includ-
ing dividends and share repurchases) may be paid out of "capital surplus"; 90
other states provide that even if a company does not have capital surplus, it
may make distributions out of the prior year's earnings. 9 ' California has
adopted an entirely different approach: a corporation is permitted to make
distributions out of its retained earnings. In addition, distributions are al-
lowed if minimum levels of assets-to-liabilities ratios (post-distribution) are
met.92 It is entirely possible that a corporation could satisfy the Delaware-
type standard and not satisfy the California standard.
93
Other more significant conflicts between state corporate laws could re-
sult. For example, the laws of many states, including Delaware, make cumu-
lative voting for directors optional; 94 it is only permitted if such a provision
is included in the corporation's articles or bylaws. Contrastingly, under Cal-
ifornia and Illinois law cumulative voting is mandatory. 95 (This require-
ment is one of those applicable to California pseudo-foreign corporations
87. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1315-1320 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80). New York
pseudo-foreign corporations are subject to the following provisions of the New York corpora-
tions code: section 1315 (the release of a list of shareholders to a shareholder upon demand);
section 1316 (voting trust records); section 719, except subsection (a)(3) thereof (liability of di-
rectors); section 720 (actions against a director or officer); section 1318 (information to share-
holders); section 623 (dissenters' rights); section 626 (shareholder derivative actions); section 627
(security for expenses in a derivative action); sections 721-727 (indemnification of directors and
officers); and section 907 (merger of domestic and foreign corporations).
88. See generally Baraf, supra note 8, at 229-32; Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27, at 1324-
27.
89. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 241 (1968); Coleman, supra note 85,
at 466; Reese & Kaufman, supra note 8.
90. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 154, 160 (1974 & Supp. 1978).
91. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1974).
92. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 500-505 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978).
93. A corporation obviously could have earnings in a year and satisfy the Delaware stan-
dard for a nimble dividend and not have retained earnings or an adequate assets-to-liabilities
ratio. Of course, the opposite could also occur. See Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27, at 1308.
94. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 618 (McKinney
1963).
95. CAL. CORP. CODE § 708 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.28
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
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pursuant to section 2115.) Massachusetts proscribes cumulative voting.
96
Consequently, it would be possible to have a Massachusetts corporation gov-
erned by section 2115 of the California Corporations Code and thereby have
the California Code make a provision mandatory that is prohibited by the
law of the state of incorporation. The more common situation will be that a
Delaware or Nevada corporation will be governed by section 2115, and such
corporations rarely provide for cumulative voting in the articles or bylaws.
A corporation confronted with this conflict in governing law would probably
seek a declaratory judgment prior to the shareholders' meeting, regarding
the procedure for counting votes for directors.9 7
Another important difference among state corporate codes is the stan-
dard set forth for the approval of mergers and other reorganizations. Cer-
tain state laws require the approval of two-thirds of the shareholders to any
such corporate reorganization; 98 other states merely require majority ap-
proval.99 In a reorganization, if it were unclear whether the corporation was
governed by two-thirds or by majority approval, once again a declaratory
judgment would probably be required to determine whether the reorganiza-
tion had been appropriately ratified by the shareholders.
This discussion indicates that significant problems would arise if the
ability of a corporation to make distributions to shareholders, to participate
in reorganizations, and to vote cumulatively for directors were governed by
the law of more than one state.' °° The corporation might be required to
satisfy the most restrictive statute. This can be done in certain instances.
The problems, however, cannot be so glibly dismissed. If the law of one
regulating state provides for straight voting for directors and the other regu-
lating state requires cumulative voting, there is no "most restrictive statute."
Similarly, it would be unclear whether a reorganization, which received an
affirmative vote of fifty-five percent of the shareholders, would be approved
if the law of one regulating state required a majority approval of sharehold-
ers and the law of another state required two-thirds approval. Perhaps the
requirement of two-thirds approval could be considered the most restrictive
96. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156, § 32 (West 1970).
97. For example, Arden-Mayfair, Inc. was a Delaware corporation which satisfied the stan-
dard set forth in section 2115 of the California Corporations Code for California pseudo-foreign
corporations. At that time, the board of Arden-Mayfair served staggered terms and directors
were elected non-cumulatively. Louart Corporation, a major shareholder in Arden-Mayfair,
sought to have all directors elected cumulatively at the annual shareholders meeting pursuant
to section 2115. See generall Louart Corp. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., No. C 192091, minute order
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct., June 30, 1977). In this action, the California court held section
2115, insofar as it requires cumulative voting and the annual election of directors, unconstitu-
tional as applied to Arden-Mayfair. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 22-23 (on file
with author) (filed with the court April 27, 1978). An action for declaratory judgment was filed
in Delaware by Arden-Mayfair while the California action was progressing. See Palmer v. Ar-
den-Mayfair, Inc. No. 5549, (Del. Ch. Newcastle County July 6 (1978), mem. opinion (on file with
the author). In that case the Delaware court noted the California decision summarized above
and ordered the annual meeting of Arden-Mayfair to be held under Delaware law.
98. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 902, 903, 909 (McKinney Supp. 1979); VA. CODE
13.1-70, 13.1-77 (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.64, 157.72 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
99. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1200, 1201 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 251, 271 (19 7 4 & Supp. 1978).
100. See generally Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27.
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statute, but it appears that as a practical matter there would be a considera-
ble amount of time spent determining which statute would govern and
whether the reorganization could go forward. The potential for substantial
stock price fluctuations and the inevitable securities act lawsuits which
would ensue from such fluctuations would make a securities lawyer cringe at
such uncertainty.
It was argued above that certain questions pertaining to the internal
affairs of a corporation require uniform national regulation. If this is true,
the next question which must be addressed is what the nature of this law
should be. Perhaps the most logical result would be the adoption of a fed-
eral corporation law for truly national corporations.10 ' For a number of
reasons, the enactment of a federal corporation law appears both unlikely
and unwise. For national and domestic corporations, the law of the state of
incorporation therefore should be applied to questions pertaining to the in-
ternal affairs. This should be required by full faith and credit. Certainty in
choice of law would result from such a policy, and there would be no other
state with an overwhelming interest in regulating such corporations.
In contrast, there is apparently no persuasive rationale for applying the
law of the state of incorporation to technically foreign corporations or argua-
bly foreign corporations.' 0 2 The state of commercial domicile has a more
significant relationship and greater interest in regulating such corporations
than the state of incorporation. The mention of such an idea always causes
corporate lawyers to shriek in unison "but what about certainty in corporate
choice of law?" There are a number of persuasive responses. It seems a bit
absurd to sacrifice all policy concerns in the area of corporate choice of law
on the alter of certainty. 0 3 Moreover, in a number of cases such uncertainty
could be rectified by reincorporating in the state of commercial domicile.'
0 4
As a practical matter, certainty does not currently exist regarding questions
pertaining to the internal affairs of technically foreign corporations; some
courts apply local law to such corporations.' 0 5 A statutory scheme which
would clearly define the scope and timing procedures for the application of
the law of the commercial domicile to the internal affairs of pseudo-foreign
101. A number of commentators have suggested such a statute. Although certain commen-
tators have suggested such a statute throughout the twentieth century, see Brabner-Smith, Fed-
eral Incorporation of Business, 24 VA. L. REV. 159 (1937); Grosscup, The Federal Corporation Problem
and the Lawyer's Part in its Solution, 39 AM. L. REV. 835, 849-51 (1905); Reuschlein, Federaliza-
tion-Desgnfor Corporate Reform in a National Economy, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (1942); Snapp, Na-
tional Incorporation, 5 ILL. L. REV. 414 (1911), the idea seemed to be advanced by many
individuals in the early 1970's. See generally Henning, Federal Corporate Chartering for Big Business:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 915 (1972); Jennings, supra note 7;
Schwartz, supra note 7; Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89 (1972).
See generally Oldham, Book Review, supra note 12. It was discussed above that such a federal
corporation law would be unwise. See notes 28-34 and accompanying text, supra.
102. See, e.g., Kirgis, supra note 40, at 140-42; Oldham, supra note 2.
103. Brainerd Currie has noted that if certainty of result were the only concern relevant to
choice of law, a good choice of law rule would be to apply the law of the interested state first in
alphabetical order. See Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28
U. CHI. L. REV. 258, 279 (1961).
104. See H. MARSH, 18 CALIFORNIA PRACTICE-CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 24.18 (1978).
105. Set Oldham, supra note 2, at 93-98.
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corporations would eventually result in at least equal (and probably greater)
certainty in corporate choice of law for technically foreign 10 6 and arguably
foreign corporations and advance more sensible policies.'0 7 (Of course, stat-
utes such as some of the takeover laws of certain states which provide that
the laws apply to any corporation whose "principal place of business" is in
the state, or which has "substantial assets" in the state, 0 8 without defining
these terms, should obviously be avoided.) For example, the California
scheme has incorporated filing procedures and specific rules regarding the
time during which California law will govern pseudo-foreign corporations
and the sections of California law which will govern them. Admittedly,
some uncertainty has resulted regarding what law applies to such corpora-
tions, at least during the interim period while such statutory schemes become
accepted. It is presently unclear whether courts of the state of incorporation
will enforce pseudo-foreign corporation laws of another jurisdiction.'0 9
It should be noted that the application of the law of the state of incorpo-
ration to the internal affairs of a technically foreign corporation or an argua-
bly foreign corporation may constitute a violation of the full faith and credit
clause, since the state of commercial domicile has an overwhelming interest
in regulating the corporation as compared to the state of incorporation. '10
The enforceability of the California and New York pseudo-foreign cor-
poration choice of law statutes currently depends, as a practical matter,
upon the state in which suit is brought.I" If the action is brought in the
106. Such a scheme could increase the certainty of the law applicable to technically foreign
corporations, since currently it is somewhat unclear whether the state of the commercial domi-
cile would apply local law or the law of the state of incorporation to questions pertaining to the
internal affairs of such a corporation. If full faith and credit requires the application of the
pseudo-foreign corporation law of the commercial domicile of a pseudo-foreign corporation
rather than the law of the state of incorporation, this would definitely increase certainty in
corporate choice of law regarding pseudo-foreign corporations.
107. See Kirgis, supra note 40, at 141-42. Many civil law countries do not follow the rule
that the law of the place of incorporation governs a corporation's internal affairs. See generaly
Latty, supra note 2, at 167 n.134. In these countries the law either of the "social seat" (siege
social) or the principal place of business (centre dexploitation) applies to such questions. See
generally 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 33-35 (2d ed. 1960); Vagts, The Multhnational
Enterprise, A New Challengefor Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 740 (1970); Note, The "Na-
tisnality" ofnternational Corporations Under Civil Law and Treaty, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (1961).
Laity notes that this choice of law rule evolved as a result of England's relatively lax corporation
laws in the Nineteenth Century. Businesses apparently were chartered in England and then
conducted business in France and other parts of Europe. See Latty, supra note 2, at 166 n. 130.
A corporation's social seat is generally said to be the place of its "central administration."
The determination of a corporation's social seat normally depends upon where its executive
offices are located and where shareholders and directors meetings are held. See Hadri, The Choice
ofNational Law Applicable to the Multi-National Enterprise and The Natonality ofSuch Enterprises, 1974
DUKE L.J. 1, 7. Although in some instances a corporation's social seat is unclear (see Latty,
supra note 2, at 168), the civil law choice of law rule for corporations has generally been a
workable approach. See generally 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1960); Latty,
supra note 2, at 166-72; Vagts, supra note 107.
108. See generally Note, The Consttutionality ofState Takeover Statutes. A Response to Great West-
ern, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 872, 881 (1978) [hereinafter cited State Takeover Statutes/.
109. It was noted above that in the litigation relating to the election of directors of Arden-
Mayfair, Inc., even though Arden-Mayfair satisfied the standard for a California pseudo-foreign
corporation set forth in California's code, a Delaware court held that the Arden-Mayfair annual
meeting of shareholders should be held pursuant to Delaware law.
110. See Kirgis, supra note 40, at 142 n.87; Oldham, supra note 2, at 119.
111. See Oldham, supra note 2, at 123-30.
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state of incorporation, the forum will probably apply its law and not the
pseudo-foreign corporation statute; if suit is brought in the state of commer-
cial domicile, the forum will probably apply its pseudo-foreign corporation
law, unless it is deemed unconstitutional. This obvious forum-shopping
problem (and the related burden on commerce) could be greatly amelio-
rated, and certainty in corporate choice of law regarding pseudo-foreign cor-
porations could be greatly advanced, by establishing the following rule: if a
corporation has minimal contacts with its state of incorporation and has sub-
stantial contacts with a state that has adopted a pseudo-foreign corporation
law (thereby showing its interest in applying its law to such corporation),
and the foreign corporation satisfies the test for jurisdiction incorporated in
the pseudo-foreign corporation law, full faith and credit should require the
application of the law of the commercial domicile rather than the state of
incorporation.
The uncertainty which would remain would be whether the corporation
had "significant contacts" with the state of incorporation. Given this uncer-
tainty, the rule should provide that if the state of commercial domicile has
enacted a law which attempts to assure that only corporations whose com-
mercial domicile is within that state are governed by that law,1 12 full faith
and credit should require the application of such a law to the exclusion of
the law of the state of incorporation, regardless of the contacts between the
corporation and the state of incorporation.
It has been noted that different forums use substantially different tests
to establish whether they have a substantial interest in regulating foreign
corporations. For example, the various state tender offer laws consider the
number of shareholders and the number of employees which reside in the
state, the location of the corporation's principal executive offices, the amount
of assets in the state, and the amount of revenues the corporation derived
from the state, among others. t t 3 The New York statutory scheme pertaining
to the internal affairs of foreign corporations considers the percentage of rev-
enues the corporation derived from New York.' t 4 The California statute
considers the number of shareholders, employees, revenues, and assets lo-
cated or generated in California.' 1 5
It is certainly possible that a tender offer could be governed by the
tender offer laws of two or more states. For example, when Great Western
tendered for the shares of Sunshine Mining Company, it was initially consid-
ered possible that the tender offer would simultaneously be regulated by
112. California's statutory scheme would arguably fall within this group of statutes, since it
considers a number of factors in connection with the determination and requires that the aver-
age of these contacts exceeds 50% and that 50% of the shareholders reside in California.
To the extent that the various state tender offer laws purport to govern a foreign corpora-
tion with "substantial assets" in the state or which has its "executive office" or "principal place
of business" within the state, such laws are obviously undesirable. These terms are vague and
do not ensure that the state will have the dominant interest in regulating the corporation.
113. Seegenerally E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 207 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Tender Offers].
114. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1320 (MeKinney 1963).
115. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2108, 2115 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978).
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three state takeover laws.'16 It should be emphasized, however, as to ques-
tions pertaining to state regulation of affairs of foreign corporations which
required uniform national regulation, full faith and credit was only required
to be given to those state laws which made a reasonable attempt to limit
their application to only those corporations that had more than fifty percent
of their contacts with the state. No state tender offer law approaches this
standard. For this reason, state tender offer laws, insofar as they attempt to
extraterritorially regulate tender offers made pertaining to foreign corpora-
tions, should be deemed to violate due process, and the application of such
laws would not be required by the full faith and credit clause. The tender
offer law of the state of incorporation, if there is such a law, should be given
full faith and credit by all states.'
t 7
The California scheme regulating certain internal affairs of pseudo-for-
eign corporations requires that fifty percent of the corporation's shareholders
reside in California and that the average of the corporation's property, pay-
roll, and sales located in or derived from California exceed fifty percent. 1"8
This standard makes a reasonable attempt to limit the application of the
statute to those corporations in which California has the predominant inter-
est in regulating. Although different standards are conceivable, as long as
the state standard included more than one contact between the corporation
and the state, and required that the contacts with the states exceed fifty
percent, it would appear highly unlikely that a corporation would satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of more than one such statute.1 19
A related question which arises is what law should apply to a techni-
cally foreign or arguably foreign corporation whose commercial domicile has
not adopted a statute such as California. Then, certainty in choice of law
becomes a concern. Possibly at some point it will become the accepted rule
that, regardless of whether the state of commercial domicile has adopted a
pseudo-foreign corporation statute, the law of the commercial domicile ap-
plies to a pseudo-foreign corporation. (Such a rule would not evolve without
116. See State Takeover Statutes supra note 108, at 888 n.125.
117. It could be argued that only the sections of the state tender offer law which require
uniform national regulation should be given full faith and credit rather than the whole tender
offer law. This may be true in principle, but as a practical matter it would probably create a
great deal of uncertainty as to which provisions must be given full faith and credit. For this
reason, the whole tender offer law of the state of incorporation should be given full faith and
credit by all other states. This general rule regarding giving full faith and credit to the tender
offer law of the state of incorporation is subject to the pseudo-foreign corporation exception
discussed herein.
118. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West Supp. 1978).
119. Accord, Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27, at 1324-27. It may be advisable for the
statute to consider both the percentage of shareholders residing in the state as well as certain
business contacts (such as assets in the state, principal executive offices in the state, or revenue
derived from the state) between the corporation and the state. If the statute covers both types of
contacts, it would be even less likely that a company could satisfy more than one of such laws.
An interesting example of the fringe area of pseudo-foreign corporations is Great W.
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aJ'd, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cit.
1978), reo'don oenuegrounds, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2710 (1979). Sunshine,
the target company, was a Washington corporation with no significant contacts with Washing-
ton. Its principal executive offices and more than 50% of its assets were located in Idaho, and it
conducted a significant amount of business in New York. Sunshine's main subsidiary was a
Delaware corporation which conducted a great deal of its business in Maryland.
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the states adopting pseudo-foreign corporation statutes.) If this occurs, such
a rule could be applied and the corporation, if clearly a "tramp" pseudo-
foreign corporation, would be certain what law would govern its internal
affairs. Until such a rule evolves, however, technically foreign and arguably
foreign corporations should be governed by the law of their respective states
of incorporation; any other result would leave the corporation unsure which
law governed its internal affairs. Even assuming such a new choice of law
rule would develop, the problem would still exist as to what constituted a
pseudo-foreign corporation; until a workable definition evolves or until the
state of commercial domicile would adopt a pseudo-foreign corporation stat-
ute, the corporation would be unsure which law governed its internal affairs.
C. Commerce Clause
Arguably, certain state regulations of corporate affairs violate the Con-
stitution's commerce clause.' 20 It has been suggested that pseudo-foreign
corporation laws' 2 ' and tender offer laws 122 place an impermissible burden
upon interstate commerce.
1. General Rules
It is somewhat difficult to predict whether courts will conclude that
pseudo-foreign corporation laws or tender offer laws impose impermissible
burdens on interstate commerce. Few appellate courts have confronted
these questions, 123 and the guidelines for what constitutes an impermissible
burden are vague and depend upon a number of considerations. The extent
of the restriction on state power imposed by the commerce clause has fre-
quently been stated by the Supreme Court in a manner that begs the ques-
tion and provides little guidance. For example, the Court has often
concluded that the burden imposed upon commerce by a state statute is
"direct" or "indirect," depending upon whether the statute is to be upheld
or deemed unconstitutional. 1
24
Nevertheless, it is possible to set forth some general rules. If the state
statute is deemed to discriminate against interstate commerce, or to favor
local business vis-a-vis out of state business, such statutes are almost always
ruled unconstitutional. 125 Courts generally uphold regulation if the subject
120. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
121. See Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27.
122. See Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 225.
123. Accord, Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977). A few
district courts have recently considered the constitutionality of state tender offer laws. See gener-
aly AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979); City Investing Co. v.
Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112 (D.C. Ind. 1979); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97, 154 (E.D. Va., September 3, 1979); Telco Marketing Services, Inc. v. Hospital
Financial Corp., No. 79 C 2343 (N.D. Il. June 11, 1979); Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter, No. 79-1253
(E.D. La. May 3, 1979); Mite Corp. v. Dixon, No. 79 C 200 (N.D. Ill. February 9, 1979); Uarco,
Inc. v. Daylin, Inc., No. 798 C 4246 (N.D. I1. November 27, 1978); Dart Indus. Inc. v. Conrad,
462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978); Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (BNA) at A-I
(Del. Ch. Ct., December 14, 1979).
124. See generally Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
125. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); H.P. Hood and Sons, Inc. v.
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). See generally Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA.
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matter is deemed one "of local concern" which Congress has not regu-
lated. 126 The trick, of course, is discerning when a matter is of local concern.
The Court has sometimes been quite generous in its willingness to find the
matter one of local concern; the regulation of the interstate marketing of the
California raisin crop' 27 and pollution control of ships traveling upon the
Great Lakes have been deemed local in nature.
128
Recent decisions have stated that the validity of state statutes under the
commerce clause will generally be determined by balancing the burden
upon commerce against the local benefit derived therefrom. 129 Professor
Dowling has argued that a state regulation will only be deemed an imper-
missible burden when that burden exceeds its local benefits. 130 In the fa-
mous case of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,' 13 1 the Supreme Court set forth the
standard of review of state statutes under the commerce clause in this man-
ner:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a le-
gitimate local public interest and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree, and the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will, of course, depend on the nature of the local interest
involved and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities. Occasionally, the court has can-
didly undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these issues
132
Pike suggests the following considerations: the nature and extent of the local
benefit advanced, the extent of the burden imposed upon interstate com-
merce by the statute, and the existence of an alternative way of advancing
the state interest with a lesser impact on interstate commerce.
2. Burdens Upon Interstate Commerce
A. Pseudo Foreign Corporation Laws
The different state regulatory statutes discussed herein obviously impose
different burdens upon interstate commerce. Pseudo-foreign corporation
laws, such as California's, currently do place a burden on interstate com-
merce, but primarily because of the uncertainty of whether the internal af-
fairs would be governed by the law of the state of incorporation or by
California, its commercial domicile. If and when it becomes settled that the
L. REV. 1 (1940); Dowling Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 547 (1947).
126. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
127. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
128. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
129. See generall Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Aldens, Inc. v.
Packel, 524 F.2d 38 (3rd Cir. 1975).
130. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. I (1940).
131. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
132. Id. at 142 (citation omitted). This test has been considered the appropriate standard
for commerce clause review of state statutes in a number of cases, including Great Western United.
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internal affairs of pseudo-foreign corporations should be governed by the
pseudo-foreign corporation law of the commercial domicile (if such a law
exists), rather than the law of the state of incorporation, minimal burdens on
interstate commerce would then result from pseudo-foreign corporation
laws.
A current example of the type of burden imposed by pseudo-foreign
corporation laws is reflected in the Arden-Mqayfair litigation. Arden-Mayfair
was a Delaware corporation that satisfied the California pseudo-foreign cor-
poration tests. It was unclear whether Delaware or California law governed
certain internal affairs of the corporation, including the method for the elec-
tion of its directors. Suits were initiated in both California and Delaware to
resolve, among other things, whether votes for directors should be cumu-
lated. 133 The California court concluded that the California provision, as
applied to Arden-Mayfair and the method of its election of directors, placed
an impermissible burden on interstate commerce and was therefore uncon-
stitutional. The court ordered that the election of Arden-Mayfair's directors
be held pursuant to Delaware law.' 34 By the time the Delaware court re-
viewed the matter, the California decision had been rendered; the Delaware
court merely reiterated the California holding.
135
Arden-Mayfair represents the extreme example of the types of burdens
currently imposed upon interstate commerce by the pseudo-foreign corpora-
tion laws. California required a transaction be carried out in one way, while
Delaware required the transaction be carried out in a significantly different
manner. It was impossible to comply with both; the directors either had to
be elected cumulatively or by straight voting.
Of course, other types of conflicts could result. 3 6 In addition to Arden-
Mayfair's cumulative voting dilemma, corporate reorganizations (and dis-
senters' rights relating thereto), corporate distributions and repurchases of a
corporation's shares, and the legality of the indemnification of corporate of-
ficers or directors all could be sources of conflict between the state of incor-
poration and pseudo-foreign corporation law.
B. State Tender Offer Laws
State takeover laws' 37 impose burdens on interstate commerce in addi-
tion to those resulting from the pseudo-foreign corporation laws. Added to
the problem of uncertainty as to which state law is applicable to the transac-
tion, state takeover laws place a number of unique burdens on commerce.
Many takeover laws provide for more extensive disclosure than required
under the Williams Act. A significant number of state laws grant with-
133. See generally Louart Corp. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., No. C-192091 (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. June 30, 1977); Palmer v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., No. 5549 (Del. Ch., New Castle
County 1978).
134. Minute Order in Louart Corp. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., No. C-192091 (Los Angeles
County Superior Court July 6, 1979). The order is dated June 30, 1977.
135. See Palmer v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., No. 5549 (Del. Ch., Newcastle County 1978).
136. See notes 91-101 supra and accompanying text.
137. See notes 218-43 trfra and accompanying text for an extensive discussion of state take-
over laws.
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drawal rights to a target company's shareholders for a period exceeding that
provided in the Williams Act, thereby making it less clear to the bidder,
until a later date, how many shares are definitely tendered. State law pro
rata repurchase requirements sometimes extend beyond the period set forth
in the Williams Act, forcing the bidder to buy more shares to satisfy both the
Williams Act pro rata repurchase requirements and the requirements of the
various state laws.
Moreover, between the notice of intention to make a tender offer and
the date the tender offer commences, the market for target company's securi-
ties will be highly unstable and might require the cessation of trading for
that stock.' 38 If the stock exchange or the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) suspends trading of the target company's stock, this obviously
would dry up the market for these shares during that period. If trading is
not suspended, however, there is normally a very active market for shares for
which a tender offer is to be made. i39
State takeover laws seem to encourage bidders to use the "bear hug"
tender offer approach: the bidder first makes a takeover proposal to the tar-
get company's management. If target management does not approve the
offer (thereby foreclosing taking advantage of the "friendly offer" exemption
contained in most state takeover laws), the bidder would then make a tender
offer at a lower price to the shareholders. 140 Similarly, since state takeover
laws tend to facilitate the entry of a third-party bidder, the initial tender
offer may be lower than what otherwise would have been made, in anticipa-
tion of further bidding. 
14 '
By far the most significant burden of the state takeover laws, however,
results from the delay created by most laws. 142 State takeover laws generally
prolong tender offers, since many state takeover laws require a waiting pe-
riod between the required filing of a notice of intention to make a tender
offer and the date upon which the offer commences. Thus, the offer remains
open longer than required under federal law. In addition, a number of state
takeover laws provide that, upon request from target management, the state
securities commission must hold a hearing regarding the adequacy of disclo-
sure in the tender offer document and the fairness of the terms of the offer.
138. Both the district court and the circuit court in the Great Western United case seemed
concerned about this possibility. The New York Stock Exchange also believes this to be a possi-
bility. See SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at A-12 (June 1969).
139. See generally Note, supra note 108; Troubh, Purchased Afectian: A Primer on Cash Tender
Offers, HARV. Bus. REV., July-August (1976). For example, two recently announced tender
offers caused the market of the target company's stock to be quite active. See Acquisittin Offer of
$480,000,000 i made for ERC, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1979, at 5, col. I (western edition); Warnerand
Swasey is Target of Offer by Canada Firm, Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1979, at 4, col. I (western edition).
140. The district court in Great Western United voiced this concern. 439 F. Supp. at 438.
141. This point was made by the circuit court in Great Western United. See 577 F.2d at 1283.
142. For example, one study found that, prior to the widespread enactment of state takeover
laws, more than 2/3 of all tender offers were completed 22 days after the announcement of the
tender offer. See Ebeid, Tender Offers- Characteristcs A ecttg Their Success, MERGERS & AcQuISI-
TIONS 24 (1976). Because of the waiting period and mandatory hold-open period set forth in
most state takeover laws, the average tender offer now takes much longer to complete.
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The tender may not commence until such hearings have occurred.'
43
One result of the delay is that the offeror's expenses are increased.'
44
Frequently, tender offers are financed and the bidder must pay a daily com-
mitment fee for the financing; the longer the tender offer remains open, the
greater the financing fee. Further, the bidder's expenses are increased by
having to deal with the various state securities commissions and having to
appear at any required hearings.
Aside from the economic hardship on the offeror, the waiting period
also gives target management time to communicate its position to target
shareholders and generally engage in defensive tactics. A variety of defen-
sive tactics may be attempted by the target company: issuing additional
shares to friendly shareholders, attempting to enter into a merger with a
third party, or wooing another buyer. 145 It is unclear whether these defen-
sive tactics permit target management to defeat bidders more frequently in
contested tender offers. 1
46
143. See notes 227-31 tnfia and accompanying text for a discussion of the provisions regard-
ing such hearings and waiting periods.
144. See generaly Bromberg, Tender Offers. Safeguards and Strengths-An Interest Analysis, 21
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 613, 651 (1970).
145. See generally Fleischer, Defensive Tactics in Tender Ofers, 9 REV. SEC. REG. 853 (1976);
Reuben & Elden, How to bea Target Company, 23 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 423 (1978); Schmults & Kelly,
Cash Takeover Bids Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115 (1968). See, e.g., Bell Industries Plans Anti-
Takeover Moves: Shareholders to Vote, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1979, at 45, col. 4.
On October 18, 1979 Dominion Bridge indicated its desire to tender for the shares of
Warner & Swasey Co. Warner & Swasey's management resisted the proposed tender offer. The
Ohio Division of Securities did not approve the adequacy of Dominion Bridge's disclosure docu-
ment until more than two months had elapsed. During that time, a "white knight" third-party
bidder, Bendix Corp., was located. Warner-Swasy Takeover Fight's Stakes Increased, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 17, 1979, at 5, col. 1.
146. Sometimes bidders may not make an actual tender offer after the announcement of an
intention to make a tender offer if target management actively engages in defensive tactics
between the time the intention to tender is announced and the date the tender is to occur.
Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 882, 889 n.28
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Steinbrink].
One study found that of the contested cash tender offers and exchange offers studied that
were made from 1972 through 1975, 78% were either completely or partially successful. Austin,
Tender Offer Statistics.- New Strategies Are Paying Off, MERGERS & AcQuisITIONS 11-14 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Austin, Tender Offers Statistics]. A later study conducted by the same writer
found that the probability of success in connection with a contested tender offer decreased sig-
nificantly during 1976 and 1977. It was found that of the 18 contested tender offers made in
1977 that were studied, only 10 were completely or partially successful; 45% were unsuccessful.
Similarly, of the 26 contested tender offers made in 1976 that were studied, only 13 were com-
pletely or partially successful; 50% were unsuccessful. See generally Austin, Study Reveals Trends in
Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Offers, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1978, at 25, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as
Austin, Study Reveals Friends in Tactics, Premtiwns Success Rates in Offers.]
Professor Austin contends that these figures suggest that, because of the state takeover laws
and the increasing use of defensive tactics by target management, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to make a successful tender offer. Another article interprets this information differ-
ently. See generally Comment, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great
Western, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 872 n.2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NYU Comment]. This article
notes that, of the contested tender offers made during 1976 and 1977 deemed "unsuccessful" by
Professor Austin, a third-party bidder frequently gained control of the target company. It is
stated that of the 18 tender offers made in 1977 that were studied by Austin, in 16 (88%) of these
either the initial bidder or a third-party bidder was partially or completely successful. Simi-
larly, of the 26 tender offers made in 1976 that were studied by Austin, the initial bidder or a
third-party bidder was completely or partially successful in 80% of the offers. (These findings
1980] REGULA TING THE REGULA TORS
A separate problem is created by the rights of the state securities com-
missions to hold hearings regarding the adequacy of the disclosure and the
fairness of the transaction. These hearings may either be held upon motion
by the commission itself or upon request by target management. 147 A re-
quest for a hearing by target management is a defensive tactic often used to
postpone a tender offer. The tender offer will be held at bay until the securi-
ties commission is satisfied that the disclosure is adequate and the terms are
fair. In addition, if the state securities commission does not approve the de-
gree of disclosure or the terms of the transaction, the tender may be enjoined
by the securities commission.
148
A significant result of the delays imposed by the state takeover laws is
that the initial bidder is less likely to be successful.' 49 In a growing number
of cases, the initial bidder is defeated by a "white knight" third-party bid-
der. 150 It is unsettled whether target management is more successful in re-
taining control in contested offers because of the state laws.' 5 '
State takeover laws, in their current form, may dampen the interest of
were made by the authors of the NYU Comment after they reviewed Professor Austin's basic
research (correspondence with Austin on file with the author)).
It appears from the additional statistics noted in the NYU Comment that Professor Austin
overemphasizes the significance of the diminishing success rate of the initial bidder in a con-
tested tender offer. Without knowing the percentage of instances during which a third-party
bidder gained control of the target company in the contested tender offers studied by Austin
during 1972 through 1975, however, it is impossible to know whether target management is now
more successful in combating tender offers, or whether the only change is that the initial bidder
is now more frequently defeated by a third party.
147. For example, the management of Cedar Point Inc. requested such a hearing regarding
the tender for its shares by MCA Inc. Cedar Point Pursues Ruling on Tender Offr, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Dec. 20, 1979, § C, at 1, col. 6.
148. For example, the terms of the proposed tender offer by APL Corporation for the shares
of Pabst Brewing were not approved by the Wisconsin Commissioner of Securities. This reluc-
tance on the part of the Wisconsin Commissioner of Securities to approve the terms of the
proposed tender offer significantly frustrated the ability of APL to make the tender offer. See
generally Pabst Buys Stake Heldby SuiorAPL: Takeover FeudEnds, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1979, at 19,
col. I (western edition).
State securities commissioners have rarely found the terms of a proposed tender unfair,
however. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 116 n.49 (1979).
149. Of all contested tender offers occurring from 1972 through 1975 studied by one com-
mentator, 78% were either successful (meaning that the number of shares requested by the bid-
der were tendered) or partially successful (meaning that the bidder accepted tenders for less
than the number of shares requested). Austin, Tender Ofer Statistics, supra note 146, at 12-14.
This commentator also studied contested tender offers made during 1976 and 1977, and found
that bidders were either partially or completely successful in 1976 in only 50% of the contested
tender offers studied and partially or completely successful in 1977 in 55% of the contested
tenders studied. Austin, Study Reveals Trend in Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Ofers, supra note
146, at 35.
150. See generally Austin, Study Reveals Trend in Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Offers, supra
note 146. A third-party bidder not friendly to target management is sometimes referred to as a
"grey knight."
151. See note 146 supra. If a third-party bidder friendly to existing target management
prevails, target management may be retained or even receive a long-term employment contract
in connection with the transaction. Even if a third-party friendly bidder prevails in the tender
offer, target shareholders are able to sell their shares at the tender premium. Based on the
results of Austin's studies (and the information contained in the NYU Comment), it appears
that target shareholders are able to sell their shares at the tender premium in about the same
percentage of contested tender offers as they were able to prior to the extensive enactment of
state takeover laws. Of course, Austin's comparative figures do not reflect the numbers of
tender offers discouraged by state takeover laws.
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arbitrageurs in a tender offer. Arbitrageurs play a very important role in a
tender offer. 15 2 Arbitrageurs buy shares of a target company on the open
market after a tender is announced, with the hope of receiving the full
tender premium for the shares within a short period after the arbitrage
purchase. If it appears that the state securities commission will not allow the
tender to commence, or even if the commission significantly delays the
tender, arbitrageurs may be less interested in participating.
When state takeover laws were initially enacted, commentators pre-
dicted that tender offers would no longer be effective vehicles for acquiring
control of companies. 15 3 Although these predictions were less than pre-
scient, the data discussed above do suggest that the probability of an initial
bidder in a contested tender offer gaining control of the target company has
decreased in the last few years. This could be attributed to the opportunity
of target management to use defensive tactics as a result of the enactment of
takeover statutes by many states and the more frequent appearance of a
"white knight" third-party bidder.
In addition to decreasing the likelihood that initial bidders will be suc-
cessful in a contested tender offer, state takeover laws probably have a "chil-
ling effect" upon tenders. A number of effects of state takeover laws
probably discourage tenders. First, it seems less likely that the intial bidder
will be successful, and second, the delayed and prolonged tender makes it
less likely that the shares will sell at bargain prices. 54 Finally, the bidder's
expenses are increased. It does not appear, however, that state takeover laws
have significantly reduced the number of tenders made.
During the period from 1970 through 1974, a relatively small number of
tender offers were made.' 55 During this period, only a handful of state take-
over laws were in effect. During 1975 through 1979, the annual number of
152. See Rubin, Arbitrage, 32 Bus. LAW. 1315 (1977).
153. Vorys, Ohio Tender Ofers Bill, 43 OHIO BAR 65, 73 (1970).
154. See Flom, The Role of the Takeover t the American Economy, 32 Bus. LAW. 1299 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Flom].
155. Ruth Appleton, Esq., Chief of the Office of Tender Offers and Acquisitions of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, has provided the following information regarding the
number of tender offers made during the period from 1969 through 1979. Note that the infor-
mation set forth below refers to the SEC fiscal year, which runs from October 1 through Sep-
tember 30.
Year No. of Tender Offer Filings
1969











Most of the principal, commercial states adopted tender offer laws during 1975 and there-
after. During this period, the number of tender offers made has significantly increased. See
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tender offers has generally increased. 156  During the period from 1975
through 1977, tender offer laws became effective in twenty-seven additional
states. 157 Although it is impossible to tell how many tender offers were dis-
couraged by these laws, it does not appear that the enactment of such laws
during 1975-1977 by almost all the major, commercial states (California, ac-
cording to form, being the lone rebel) has dramatically affected the number
of tender offers made.
3. Local Benefits
A. Pseudo-Foreign Corporaton Laws.
The internal affairs doctrine permits corporations to avoid regulation
by the law of the state of commercial domicile by incorporating or reincor-
porating elsewhere. 5 ' With pseudo-foreign corporation laws, states can re-
tain regulatory control over corporations commercially domiciled there, if
the state so desires. This is not an insignificant benefit. The state of com-
mercial domicile obviously has an interest in the financial stability of corpo-
rations domiciled there, both to protect resident shareholders and creditors
of the corporation. Further, such a state would have an interest in promul-
gating the standard of care which should be exercised by directors and of-
ficers of corporations and standards for indemnification of officers and
directors of commercially domiciled corporations.
Perhaps most important, states have an interest in protecting resident
shareholders from fraudulent or unfair practices. For example, the recent
drop in stock prices has made more companies consider the advisability of
attempting to "go private." Different states have taken different approaches
to regulating procedures for going private. Many states have done nothing
(generally relying upon the fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders and
management to other shareholders), while other states, such as California,
have adopted more restrictive protective legislation. 159 Indeed, states have
generally Mishkin and Nathan, Tender Offers Continue to Surge, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1977, at 30, col.
1.
Professor Douglas Austin of the University of Toledo is preparing information regarding
tender offers made during 1978 and 1979. He is compiling this information during the winter of
1979 and it will be published in 1980. (Correspondence on file with author.)
Professor Austin has stated that from 1970 through 1975 an aggregate of 269 tender offers
were made. See Austin, Stud Reveals Trends i Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Offers, supra note
146, at 25. This difference between his figures and the figures supplied by the Securities and
Exchange Commission could result from the fact that the SEC figures are compiled on the basis
of its fiscal year (from October 1 through September 30), while Professor Austin's information is
presumably compiled on a calendar year basis.
156. See Austin, Study Reveals Trends in Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Offers, supra note 146.
See also information supplied by Ruth Appleton, supra note 155.
157. During this period takeover laws became effective in Indiana, Delaware, Connecticut,
New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Texas, and New Jersey, among
others.
158. See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
159. California Corporations Code § 1101 provides that in connection with any merger
other than a short-form merger, the common shares of a disappearing corporation may be con-
verted only into common shares of the surviving corporation unless all shareholders of the disap-
pearing corporation approve another plan. Similarly, in connection with a sale of assets
transaction, if the buyer controls the seller, the terms of the sale must be approved by at least
19801
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an interest in protecting shareholder rights in connection with any corporate
reorganization, if a large percentage of its shareholders reside in the state.
The benefit derived from pseudo-foreign corporation laws, therefore, is
that the state of commercial domicile retains the right to regulate the inter-
nal affairs of corporations commercially domiciled there, to the extent, if
any, that the state desires to do so to protect shareholders and creditors resid-
ing there.
B. Benefits Dertved from Stale Takeover Laws.
Given that the primary effect of state takeover laws is to delay the com-
mencement of a tender offer and to prolong the tender offer once it has com-
menced,' 6° the bidder rarely acquires the target company shares for the
price originally bid. A third party frequently enters the fray and competes
with the original bidder for the shares of the target company. 161 Therefore,
one effect of state takeover laws seems to be that bidders are not able to get
the bargain they had been able to obtain under the quicker "Saturday night
special" tender offer permitted under the Williams Act. 162 (Alternatively,
one could argue that bidders now bid a lower initial price in anticipation of
the bidding to follow.)
90% of the seller's outstanding shares, unless the shareholders of the seller receive common
shares of the buyer in connection with the sale. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1001(d) (West 1977).
160. See, e.g., Flom, supra note 154.
161. See Steinbrink, supra note 146, at 894 n.42; Austin, Study Reveals Trends in Tactics, Premi-
uns, Success Rates in Ofers, supra note 146. See, e.g., Auerbach, Pertec Suitors Agree to Settle Takeover
Battle, L.A. Times, Nov. 21, 1979, Part III, at 10, col. 4; Takeover Talks Held by Buckeye Interna-
tional, Inc., Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1979, page 14, col. 2; Posner's Victorv in a Btdding War, NEws-
WEEK, Dec. 10, 1979, at 97.
An example of such a bidding war in which target shareholders received a large premium
for their shares was the contest between United Technologies and J. Ray McDermott for con-
trol of Babcock & Wilcox Company. At the time the tender was announced, the market price of
the shares was $35. United Technologies originally bid $42 for the shares. McDermott was
eventually successful with an offer of $65 per share. See Metz, Babcock and Wilcox: A Battle That
Shook Wall Street Notins, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1977, at 57, col. 1.
Similarly, Dominion Bridge and Bendix battled for control of Warner & Swasey. When
Dominion Bridge initially announced its proposed offer of $57 per share, Warner & Swasey's
stock was trading for $36-%. The final successful bid by Bendix was $83 per share.
162. See, e.g., Flom, supra note 154; Brown, Changes in Offeror Strategy, 28 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 843, 848 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Brown]. See generally Ehrbar, Corporate Takeovers Are
Here to Stay, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 91; Bus. WEEK, Nov. 14, 1977, at 184.
Professor Austin's studies suggest that tender offer premiums are currently not significantly
higher than premiums received by target shareholders a decade ago. He notes that during the
period from 1968 through 1972, a "majority" of the premiums contained in tender offers
amounted to less than 50% of the market price of the shares two weeks prior to the tender offer.
See Austin, Study Reveals Trends in Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates in Offers, supra note 146. Al-
though the premiums received by shareholders during 1972 through 1975 increased somewhat,
during the 1976-1977 period 71.6% of the tender offers studied offered target shareholders pre-
miums of less than 50% of the market price of the shares. These figures do not distinguish
between contested and uncontested tender offers, however. It could be true that premiums
currently received by shareholders in uncontested tender offers are not significantly higher than
those received a decade ago, but that shareholders now receive greater premiums in a contested
offer or when two bidders are fighting for control of a target company.
A.F. Ehrbar disagrees with the findings of Professor Austin and contends that tender offer
premiums were then averaging more than 60% over market price, and in contested tender offers
the premiums were greater. Ehrbar notes that the premium target shareholders have histori-
cally received in tender offers is approximately 25%.
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Another related local benefit stemming from state takeover laws is the
additional time given shareholders to decide whether to tender their shares.
This results both from the waiting period (during which a tender has been
announced but has not commenced) and from the longer hold-open period
required, coupled with the increased withdrawal rights and pro rata takeup
protection given target company shareholders. Since the recent SEC propos-
als regarding tender offer regulation would lengthen the required hold-open
period and would extend withdrawal rights and pro rata takeup protection
beyond that currently provided in the Williams Act, this suggests that these
measures are now seen as a more desirable regulatory scheme.'
63
4. Less Restrictive Alternatives
A. Pseudo-Foreign Corporatzon Laws.
It does not appear that there is an alternative to pseudo-foreign corpo-
ration laws which would be less burdensome on interstate commerce while
still affirming a state's right to regulate commercially domiciled corpora-
tions. The foreign corporation could be required to have seventy to ninety
percent of its contacts with the state before the pseudo-foreign corporation
law would apply. This change would result in such laws applying to fewer
corporations and to corporations with generally fewer national contacts;
while placing less of a burden on interstate commerce, this would also sub-
stantially erode a state's ability to regulate commercially domiciled corpora-
tions.
B. State Takeover Laws.
In sum, the principal benefit accruing from state takeover laws seems to
be a prolongation of tender offers, resulting from the required waiting pe-
riod, the expanded withdrawals rights, the pro rata takeup provisions, and
the extended mandatory hold-open period. One significant burden upon
commerce is that tender offers now must be announced in advance of the
tender rather than concurrently with the commencement of the tender, as
the Williams Act permitted. The waiting period provisions permit target
management to engage in defensive tactics and give third parties additional
notice of the tender, affording them time to consider whether they also wish
to bid for the target shares.
It appears that whatever benefit is derived from the waiting period is
outweighed by the resulting burden upon commerce. The advantages of the
waiting period could essentially be retained by prolonging the hold-open pe-
riod and lengthening pro rata purchase rights and withdrawal rights. Under
such a regulatory scheme, shareholders would still have a significant period
of time to consider whether they wish to tender their shares and manage-
ment would not have an opportunity to engage in defensive tactics prior to
the commencement of a tender. For these reasons, it seems that state law
163. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,548, [19791 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,935 [hereinafter cited as Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,548]; see also Federal Regu-
lation of Securities Committee, State Takeover Statutes and the WitThams Act, A Report of the Subcom-
mittee on Proxy Sohttattwns and Tender Oers, 32 Bus. LAW. 187, 189 (1976).
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waiting period provisions should be deemed an impermissible burden upon
interstate commerce.
A similar conclusion should be reached regarding the provisions of state
laws which provide for hearings by the state securities commission. These
hearings probably do benefit shareholders by attempting to insure full and
accurate disclosure. Target management uses these hearings, however, as a
significant defensive tool. Many state statutes provide that hearings must be
held upon request by target management. Since the tender may not com-
mence until all hearings have been completed, target management almost
always requests hearings, often in more than one state. Consequently, the
commencement of tender offers could be delayed for months, thereby sub-
stantially increasing the costs to the bidder and making it more likely that a
third-party bidder will enter the scene. ' 64 Because these hearing procedures
substantially delay the commencement of a tender offer after its announce-
ment, and because the essential benefits of the state laws would continue
without such provisions, they should be deemed impermissible burdens upon
interstate commerce. The primary benefit of state takeover laws-the pro-
longation of the period during which shareholders may decide whether to
tender their shares-may be retained without providing for hearings by the
state securities commissions.
164. For example, United Technologies Corporation initially announced on April 5, 1977,
its intention to tender for the shares of Babcock & Wilcox at a price of $42 a share, with the
tender to commence as soon as all state law requirements had been satisfied. Babcock & Wilcox
then requested hearings under the takeover laws of four different states. Because of these ma-
neuvers by target management, United Technologies was not able to have the tender commence
until August 4, 1977; the initial tender price was then $48. A third-party bidder appeared on
the scene and was successful. See generaly Brown, supra note 162, at 844-45.
Another example of the burdens imposed by the state law hearing requirements can be
seen in the attempted tender offer by Thrall Car Manufacturing Company for the shares of
Youngstown Steel Door Company. On May 24, 1976, Thrall Car announced its intention to
tender for Youngstown Steel shares at a price of $14 a share. The management of Youngstown
Steel requested a hearing pursuant to the state takeover law. These hearings were held from
June 25 through July 16, 1976. The commission issued its order on August 2, 1976. When one
reads this order, it appears that the Ohio Securities Commission was attempting to insure that
state takeover laws would be deemed unconstitutional. The division found the disclosure docu-
ment inadequate in many ways. Among other things, the division wanted Thrall Car to disclose
a great amount of information regarding the business of Youngstown Steel. This information
seemingly could only have been obtained from Youngstown Steel management, who did not
appear amenable to such cooperation, to say the least. More importantly, the division found
both the price offered target shareholders too low and the hold-open period of the offer too
short. As if this was not enough to frustrate Thrall Car, the division announced that any
amended offer and the accompanying disclosure document would first be forwarded to Youngs-
town Steel management for their comments, and then the offer and disclosure document would
be again reviewed by the commission. A third-party bidder appeared that was supported by
Youngstown Steel management; this third-party bidder was able to avail itself of the "friendly
offer" exemption of the Ohio takeover law. The bidder was therefore able to tender successfully
for the shares of Youngstown Steel while Thrall Car could not make a tender offer, since it had
not complied with the state statute. See Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 223-25.
A recent case considered the constitutionality of the Ohio takeover law. The court found
that the Ohio law did not impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, that the
Ohio law did not conflict with the federal law, and that the Williams Act did not intend to
preempt the field of regulation of tender offers. AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929
(S.D. Ohio (1979).
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5. Balancing the Benefits and Burdens
A. Pseudo-Foreign Corporatton Laws.
It was argued above that pseudo-foreign corporation laws could ad-
vance significant state policies, but their enforcement could also result in
substantial burdens upon interstate commerce. The commerce clause bal-
ance in some circumstances will not be an easy one.
The burdens upon interstate commerce resulting from pseudo-foreign
corporation laws hopefully will ebb as the pseudo-foreign corporation excep-
tion to the internal affairs doctrine becomes more established, which should
occur if a number of states adopt pseudo-foreign corporation laws. Most
civil law countries apply the law of the country in which the corporation's
"social seat" is located to internal affairs questions; no significant burden on
commerce appears to result.16 5 The burdens upon interstate commerce im-
posed by such laws, therefore, seem largely to be a transitory phenomenon.
State regulations which are aimed at restraining fraudulent or unfair
trade practices seem more likely to survive commerce clause review than
those oriented toward increasing the profitability of local business.
166
Pseudo-foreign corporation laws seem clearly to be of the former type.
Because the commercial burden hopefully will gradually diminish, and
because these laws do not represent an attempt by a state to favor local
business vis-a-vis out of state enterprise, these laws should be allowed to sur-
vive commerce clause challenge. Of course, if the burden is substantial, it
may be necessary to deem such laws unconstitutional as applied in certain
situations.
B. State Takeover Laws.
As noted, both the waiting period provisions of state takeover laws and
the provisions allowing hearings by state securities commissions should be
held impermissible burdens upon interstate commerce, since the benefits of
state takeover laws could be retained while these significant burdens upon
interstate commerce could be eliminated. The question remains, however,
whether state takeover laws without these provisions should be deemed im-
permissible burdens upon interstate commerce.
A number of judges and commentators have noted that state takeover
laws were essentially special interest legislation designed to protect manage-
ment of local target companies; 167 however, this should not be considered
determinative. Although the Supreme Court has sometimes focused upon
an improper legislative purpose or motive in connection with the enactment
of legislation as a justification for deeming the statute unconstitutional, in
165. See note 107 supra.
166. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 340 (1978). The constitutionality of
§ 2115 of the California Corporations Code was considered in a recent student note. See Note,
California's Statutory Attempt to Regulate Foreign Corporations.- Witl it Surove the Commerce Clause?, 16
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 943 (1979).
167. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420, 437 (N.D. Tex. 1977);
Bartell, The Wtsconsin Takeover Statute, 32 Bus. LAW. 1465, 1466 (1977); Buford, The Virginia
Takeover Statute, 32 Bus. LAW. 1469 (1977).
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most instances the Supreme Court does not deem legislative purposes signifi-
cant. 168 The commerce clause determination should be based upon the ef-
fect of these laws and not on an attempt to generalize the motivations of the
legislatures of more than two-thirds of the states.
The extent of the burden imposed upon interstate commerce by state
takeover laws would depend upon whether state takeover laws would be
deemed analogous to internal affairs questions and thus be governed by only
the law of one state. ' 6 9 If this view would be accepted, only one state take-
over law would apply to any takeover. If not accepted, it is quite possible
that two or more state takeover laws could regulate a tender. Additional
hindrances upon interstate commerce would result from the conflicting re-
quirements.
Assuming that a tender offer is not an internal affairs matter, tender
offers could be regulated in the same manner that securities transactions are
generally regulated by blue sky laws. Accordingly, state takeover laws would
not be extraterritorial and would only govern offers made to resident share-
holders. Such an approach would be an improvement upon the current ex-
traterritorial laws which base jurisdiction upon any substantial (sometimes
even a minimal) contact with the state. It is submitted that such an analysis,
however, fails to consider the distinction between a tender offer and a nor-
mal offering of securities. In a normal public offering of securities, securities
are being offered by the company to the general public. If for some reason a
state blue sky law is deemed too restrictive or the offer would not qualify in
that state, no significant problem results; offers are made only in the states
where the applicable blue sky laws are satisfied. As a result, the only burden
upon interstate commerce is that the shares may not be offered to residents
of states with restrictive laws.
In contrast, a tender offer is made to a specific group of people---ex-
isting shareholders. In addition, it is a complex transaction with a number
of important substantive terms and rights (such as the hold-open period,
withdrawal rights, and pro rata repurchase rights) provided to the target
shareholder. The regulation of a tender offer by all states in which target
shareholders reside would obviously result in different shareholders being
treated differently (e.g., the tender would remain open in some states longer
than in others). Most importantly, if a state enacted a restrictive takeover
law, or if only a few shareholders resided in the state, a bidder might choose
to ignore such states and merely bid for shares in states where a larger
number of shareholders reside or which have less restrictive takeover laws. 7 0
The undesirable result is that certain shareholders are not able to take ad-
168. Compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) wih Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976) and Baldwin v. GAF Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). See generally
Note, supra note 108, at 896.
169. See notes 244-51 zn/fa and accompanying text.
170. Arkansas purports to regulate all tender offers made regarding target companies with
more than 35 Arkansas shareholders. Offerors have attempted to avoid compliance with the
Arkansas statute by excluding Arkansas residents from the offer. See genera(y I M. LIPrON & E.
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 244-45 (1978). Such a tactic would appear to
violate the terms of the New York Stock Exchange Company Manual. Id. at 225.
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vantage of the full premium offered in the tender offer.' 7 1 Because of these
factors, it seems more desirable to have one extraterritorial tender offer law
govern a tender offer rather than different state takeover laws.
Regulating tender offers made to shareholders residing outside the state
does not result in any local benefit to the regulating state. This in no way
differs from the extraterritoriality of state regulation of corporate internal
affairs; such regulation almost always has some extraterritorial effects, but
has never been considered impermissible for that reason. It will be argued
below that a tender offer should be considered an internal affairs matter,
hence justifying the extraterritoriality of the tender offer laws.
If the waiting period provisions and the provisions permitting hearings
by state securities commissions are deleted from state takeover laws, the bur-
den upon interstate commerce would diminish. The following significant
burdens remain: disclosure requirements exceeding those of federal law, dif-
ferent hold-open periods, pro rata repurchase, and withdrawal rights.
The additional state disclosure requirements do not seem to create a
constitutional problem. 172 State blue sky laws frequently impose disclosure
requirements in addition to those required by the SEC, and it is accepted
that state blue sky laws are constitutional. No disclosures required by state
law are prohibited by federal law.
The longer hold-open period (coupled with prolonged withdrawal
rights) of state statutes, however, would burden interstate commerce. These
provisions give target shareholders more time to decide whether to tender
their shares, and consequently give a third-party bidder additional time to
decide whether to bid for the shares. Although such provisions have not
significantly reduced the number of tender offers, such provisions clearly
could have a "chilling effect" upon tender offers.
Apparently, the SEC has concluded that it would be wise to lengthen
the hold-open period and withdrawal rights prescribed under the Williams
Act. 17 3 These proposals would extend withdrawal rights until the expiration
of fifteen business days from the commencement of the offer (proposed rule
14d-7) and they would require a tender offer to remain open at least thirty
business days from the commencement of an offer (proposed rule 14e-1).
This suggests that the SEC has concluded that the benefits accruing to target
shareholders from such extensions would exceed any burdens upon com-
merce which would result. It is submitted that state hold-open periods and
withdrawal rights which are longer than those prescribed under the Wil-
liams Act should be deemed constitutional, unless the period is clearly exces-
sive.
171. Unless trading of the shares of the target company would be suspended, shareholders
would be able to sell shares on the open market. The market price in such instances, however,
often is significantly less than the tender price.
172. Accord, Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1281-87 (5th Cir. 1978).
Under federal law, a Schedule 14D-I must be filed in connection with a tender offer. 17
C.F.R. § 240. 14d-100. Various states have different disclosure requirements. See generally
Gould & Jacobs, The Practical E ects of State Tender Ofer Legislation, 23 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 399, 410
(1978).
173. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,548, supra note 163.
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Lengthened pro rata repurchase rights also place a burden upon the
tender offer. To satisfy the pro rata repurchase rights of both the Williams
Act and state law, the bidder would need to buy more shares than required.
In light of the benefits which accrue to shareholders from giving them a
significant period of time to decide whether to tender their shares, however,
such prolonged pro rata repurchase rights should be deemed constitutional.
State regulation of securities transactions and corporate internal affairs
has generally not been considered an impermissible burden upon commerce.
State takeover laws (without a waiting period and without provisions for an
administrative hearing) should satisfy a commerce clause review. 174
D. Preemption
A question exists whether state regulation of tender offers has been pre-
empted by the Williams Act.' 75 A state statute normally is preempted if the
federal law (or the legislative history of that law) clearly reflects the inten-
tion of Congress that state regulation of the subject matter should not be
allowed.176 Even if the federal law does not expressly preempt state regula-
tion, sometimes an intention to preempt will be inferred if (i) the federal
174. Accord, AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979); City Investing
Co. v. Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Ind. 1979). Quite another question is presented by a city
and not a state enacting a takeover law. Such a law was enacted by Urbana, New York. See
Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 254 n.103. It is extremely doubtful that such a law would be
constitutional.
Certain state takeover laws have unusual provisions which appear to impermissibly burden
interstate commerce. For example, Hawaii's law requires that a bidder offer to purchase 100%
of the target shares (see HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-2(3) (1976); a bidder may not specify that it
will only bid for a certain lower percentage of the shares. This significantly burdens interstate
commerce, since tender offers frequently are made for less than 100% of the shares; the cost of
buying all or nearly all of the outstanding shares may be prohibitive. The benefit is that all
shareholders wishing to tender may obtain the premium for all shares tendered, rather than the
pro rata take-up which would normally occur. The burden on interstate commerce resulting
from such a provision clearly seems to exceed its benefits.
Kansas has enacted a provision which provides that if a person acquires 2% of a company's
stock without disclosing an intention to "influence control of the target company" or without
making the appropriate filing with the state securities commission, a tender offer may not be
made for one year. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1277(b) (1975). For similar statutes, see GA. CODE
§ 22-1904 (1977); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(b)(2) (Anderson 1978). It is unclear what
local benefit is derived from these provisions, other than making sure that target management is
notified at an early date of an intended tender offer. The burdens imposed by the provision are
significant; if a person has purchased shares at some point when it did not have an intention to
make a tender offer or for whatever other reason the provision was not satisfied, a tender offer
cannot be made until the expiration of the one-year period. (In one instance, the Ohio Securi-
ties Commissioner concluded that the Ohio provision only applied if the purchaser had an
intention to seek control of the target company at the time the purchaser bought the shares. I
M. LIPrON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 251 (1978)). In addition, the
provision represents an additional means of alerting target management of an intended tender
offer. Since the benefits are minimal and the burden significant, such a provision should not
withstand a commerce clause review. (It should be noted that the SEC's proposed rule 14e-2
contains a somewhat similar requirement regarding disclosure of an intention to make a tender
offer.)
After this article was prepared, the SEC adopted amendments to its tender offer rules. See
note 193, infa. If it is determined that such rules are enforceable, these new rules would signifi-
cantly alter the commerce clause balance set forth herein.
175. The doctrine of preemption is derived from the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2.
176. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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regulation of the subject matter is so pervasive that it leaves no room for
state supplementation; 77 (ii) the federal interest in the subject matter is so
dominant that the states must be precluded from enacting laws on that sub-
ject;' 78 or (iii) the need for uniform national regulation is so great that state
regulation cannot be tolerated. ' 79 Even if an intent to preempt state regula-
tion is not expressly evident and cannot be inferred, a state law still may be
preempted if it directly conflicts with the substantive requirements of the
federal law and it is impossible to comply with both laws' 80 or if the state
law undermines the purposes and objectives of the federal law. '8'
The three types of preemption outlined above have been referred to as
express, implicit, and operational preemption.
1. Express Preemption
The Williams Act contains no language from which one could conclude
that Congress intended to preempt the field of regulation of tender offers.
Indeed, the Williams Act was codified in the Securities Act of 1934, which
Act contains a savings clause allowing states to enact similar laws provided
they do not conflict with federal law.1
8 2
2. Implicit Preemption
There has been some debate regarding whether the Williams Act consti-
tutes a sufficiently comprehensive or pervasive federal scheme so that an in-
tent to preempt could be inferred.' 3 An important consideration is that
state and federal governments traditionally have concurrently regulated se-
curities transactions.'8 4 In addition, Virginia had adopted its takeover law
before Congress enacted the Williams Act, and the continuing effectiveness
of this state law was not addressed in the Williams Act. Of course, a number
of states have subsequently adopted state takeover laws. The Williams Act
has been amended during this period and no mention has been made of an
intention to preempt. Similarly, the proposed new federal securities law ex-
177. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). Sometimes, however, even where there was extensive fed-
eral regulation, no intention to preempt was found. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976);
Head v. Board of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
178. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (national security); Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (foreign affairs).
179. See Evansville Vanderburg Airport Auth. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 720-21
(1972); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297,300 (1961). See generall Hirsch, Towarda New View of
Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515 [hereinafter cited as Hirsch].
180. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Kelley v. Washington, 301 U.S. I
(1937).
181. See, e.g., Jones v. General Mills, 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Lodge 76, International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Perez v. Camp-
bell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
182. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976). This savings clause should not be given a great deal of
weight, however, since it was enacted decades before the enactment of the Williams Act or state
takeover laws.
183. See Note, supra note 108.
184. For example, it has been said that "under the [federal] securities laws state regulation
may co-exist with that offered under the federal securities law. ... SEC v. National Sec.,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 461 (1969).
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pressly permits state regulation of tenders if the corporation has a certain
level of contacts with the state. 185 Accordingly, it seems that state takeover
legislation should not be deemed impliedly preempted by the Williams Act.
The Supreme Court cases in which the federal interest in the subject
matter has been so dominant that the states have been barred from enforc-
ing their laws have generally been limited to foreign affairs and national
security. 186 Therefore, it does not appear that the federal interest in regulat-
ing tender offers is so dominant that state regulation of the field must be
precluded.
On the other hand, one may view uniform national regulation of the
securities area as necessary.18 7 This argument, however, has not been well
received in the United States; state regulation of securities transactions has
generally been deemed constitutional.' 8 8
A related point is that tender offer regulation could be treated as an
internal affairs matter and not as an "issuance of securities." State regula-
tion of corporate internal affairs has generally been constitutionally sanc-
tioned. 189
There is a more basic reason why uniform national regulation of tender
offers is not necessary. Valuable information has been learned from the state
regulation: prolonging the tender offer period (while giving target share-
holders certain prophylactic rights during that period) benefits target share-
holders and does not appear to put a significant burden upon interstate
commerce. Because much has and will be learned from state tender offer
regulation, state tender offer regulation should be preempted only to the
extent that it conflicts with or undermines the objectives of the federal law.
3. Operational Preemption
Of course, a state law is preempted if it conflicts with the federal law
and it is impossible to comply with both. 190 State takeover laws frequently
185. Under the proposed new federal securities law, states could regulate tenders if 50% of
the corporation's shareholders lived in the state and the corporation's principal place of business
was there. See Bartell, Federal-State Relations Under the Federal Securities Code, 32 VAND. L. REV.
457, 480 (1979).
186. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (foreign affairs); Pennsylvania v. Nel-
son, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (national security); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (foreign
affairs). In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), the Supreme Court noted the
strong federal interest in regulating the design of tankers used in foreign commerce.
187. See, e.g., I L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 102 (2d ed. 1961).
188. See, e.g., Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917). Of course, it could be argued
that the regulation of tender offers is somehow different from the regulation of other types of
securities transactions and that states should not be able to regulate them.
189. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
190. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663
(1962). In addition to an actual and resolvable conflict, the Supreme Court has sometimes
suggested that the posstbility of states enacting legislation conflicting with federal legislation is
sufficient to deem state law preempted. See generally Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151
(1978); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973); accord, Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960). The holdings of the Atlantic
Richfitld and Burbank cases, however, were principally based upon the fact that a pervasive
federal scheme was in effect and preemption was thus required.
Even if a state statute has conflicted with the federal statute and the conflict was not resolv-
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set forth substantive provisions that are different from those set forth in the
Williams Act.' 9 ' For example, the pro rata repurchase rights, withdrawal
rights, hold-open periods, disclosure requirements, and waiting periods in
the various state takeover laws frequently vary from those in the Williams
Act.19 2 It is possible, however, to comply with both the state and federal
provisions:193 if more shares are tendered than desired, the pro rata repur-
chase requirements of the Williams Act can be satisfied as to target company
shareholders who tender within the first ten days; then, another computation
could be made under the applicable state law as to shares tendered after the
tenth day but within the period during which target company shareholders
are given pro rata repurchase rights under state law. The bidder would need
to buy more target shares than desired, but both state and federal require-
ments would be satisfied.'
9 4
able, the Supreme Court has ruled that the state law will only be preempted if it undermines
the purposes of the federal law. See Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414
U.S. 117, 134-40 (1973).
191. For a general discussion of the state takeover laws and the Williams Act, see notes 218-
51 ,nfra and accompanying text.
192. See notes 218-43 btfra and accompanying text.
193. It should be noted, however, that certain rules proposed by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission could result in an irreconcilable conflict between state and federal rules.
Proposed rule 14e-l, 44 FED. REG. (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240) provides, among
other things, that tender offers must remain open for at least 30 busihess days. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 15,548, supra note 163. Under proposed rule 14e-l, it could be im-
possible to satisfy this requirement as well as the requirements of some state takeover laws that
tender offers remain open no longer than 35 days.
Some commentators argue that state law deviations from federally mandated pro rata re-
purchase obligations and withdrawal rights should be preempted. See Tender Offers, supra note
113, at 226-29.
After this article was prepared, the SEC adopted amendments to its tender offer rules. The
new rules provide that shareholders of a target company should be able to withdraw tendered
shares until 15 business days have elapsed from the commencement of the offer. New rule 14e-1
now requires that a tender offer must remain open for a minimum of 20 business days. A bidder
is permitted, under rule 14d-8, to extend the pro rata repurchase period beyond the 10-day
period set forth in the Williams Act.
The most significant new provision is rule 14-d-2(b). This requires a bidder, within five
days after the material terms of a proposed tender have been publically announced, to (i) file a
schedule 14D-1 with the SEC and (ii) transmit to the shareholders of the target company a
disclosure document which contains a summary of the material terms of the offer. The Release
states that "Rule 14d-2 is intended to prevent public announcements by a bidder of the mate-
rial terms of its tender offer in advance of the offer's final commencement." See SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA), No. 531, at E-5 (Dec. 15, 1979). This directly conflicts with state takeover laws
which require waiting periods between the announcement and commencement of tender offers.
This provision also states that an offer generally will be deemed to commence the date
upon which the material terms of a proposed offer are made public. This is substantially differ-
ent from when an offer may be deemed to have commenced under state law, thereby making it
more difficult to comply with both federal and state pro rata repurchase requirements and
withdrawal rights.
In addition, the SEC has taken the position that setting forth the material terms of a pro-
posed tender offer in a document filed with a state securities commission constitutes a public
announcement of the tender offer. SEC brief in H.B. Holdings v. Rosario Resources Corp.
(S.D.N.Y.) No. 80 Civ. 0201 (CLB) Uan. 14, 1980).
If it is determined that these rules adopted by the SEC (and the state law waiting period
and administrative hearing provisions) are enforceable, it may be impossible to comply with
both the state and federal provisions, thereby significantly changing the preemption discussion
set forth herein. The Ohio Division of Securities has challenged the authority of the SEC to
adopt these new rules in Ohio v. SEC, CA 2-80-111 (S.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 15, 1980).
194. Accord, Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 226-29.
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Similarly, if state law granted shareholders withdrawal rights for a
longer period than that set forth in the Williams Act, the bidder would
merely honor the state's longer withdrawal right period to satisfy both the
state and federal law requirements. This could, however, undermine the
federally created right of the bidder which provides that tenders become
irrevocable the eighth day after the tender commences.' 9
5 Nevertheless, the
longer withdrawal rights provided by state law seem to be designed to afford
unsophisticated shareholders additional time to decide whether to tender
shares. Thus, this provision is intended to protect target shareholders and it
supports-rather than undermines-the purpose of the Williams Act. Since
the state withdrawal rights advance the general purpose of the Williams Act,
and since it is possible to comply with both federal and state withdrawal
rights, the state provisions should not be preempted.
The Supreme Court has been solicitous of the state interest in regulat-
ing securities transactions. In Merr'll, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v.
Ware,19 6 the Court upheld a state statute which conflicted with the require-
ments of the New York Stock Exchange Rules (which were promulgated
pursuant to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act). 19 7 The Court decided that it
was unnecessary to hold the state law preempted to advance the policy of the
1934 Act.1 98 Because currently there is no irreconcilable conflict between
state and federal takeover laws, and because states historically have been
given the right to regulate securities transactions concurrently with the fed-
eral securities laws, it is submitted that state takeover laws should not be
preempted by federal law.
The most difficult preemption question is whether the state laws are
preempted by the federal law because they frustrate the objectives of the
Williams Act. The analysis is confounded because these objectives are less
than clear. One purpose of the Williams Act clearly is to protect sharehold-
ers of the target company. '99 A question that remains is whether the Wil-
liams Act is designed to balance the equities between target management
and the tender offeror. Certain statements found in the legislative history
suggest that such a balance was attempted. On the basis of this legislative
history, the circuit court in Great Western held that a purpose of the Williams
Act was to establish such a balance between target management and the
tender offeror, and that the state laws undermine this balance and therefore
should be preempted.
2 ° °
195. See Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 227.
196. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
197. Id at 139-40.
198. Id at 134-40. The Burger Court seems reluctant to hold that a state statute is pre-
empted. Compare New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) and
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) with Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) and
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). See generally Note, The Preemption
Doctrine- Shifting Prospecives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
The Burger Court has not handled preemption consistently; at times it seemed to strain to find
preemption. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
199. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
200. 577 F.2d at 1279-80.
Senator Williams noted, regarding the Williams Act, that "we have taken extreme care to
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Other commentators have argued that no such balance was struck. Pro-
ponents of this view note that the "Williams bill" as initially introduced by
Senator Williams was decidedly pro-target management and gradually was
amended to the form enacted as the Williams Act. Moreover, a number of
people who testified regarding the bill stated that its sole purpose was to
protect investors in target companies. 20 1 Similarly, the Supreme Court
found that the Williams Act reflects a "policy of neutrality in a contest for
control," but this policy "does not go . . .to the purpose of the legislation
. . . .Neutrality is, rather, but one characteristic of legislation directed to-
ward a different purpose-the protection of investors."
'20 2
It seems, therefore, that the purpose of the Williams Act is unclear.
This should not affect the determination whether state takeover laws are
operationally preempted by the Williams Act, however. If state waiting pe-
riod and administrative hearing provisions were stricken from state takeover
laws, these laws would not significantly undermine any balance struck by the
Williams Act between the interests of target management and tender offer-
ors. No notice of a tender offer would be required. Target management
would no longer be able to engage in defensive tactics prior to the com-
mencement of a tender offer. To satisfy state law it may be necessary to
disclose more information, to hold the offer open longer, or to give somewhat
different withdrawal rights to shareholders and pro rata repurchase protec-
tion than provided under the Williams Act. Such variances do not seem to
significantly erode any objectives of the Williams Act. 20 3 For this reason, if
the provisions of state law requiring a waiting period and permitting state
administrative hearings are deleted, state takeover laws should not be
deemed operationally preempted by the Williams Act because they under-
mine the Act's purposes.
Arguably, state takeover laws could be operationally preempted since
the state takeover laws take a "fiduciary approach" to tender offers while the
Williams Act reflects a "market approach. °20 4 The essence of this argument
seems to be that state law gives target management power to block a tender
offer, while federal law leaves the decision with the shareholders. The for-
mer belief stems from the fact that many state laws exempt tender offers
avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bid." 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967). In addition, a Senate report on the bill stated
that "the committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in
favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. The bill is designed to
require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the
offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case .... " Senate Commit-
tee on Banking and Currency, Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownersh p in Corporate Takeover
Bids, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
201. See generally Note, supra note 108. As to the degree to which the Williams Bill was
amended before its enactment, compare S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) with S. 510, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
202. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
203. Great Western found that the degree of disclosure required under Idaho law undermined
the utility of federally mandated disclosure and was thereby preempted. 577 F.2d at 1281.




approved by target management. Absent such approval by target manage-
ment, state takeover requirements must be followed in most cases.
This "fiduciary approach-market approach" distinction seems to over-
estimate the club given target management under state laws. Target man-
agement is successful in retaining control in less than a majority of contested
tender offers.205 Admittedly, target management is given some power under
state takeover laws.20 6 If the waiting period and administrative hearing pro-
visions are deemed impermissible burdens upon commerce, however, the
power of target management would be reduced, thereby reducing the signifi-
cance of the "friendly offer" exemption.
Since in a contested tender offer target company shareholders still have
the opportunity to tender their shares, and since the power of target manage-
ment would be reduced if the waiting period and administrative hearing
provisions are deleted, state takeover laws in such form would not signifi-
cantly undermine any objective of, or any market approach reflected in, the
Williams Act and thus should not be deemed operationally preempted by
the Williams Act.
If there is no irreconcilable conflict between state and federal law, the
question of preemption is a policy decision.20 7 As a result of state takeover
laws, the longer hold-open periods (with longer pro rata repurchase and
withdrawal rights) benefit target shareholders and probably do not substan-
tially impede takeovers. Because such valuable knowledge can result from
the experimentation in state takeover regulation, such experimentation
should be allowed to continue.
The preceding discussion concludes that the application of the pseudo-
foreign corporation law of the commercial domicile of a pseudo-foreign cor-
poration to its internal affairs does not violate the due process clause, the full
faith and credit clause, or, in general, place an impermissible burden upon
interstate commerce. Indeed, full faith and credit should be deemed to re-
quire the application of such pseudo-foreign corporation laws. Different
types of such pseudo-foreign corporation laws will be considered below.
VI. PSEUDO-FOREIGN CORPORATION LAWS
A. New York
New York law generally provides that certain provisions of the New
York corporation law 208 apply to foreign corporations that derive more than
one-half their total business income for the preceding three fiscal years from
205. See note 146 supra.
206. The probability of success of an uncontested tender offer appears to be much higher
than that of a contested one. Of the contested tender offers studied by Professor Austin during
the period from 1972 through 1977, approximately 93% of these offers were either partially or
completely successful. During the same period, only approximately 70% of contested tender
offers were partially or completely successful. See Austin, Study Reveals Trends bi Tater~s, Premiums,
Success Rates in Offers, supra note 146. Professor Austin does not note what percentage of the
"unsuccessful" contested tender offers represent instances in which a third party gained control
of the company.
207. See Hirsch, supra note 179, at 542-49.
208. See note 87 supra.
[Vol. 57:3
REGULA TING THE REGULA TORS
New York.20 9 Certain problems arise from a statute which provides that it
governs a corporation immediately if a certain test relating to the income
derived from the state is satisfied. For example, the New York law governs a
foreign corporation beginning the first day of the fiscal year if, for the prior
three fiscal years, it has had more than one-half of its total business income
allocable to New York. The trouble with this formulation is that audited
financial statements often are not available until about ninety days after the
end of the fiscal year; it could be unclear for ninety days whether the corpo-
ration would be governed by the New York law. Similarly, it would be un-
clear for ninety days whether the corporation ceased to be governed by New
York law; this uncertainty would not be resolved until the audited financial
information was available.
Another problem with New York's regulatory scheme is that it only
considers one contact (business income) and it only requires that the corpo-
ration derive more than fifty percent of its business income from New York
to satisfy the statutory test. 210 A corporation could have more than fifty
percent of its shareholders, assets, and employees in another jurisdiction; it is
not clear that the New York law will only apply to corporations whose pri-
mary contact is with New York. It would appear advisable for such state
schemes to require the consideration of a number of factors. A state then
would be on firmer ground that it is indeed the one with the primary interest
in regulating the corporation.
Aside from the above, the New York statute does not clearly provide the
manner in which it regulates newly formed corporations. The law simply
states that it will govern those corporations which during the last three years
derived more than fifty percent of their income from New York. The ques-
tion is whether such newly formed corporations would be governed by the
state of incorporation for three years until they had such financial informa-
tion, or whether the New York law would apply sooner.
B. California
California law requires any foreign corporation transacting intrastate
business in California and any "foreign parent" corporation to file an of-
ficers' certificate with the California Secretary of State.21' This officers' cer-
tificate sets forth the percentage of the company's shareholders that reside in
California, the percentage of the company's sales made in California, the
property located in California, and the salaries paid to employees in Califor-
nia. The certificate must be filed within 105 days after the close of the com-
pany's fiscal year. If the officers' certificate indicates that over fifty percent
of the corporation's shareholders reside in California and that the average of
the corporation's payroll, property, and sales "factors" allocable to Califor-
nia exceed fifty percent, certain sections of California law apply to the corpo-
209. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1315-1320 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1979).
210. The bill as originally submitted to the New York legislature required either that 67% of
the corporation's revenue be generated from New York or that 67% of the shareholders resided
in New York. See Baraf, supra note 8, at 233.
211. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2108 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978).
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ration, beginning the first day of the next fiscal year.
2 12
The California provision avoids certain of the problems of the New
York provision discussed above. For example, it has a more workable time-
table for application. After the financial information has been computed
and the officers' certificate prepared, the corporation normally will have ap-
proximately eight months to plan its corporate activities while being aware
that certain California provisions will govern its activities during the upcom-
ing fiscal year. Conversely, the corporation will normally have eight months'
notice that the law will no longer apply. In addition, the California provi-
sion considers a number of different types of contacts between the corpora-
tion and California; this tends to insure that California will have the
predominate interest in regulating the company.
C. Model Provision
A certain time lag between the end of the fiscal year and the time at
which a pseudo-foreign corporation law would apply is necessary so that a
corporation can prepare its audited financial information and determine its
contacts with the state. A certain amount of additional lag time is necessary
so that a corporation may plan its corporate activities. A minimum of six
months lag time seems required, and the one year provided by the California
statute seems reasonable, since it coincides with a new fiscal year.
A number of commentators agree that such pseudo-foreign corporation
laws should apply to corporations with more than seventy to eighty percent
of its contacts with one state.21 3 The question remains whether such statutes
should apply to corporations with a lower level of state contacts. One could
argue that since such corporations have significant contacts with other states
they are more national in character and should not be governed. This does
not seem persuasive, however. If the pseudo-foreign corporation law consid-
ers a number of different contacts and the magnitude of the contacts be-
tween the corporation and the state averaged more than fifty percent, it
seems quite unlikely that any other state would have a greater interest in
regulating the affairs of the corporation. 2 14 It therefore seems more rational
212. Id. at § 2115. Section 2115(e) exempts from the scope of § 2115 corporations whose
shares are listed on the American or New York stock exchanges and corporations that are sub-
sidiaries of corporations not subject to § 2115. The exemption is unclear, however, regarding
the timing of this exemption. For example, would § 2115 govern a corporation during its next
fiscal year if, after it had filed the § 2108 officers' certificate which showed that the corporation
met the § 2115 tests (but before the beginning of the next fiscal year), the corporation either
listed its shares on the American or New York stock exchange or became a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of a corporation not governed by § 2115.
213. Halloran & Hammer, supra note 27, at 1329. See generally Kirgis, supra note 40, at 139-
42.
214. California law provides that any reorganization of a foreign or domestic corporation
must be qualified with the California Commissioner of Corporations if more than 25% of the
corporation's shareholders reside in California. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25103 (West 1977). To
qualify a transaction with the California Commissioner, the Commissioner must find that the
terms of the transaction are fair, just, and equitable. Accordingly, California purports to regu-
late offers made to all shareholders of a foreign corporation if 25% of those shareholders reside in
California.
This is an example of the troubling interface which exists between state blue sky regulation
and the internal affairs doctrine. While there is a general consensus that a state should not
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to apply the law of the commercial domicile rather than the law of the state
of incorporation.
As noted above, the New York pseudo-foreign provision only considers
the percentage of the company's revenues generated in the state. While this
is a relevant factor, more types of contacts should be considered before a
corporation is deemed pseudo-foreign. California's jurisdictional provision is
a better example of a consideration of a number of relevant contacts. It
seems highly doubtful that a corporation that satisfies California's standard
could realistically be deemed commercially domiciled in any other state.
The pseudo-foreign corporation law should provide that the sections of the
state's corporation law which reflect important state policies will apply to
pseudo-foreign corporations. These sections should obviously be set forth in
the pseudo-foreign corporation law.
Both the California and New York statutory schemes exempt corpora-
tions with securities listed on the American or New York stock exchanges.
2 15
One argument advanced in support of this exemption is that these corpora-
tions are truly national companies. This seems to be a make-weight argu-
ment; under American law, the internal affairs of all corporations, even truly
national corporations, are governed by the corporate law of some state. Any
other considerations notwithstanding, it would appear more sensible to ap-
ply the law of the state of commercial domicile to national corporations
rather than the law of the state of incorporation.
The consideration which militates against this conclusion is that, cur-
rently, full faith and credit does not seem to require the application of the
law of the state of commercial domicile. Until such a rule evolves, even if
the state of commercial domicile has adopted a pseudo-foreign corporation
provision, it will be unclear whether pseudo-foreign corporations are gov-
erned by the law of the state of incorporation or the law of the commercial
domicile. Such uncertainty will place a burden on interstate commerce, and
the burden generally would be greatest regarding large national companies
with securities traded on national securities exchanges.2t 6 Hence, it would
generally regulate the internal affairs of a foreign corporation (unless the corporation is a
pseudo-foreign corporation), there is general agreement that states should have the power to
regulate securities transactions, at least insofar as they pertain to resident shareholders. In this
example, however, California does not merely purport to regulate offers made to California
shareholders but attempts to regulate the total transaction. Such an attempt to regulate the
total transaction, coupled with the California practice of reviewing the fairness of the terms of
the transaction, makes this blue sky regulation resemble an attempt to regulate the internal
affairs of foreign corporations.
One treatise argues that this California policy does not amount to an attempt to regulate
the internal affairs of pseudo-foreign corporations and is merely an exercise of California blue
sky jurisdiction. See generally 1 MARSH & VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURI-
TIES LAWS § 7.06 (1979). The commentators note that the specified minimum level of contacts
which require qualification in California is somewhat arbitrary.
It seems that the minimum level of contacts required by this California policy is much too
low. As a general rule, a state should not attempt to exercise primary jurisdiction over a reor-
ganization involving a foreign corporation unless the corporation has at least 50% of its contacts
(as somehow determined) with the regulating state.
215. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(e) (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1320 (Mc-
Kinney 1963).
216. The distinction between companies with shares listed on the American or New York
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be wise to maintain such an exemption for such companies with listed securi-
ties, at least until such time, if ever, the proposed full faith and credit re-
quirements discussed above are accepted.
D. Recommendations
States should adopt pseudo-foreign corporation statutes such as the
model provision suggested above. If many states would enact such statutes,
a corporation could not easily evade the corporate law of its commercial
domicile merely by incorporating elsewhere. The upshot would be that
states could regulate corporations in the manner deemed optimal rather
than the manner deemed necessary to induce corporations to incorporate in
the state.
Since it is unclear whether states other than the commercial domicile
will apply pseudo-foreign corporation laws to questions pertaining to the in-
ternal affairs of pseudo-foreign corporations until the notion of pseudo-for-
eign corporation laws becomes accepted, some uncertainty will exist in
corporate choice of law regarding the law applicable to a pseudo-foreign
corporation. 21 7 One way of ameliorating this uncertainty would be to deter-
mine that full faith and credit would require the application of reasonable
pseudo-foreign corporation laws to questions pertaining to the internal af-
fairs of such corporations. Alternatively, states could include a choice of law
provision in their corporate codes stating that the internal affairs of all do-
mestic corporations would be governed by the state corporations code, unless
the corporation satisfied the jurisdictional test of a reasonable pseudo-foreign corporations
code of another state. It is not anticipated that pro-management states (e.g.,
Delaware) would be inclined to adopt this type of choice of law provision,
however.
stock exchanges and companies with shares traded on other exchanges or traded over-the-
counter is obviously somewhat arbitrary. It has been argued that the exemption from pseudo-
foreign corporation laws should be extended to such companies. For example, the initial Cali-
fornia draft of § 2115 did exempt such companies. Including such companies under the um-
brella of this exemption, however, would significantly increase the number of companies
exempted from the statutory scheme. It seems, therefore, that the line drawn between compa-
nies with shares listed on the New York and American stock exchanges and other companies is a
reasonable distinction and should be continued. Of course, the uncertainty regarding an inter-
nal affairs transaction of a company with shares listed on the American and New York stock
exchanges could cause a greater burden on commerce than uncertainty in internal affairs mat-
ters of other companies.
The distinction between companies with shares listed on the American and New York stock
exchanges and other companies with traded shares is one which also could be in violation of the
equal protection clause. This argument should fail, however, since there is a rational basis for
the distinction. Because it could reasonably be concluded that applying pseudo-foreign corpo-
ration laws to companies with shares listed on the American and New York exchanges would
cause a greater burden on interstate commerce than applying the laws to other companies, and
because courts have been increasingly reluctant to strike down economic statutes on the basis of
equal protection (see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); see generally Karst, lnvdi-
ous Discrtmtnaton. Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716, 720-25 (1969)), this distinction probably could withstand constitutional
attack.
217. Seegeneral4y Oldham, supra note 2, at 123-31.
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VII. STATE TENDER OFFER LAWS: MULTI-STATE REGULATION OF A
CORPORATE ACTIVITY
More than two-thirds of all the states have enacted takeover statutes in
some form. 21 8 These statutes contain some combination of the following
provisions: (i) certain information be disclosed to target company sharehold-
ers; (ii) a specified waiting period between the time a notice of intention is
filed with a state regulatory agency and the date upon which the offer can
become effective; (iii) specified minimum or maximum periods during which
the offer may remain effective; (iv) withdrawal rights which must be given to
tendering shareholders of target companies; (v) standards for state regulatory
review of the completeness of the disclosure documents and the fairness of
the transaction; (vi) the requirement that all target company shareholders
receive the highest price offered for the shares; and (vii) the requirement that
if more shares are tendered during a certain specified period than the offeror
desires to purchase, the offeror must purchase the shares on a pro rata basis
rather than on a first tendered, first purchased basis.
219
Various standards are set forth in the state takeover laws regarding
what type of contacts the target company must have with the state to have
the tender offer governed by the state takeover law. Most statutes provide
that if the target company is incorporated in the state, the tender offer will
be governed by the state takeover law;2 20 some statutes require a domestic
corporation to have some additional contact with the state, such as doing
business in the state, 22' before the state takeover law applies to a tender offer
for its shares.22 2 Other state laws govern tender offers for shares of a foreign
corporation if the foreign corporation has its principal place of business,
shareholders, 223 a certain number of employees, its principal executive of-
fices, 2 2 4 substantial assets, or does business in the state.
225
218. Seegenerally 2 TENDER OFFERS HANDBXK (J. Robinson ed. 1976).
219. See generaly Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 153.
220. See, e.g., DEL. CORP. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(2) (Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 78.3765 (1973); seegeneraly Note, supra note 108, at 881; Note, Securitles Law and the Constitution:
State Tender Ofer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 515 (1979); Comment, State Takeover
Statutes.- An Unconstitutional Approach.', 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 391, 404 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Comment].
221. E g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-1(5) (1976); VA. CODE § 13.1-5529(e) (1978 & Supp.
1979).
222. Eg., IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(6) (Supp. 1979) (substantial assets in state); MINN. STAT.
§ 80B.01(9) (West Supp. 1979) (substantial portion of assets in state); Wis. STAT. § 552.01(6)
(West Sp. Pam. 1979) (substantial assets in state).
223. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1264(5)(c), (6) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1979) (35 shareholders
in state); 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 55,671 (1979) (Tex. Blue Sky Reg. 065.15.00.200()).
224. See CONN. STAT. § 36-45 7(a) (West Supp. 1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-A:2(vi).
225. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-2-3.1-1-0) (Burns Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-2m
(West Supp. 1979); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1601(a) (West Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. STAT.
§ 1707.041(A)(1) (Page 1978); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 47-32-3 (Supp. 1979); see generaly
Langevoort, State Tender-Ofer Legislation: Interests, Ects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 213, 219-20 (1977).
For example, New York and Ohio law provides that the corporation must have its princi-
pal place of business and substantial assets in the state before the law applies, while Indiana and
New Jersey law provides that it applies to a corporation that has substantial assets in the state or
has its principal place of business there. The significance of this distinction is unclear.
One of the most aggressive of the state laws is the Utah takeover law, which applies to any
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One aspect of the state takeover laws which has caused a significant
amount of controversy is the fact that these laws are extraterritorial. The
statutes purport to govern offers made to shareholders, regardless of domi-
cile, if the tender offer falls within the jurisdictional limits of the statute.
226
The scope of such statutes is obviously more sweeping than normal state blue
sky laws, which are limited to offers made to shareholders who reside in the
state.
A number of state statutes also create a procedure whereby adequacy of
the disclosure or the fairness of the offer may be reviewed by the state securi-
ties commission, 227 either upon request of target company management
228
or at the discretion of the state securities commission. 229 The Williams Act
has no comparable provision.
It is also common for state laws to require that a notice of a tender offer
be filed with the state a certain number of days before the tender offer com-
mences. 230 The Williams Act has no such requirement.
23 1
The state takeover statutes provide certain exemptions; one frequently
foreign corporation with $25 million of its assets or 500 employees in the state. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 61-4-3(6) (1953).
226. See generally Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 153.
227. Id. at 217-20; see Comment, supra note 220, at 406. Certain states require a finding that
there is "fair, full, and effective disclosure" (see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (B)(1)(c)
(Page 1978), while others require a finding that the terms of the offer are "fair and equitable"
(see, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-3(g) (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-2(0 (Burns Supp.
1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 803.03(5) (West Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-4(a)(2) (West
Supp. 1979-80); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 552.05(5) (West Sp. Pam. 1979).
228. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-460 (West Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1501(E)
(West Supp. 1978); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 47-32-23 (Supp. 1979).
229. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-3( (1976).
230. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I10C, § 2 (West Supp. 1979) (30 days); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1(B)(1) (1978) (20 days); VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a) (Supp. 1978) (20
days); see generally Comment, supra note 220, at 405.
231. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (and the rules promul-
gated by the Federal Trade Commission regarding this Act) provide that the Federal Trade
Commission must be notified 30 days prior to the date of certain types of acquisitions (15 days
prior to the consummation of governed cash tender offers). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)
(1976); 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 333-97 (1978). The
rules for determining what types of cash tender offers are governed by the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act are somewhat complicated, but the Act generally governs a tender offer if (i) the bidder
acquires at least 15% of the shares of the target company or the aggregate value of the shares
purchased exceeds $15 million, and (ii) the bidder has total assets or annual net sales of at least
$100 million and the target company is engaged in manufacturing and has annual net sales or
total assets of at least $10 million, or the bidder has total assets or annual net sales of at least
5100 million and the target company has total assets of at least $10 million, or the bidder has
total assets or annual net sales of at least $10 million and the target company has total assets or
annual net sales of at least $100 million. Id at 348-49.
The rules promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission exempt tender offers in which
the bidder acquires 15% of the target company's shares, but the acquired shares will not have an
aggregate value exceeding 515 million and the bidder will not acquire 50% of the voting shares
of a target company with annual net sales or total assets of at least $10 million. Id. at 349-50.
This waiting period prescribed by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act is really a period during
which the cash tender offer may not be consummated. The tender offer may commence during
this period, but shares tendered may not be purchased until the expiration of the 15-day period.
Id at 333, 334, 341, 345-62. For this reason, the 15-day waiting period created by the antitrust
laws is not a "waiting period" in the same sense as the state takeover law waiting periods.
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contained in the laws is the friendly offer exemption.2 32 Such an exemption
normally provides that if the target company's board of directors approves
the offer, the tender offer law will not apply. Some states exempt companies
with securities not registered pursuant to section 12 of the 1934 Act. 233 A
few states exempt tender offers made pursuant to a registration statement
filed with the SEC.
234
One of the more obvious drawbacks of the state tender offer laws is the
imprecise jurisdictional limits. It will be unclear where a corporation's prin-
cipal place of business is or whether it has substantial assets in a state. Spe-
cifically, it is unclear whether the latter requires the corporation to have a
substantial amount of assets in the state or a substantial portion (more than ten
percent, twenty-five percent or fifty percent) in the state.23 5 The problem
which could result from these vague jurisdictional limits is that a tender offer
could be governed by two or more statutes.
236
The state tender offer laws currently have a number of conflicting re-
quirements. For example, the laws of some states prohibit a tender offer from
remaining effective more than thirty-five days,237 while other states require a
tender offer to remain effective for more than thirty-five days. 238 Most states
232. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.57.010(3) (Supp. 1979); see generall, Tender Offers, supra
note 113, at 209; Comment, supra note 220, at 405.
233. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-102(5)(c) (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 517.351(5)(c) (Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3770(2)(e) (1973).
234. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3770(2)(b) (1973).
235. The Indiana takeover law only applies to foreign corporations that have a substantial
portion of their assets in Indiana. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1-10) (Burns Supp. 1979). In the
tender offer by United Technologies for shares of Otis Elevator, the Indiana Securities Division
concluded that the fact that Otis had $32,000,000 worth of assets in Indiana (9% of its total
assets) did not constitute a substantial portion of its assets. Vaughan, State Tender 0 er Regula-
tion, 9 REV. SEC. REG. 969, 970 n.15 (1976).
The Ohio law provides that it only governs foreign corporations whose principal place of
business is in Ohio and which have substantial assets in Ohio. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1707.04.1(A)(1) (1978). Societe Imetal made a tender offer for the shares of Cooperweld, a
non-Ohio corporation. Cooperweld's executive offices apparently were in Pennsylvania; it ap-
parently had no assets in Ohio and was not qualified to do business there. Wilner & Landy, The
Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constituttwnahty, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 12 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Wilner & Landy]. Two subsidiaries were Ohio corporations, while five
other subsidiaries were foreign. Id at 12-13. Cooperweld's management contended that, since
its two Ohio subsidiaries conducted a significant amount of its business in Ohio, the principal
place of business of the parent should be deemed Ohio and the parent should be deemed to
have substantial assets in Ohio. The Ohio Attorney General concluded that the Ohio takeover
statute governed Cooperweld. Id. at 13. This obviously represents a rather broad interpretation
of what constitutes substantial assets. The Attorney General believed that if a company has
substantial assets in Ohio, its principal place of business is in Ohio. Id. at 5; see Comment, supra
note 220, at 403 n.76.
236. It was initially believed that the tender offer by Great Western United for Sunshine
Mining would be simultaneously governed by three takeover statutes. See Note, supra note 108,
at 888 n.125.
237. See, e.g., HAWAtI REV. STAT. § 417E-2(I) (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3772(1) (1973);
VA. CODE § 13.1-530(a) (Supp. 1978).
238. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I 10C, § 7 (West Supp. 1979); MICH. COMp. LAWS
§ 451.905(2) (Supp. 1979). Both require the tender offer to be held open 60 days. The Michi-
gan law also provides that if the proposed purchase price is increased (which frequently hap-
pens) at any time during the offer, this is considered a new offer and the offer must remain open
for 60 days after the date the increased price was offered.
The Williams Act has been construed to require an offer to remain open for 10 days. The
New York Stock Exchange Company Manual provides that tender offers "should" remain open
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(and the Williams Act) permit a tender offer to be made for less than all of
the shares of a target company; Hawaii requires that a tender offer be made
for all shares. 239 Moreover, different rules exist regarding the period during
which shareholders may withdraw tendered shares, 240 and the periods dur-
ing which the offeror must purchase tendered shares on a pro rata basis if the
tender is oversubscribed. 24 1 It would be manifestly impossible to satisfy two
different types of pro rata repurchase standards, without purchasing more
shares than desired. Finally, one state regulatory authority may find a
tender offer unfair and either disapprove or postpone the tender offer, while
another state regulatory authority may approve the tender offer.
The different state requirements suggest that it would be highly burden-
some to have one tender offer regulated by more than one law. The admin-
istrative hearing requirements of the various statutes also could place a
significant burden upon tender offers. In the current extraterritorial form of
state tender offer laws, a tender offer cannot be made in any state until all
administrative hearing requirements have been satisfied in all states alleging
jurisdiction. In addition, it could be difficult to agree on terms that all state
securities commissions would deem fair and equitable.
242
These administrative hearings also could create timing problems for the
for a minimum of 10 days. 1 M. LEvrON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS
226 (1978). The American Stock Exchange Company Guide provides that a tender offer must
remain open for a minimum of 14 days. Id. at 227. The various state tender offer laws require
tender offers to remain open for a minimum of between 10 to 60 days. See generall 2 TENDER
OFFERS HANDBOOK (J. Robinson ed. 1977).
239. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-2(3) (1976).
240. See Tender Offers, supra note 113, at 213-14. Some states reflect the Williams Act rule
that tendered shares may be withdrawn during the first seven days the offer is effective, and 60
days after the offer is made if it is still open. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1506(2) (Supp. 1979).
Other states set forth a different rule. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § I 1-51.5-103(l)(c) (Supp. 1978)
(withdrawal permitted during the first 15 days after the offer and 35 days after the offer, if still
open); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (Supp. 1978) (first 20 days after offer); IND. CODE
§ 23-2-3-5(a) (1978) (withdrawal permitted at any time until three days preceding the an-
nounced termination date); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3772(2) (Supp. 1978) (first 21 days after
offer); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-9a (West Supp. 1979-80); VA. CODE 13.1-530(b) (Supp. 1978).
The Williams Act rule is found in 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976).
241. These rules generally provide that if the number of shares tendered exceeds the
number of shares desired by the bidder, shares tendered during a certain period must be
purchased by the offeror on a pro rata basis rather than pursuant to a first tendered, first
purchased procedure. For example, the Williams Act provides that shares tendered during the
first ten days of a tender offer are entitled to pro rata repurchase protection. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(6) (1976). Some states follow this rule while many others do not. For example, a
number of states provide that the pro rata repurchase protection applies to shares tendered at
any time during the tender offer. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-9(b) (Supp. 1979-80); VA.
CODE § 13.1-530(c) (Supp. 1978). Others provide for pro rata repurchase during a longer pe-
riod than that specified in the Williams Act. Eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(3) (Supp.
1978) (twenty days).
242. APL Corporation recently proposed to make an exchange offer for the shares of Pabst
Brewing Company. The Wisconsin Securities Commissioner rigorously reviewed the terms of
the offer. The offer was never made; a significant factor in this decision to abandon the offer
was the burden placed upon the offer by the Wisconsin Securities Commission. 1 M. LIPTON &
E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 255 (1978); Pabst Buys Stake Held by Suitor APL,"
Takeover Feud Ends, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1979, at 19, col. I (western edition). Another proposed
tender offer that never commenced because of burdens placed upon the offer by the involve-
ment of the state's securities commission was the proposed offer for the shares of Universal Leaf
Tobacco Company by Congoleum Corporation. After the proposed tender offer had not been
approved by the Virginia Securities Commission eight months after the intention to tender was
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offeror. For example, the laws of certain states provide that a tender offer
must be made during a certain period after the filing of a notice of intention
to make a tender offer. 243 The initiation of a state administrative hearing
could easily make it impossible to satisfy such a time requirement.
A number of commentators have discussed whether a tender offer con-
stitutes a matter pertaining to the internal affairs of a corporation. 244 This
obviously depends upon how the issue is characterized. The internal affairs
of a corporation are normally defined as matters pertaining to the relation-
ships among its directors, officers, and shareholders. Internal affairs are con-
trasted with relationships between the corporation and third parties.
A sale of a corporation's securities is generally not considered an inter-
nal affairs question. If a tender offer is characterized as a sale of control to
an existing shareholder, 245 however, this seems to be an internal affairs mat-
ter, since it is a sale of control and the purchaser already has a relationship
with the corporation. If a tender offer is characterized as just a large securi-
ties transaction, a tender offer seems to resemble the type of transaction
which has traditionally been governed by state blue sky law and not by the
state of incorporation. Certain commentators argue that a tender offer con-
stitutes an internal affairs matter;246 others contend that it is not. 247 This
debate seems to be generating much heat, but little light. The primary issue
is not whether this constitutes a matter pertaining to the internal affairs of a
corporation, but whether tender offers require uniform national regulation
by the law of one state, or whether concurrent regulation by the various
interested states is a workable approach. If it is determined that a tender
offer can be governed by a number of state takeover laws, no more need be
decided; the various interested states could regulate a tender offer. 248 If it is
decided that tender offers require uniform national regulation, then the issue
is what law should be applied to such tender offers.
The extraterritorial aspects of state takeover laws could be deleted and
jurisdiction of state takeover laws could be limited to offers made to residents
of the forum. 249 This would obviously result in one tender offer being regu-
lated by a number of various blue sky laws. As mentioned, the laws as cur-
announced, Congoleum decided not to pursue the tender offer. Congoleum Drops Universal Leaf
Bid, Richmond Times Dispatch, June 10, 1977, at A-1I, col. 1.
243. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (1978).
244. Compare Note, supra note 108, at 931 and Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State
Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 722, 722-23 [hereinafter
cited as Shipman] with Wilner & Landy, supra note 235, at 16 and Note, Commerce Clause Limita-
lion Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1153 (1974).
245. A tender offeror frequently purchases approximately five percent of the shares of the
target company before a tender offer is made. After five percent of the target's shares are
owned, a Schedule 13D must be filed with the SEC and the offeror's interest in the target
becomes public.
246. See Shipman, supra note 244, at 722-23; Note, supra note 108, at 931. Proponents of this
view note that a tender offer is the functional equivalent of a proxy fight, unquestionably an
internal affairs matter.
247. See Wilner & Landy, supra note 235, at 16.
248. Of course, it would still have to be decided whether such laws should be extraterrito-
rial.
249. See generally Note, Commerce Clause Limtation Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1153 (1974).
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rently enacted contain many different and sometimes glaringly
contradictory requirements. Disclosure requirements would vary from state
to state. More importantly, states would apply different substantive rules to
a tender offer involving shareholders residing in more than one state. There-
fore, a significant burden would result from the regulation of tender offers by
all states in which target company shareholders reside.
It has also been suggested that if multi-state regulation of tender offers
would be permitted (without extraterritorial application of the state laws),
offerors would not make offers in states with few shareholders or restrictive
* statutes. 250 Target company shareholders would inevitably receive different
prices for their shares. Such a tender offer regulatory procedure would prob-
ably be chaotic and significantly hinder interstate commerce.
The alternative would be one tender offer law governing the tender of-
fer. This would be a more manageable way to regulate a tender offer. The
law governing such a tender offer could be selected in the same manner as
other internal affairs choice of law determinations discussed above. The
tender offer law to be applied would be the tender offer law, if any, of the
state of incorporation, unless the target company were a pseudo-foreign cor-
poration and the state of commercial domicile had enacted a takeover law
which governed pseudo-foreign corporations so that the statute would only
extend to corporations whose commercial domicile was in the forum.
25'
VIII. CONCLUSION
The application of the internal affairs doctrine has had a "Gresham's
law" effect upon state corporation codes. This has resulted because the doc-
trine has been rigidly applied even regarding those corporations that had
little or no contact with the state of incorporation and had a majority of its
contacts with another state. The enactment of pseudo-foreign corporation
laws, plus statutory choice of law provisions which expressly recognize the
psuedo-foreign corporation limit to the internal affairs doctrine, such as
those discussed in the article could stem this pro-management tide of state
corporation laws. A corporation could no longer evade the corporate law of
its commercial domicile merely by incorporating elsewhere. States would be
able to regulate corporations in the manner considered optimal, rather than
in the manner considered necessary to induce domestic corporations not to
incorporate or reincorporate elsewhere.
If this scheme would curb the pro-management trend in state corporate
law, this would allow states to continue to be responsible for regulating the
internal affairs of corporations. If the pro-management trend in state corpo-
rate law continues, it seems inevitable that increasing pressure will be placed
upon Congress to regulate certain internal affairs matters, and possibly even
preempt state corporate law.
The application of the internal affairs doctrine frequently results in the
250. See Note, supra note 108, at 933.
251. None of the present tender offer statutes which attempt to govern tender offers for the
shares of certain foreign corporations is so limited.
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corporation being regulated by a state with little or no interest in governing
its affairs. The scheme advanced in this article would result in corporations
being regulated by the commercial domicile (the state with the most interest
in regulating the corporation), while retaining certainty in corporate choice
of law.
Tender offers and certain other corporate internal affairs require uni-
form national regulation. Therefore, full faith and credit should generally
require the application of the law of the state of incorporation to such ques-
tions. An exception to this rule seems reasonable if the corporation has a
majority of its contacts with another state, and if that state has adopted a
pseudo-foreign corporation statute regulating that issue. Then, full faith and
credit should be required to be given to the pseudo-foreign corporation law
of that state rather than the law of the state of incorporation. If the state of
commercial domicile has not adopted such a law, full faith and credit should
require the application of the law of the state of incorporation, even if the
corporation is a tramp or technically foreign corporation. Multi-state regu-
lation of other issues which are susceptible to multiple state regulation
should be permitted as long as the regulating state has sufficient contacts
with the corporation to satisfy due process requirements.
Such a standard is obviously not as simple as the internal affairs doc-
trine. It would, however, provide certainty in corporate choice of law and
permit the state with clearly the predominate interest in regulating a corpo-
ration to do so. Multi-state regulation of issues which require uniform na-
tional regulation would be avoided.
1980]





Chief Justice Burger and other observers of the legal profession have, in
recent years, criticized the quality of "advocacy" in United States courts.,
While such criticism is most often directed at trial representation, 2 focus on
the performance of defense attorneys in plea negotiations is apposite to
meaningful analysis of legal representation.
No studies have specifically dealt with policing the performance of
counsel within the plea bargaining system. Moreover, one prominent critic
of plea bargain justice, Professor Albert W. Alschuler, seems to dismiss the
policing problem as being unresolvable. 3 While Professor Alschuler's con-
clusion is questionable, this article accepts his challenge that the burden
"rest[s] with the advocates of plea bargaining to propose some mechanism
that can achieve the asserted advantages of the guilty-plea process without,
at the same time, yielding [to] the abuses .... 4
In a line of cases from Powell v. Alabama5 to Argersznger v. Hamtn,6 the
Supreme Court has extended the sixth amendment right to counsel to vari-
ous stages of criminal prosecutions. 7 As one observer has noted, the assist-
ance of counsel is a defendant's most fundamental right, for it "affects his
* I am particularly grateful to Edwin M. Lemert, professor emeritus of the University of
California, Davis, Department of Sociology. I also appreciate the help of Philip Dubois, assis-
tant professor of political science and judicial fellow, U.C.D. Department of Political Science;
Floyd Feeney, professor of law, U.C.D. School of Law; Forrest Dill, associate professor, U.C.D.
Department of Sociology; Jim Hanschu; and Joy Campbell. Participation by the California
County prosecutor deputies and staff was the instrumental factor in this project. That they
cooperated, considering the possible political implications, is testimony to their courage and
professionalism.
1. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialed Training and Certiftation of Advocates
Essential to Our System ofJustce?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973).
2. d passim. Similarly, most discussion of "effective assistance of counsel" has focused on
the trial stage. Craig, The Right to Adequate Representation in the Criminal Process: Some Ohservations,
22 Sw. L.J. 260, 275 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Craig]; Note, The Emerging Right to Eective
Assistance of Counsel, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 542 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Emerging Right . See
generally Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Groundfor Post-Conviction Relief in Crm-
inal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Waltz].
3. "The problem of providing effective representation within the framework of the guilty-
plea system is a problem that cannot be resolved satisfactorily." Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's
Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1313 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Defense Attorney's
Role]. See also Alschuler, The TrialJudge's Role In Plea Bargainhing Part !, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059
(1976); Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REV.
1 (1975); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968) [herein-
after cited as Prosecutor's Role].
4. Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 3, at 1313.
5. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
6. 407 U.S. 25 (1973),
7. Eg., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Contra, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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ability to assert any other rights he may have." 8 In this vein, the Court
stated in McMann v. Richardson9 that the right to counsel contemplates the
"effective assistance of competent counsel" and that "if the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be
left to the mercies of incompetent counsel."' 10
The central importance of the defense attorney in our criminal justice
system is based on the assumption that "the process is an adversary one in
which the initiative in invoking relevant rules rests primarily on the parties
concerned .... ,I" Moreover, "[t]he defense lawyer.is not only a principal
conceptual element of. . . [the] adversary system; he is also a sine qua non of
the system's implementation."' 12 Thus, while the system is legitimized by the
presumed presence and assistance of counsel, 13 it would seem that
"[i]ncompetent counsel can thoroughly vitiate the right which his presence is
meant to secure." 14 Some mechanism for quality control within the crimi-
nal justice system is imperative, but the traditional safeguards-appellate
review and professional self-regulation-thus far have proven unable to pro-
vide that control.15
While the appellate courts differ with respect to the standard of review
applicable in challenges based on counsel's effectiveness, use of either the
"farce ' ' 16 or the various "normal competency" 17 tests frequently amounts to
little more than application of the anachronistic "fundamental fairness" doc-
8. Schaefer, Federahm and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956).
9. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
10. Id at 771.
II. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 172 (1968).
12. Craig, supra note 2, at 261.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227, 233, 236, 238 (1967); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466, 469-71, 480-81 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487, 490
(1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 329, 344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-
69 (1932). See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
141 (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]; REPORT OF THE ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 10-11 (1963).
14. Fitzhugh, Prooding Efective Assistance: The Duty of Defense Counsel, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L.
123, 125 (1975-76).
15. Eg., Bazelon, The Defectwe Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 17 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Defectve Assistance]; Kavanaugh, Performance Evaluation, Education, and Testing: Alter-
natives to Punishment in Professional Regulation, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 953, 956 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Kavanaugh]; Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is it Self Regula-
tion?, 1974 LAW FORUM 193, 196, 228 [hereinafter cited as Marks & Cathcart]; Burbank &
Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession: A Survey of Boston Lawyers, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 66, 69
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Burbank & Duboff]; Note, Inefctve Representation as a Basisfor Rehief
from Conviction. Prmncplesfor Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1, 2 (1977) [herein-
after cited as Inejective Representation]. But see Note, Identifying and Remedying Inefective Assistance of
Criminal Defense Counsel- A New Look After United States v. DeCoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752
(1980); Outcaulh & Peterson, Lawyer Dsciphne and Professional Standards in California: Progress and
Problems, 24 Hastings L.J. 675, 683 (1973).
16. The "farce" tests are based on the view that the sixth amendment requires nothing
more than the formal appointment of competent counsel. Subsequent analysis of counsel's per-
formance under these tests is against the less stringent fifth amendment guarantee of due proc-
ess. Thus, a petitioner may gain relief under the farce test "only when the trial was a farce, or a
mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court, or the purported
representation was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretense." Gillihan v. Madrid
Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977). See also United
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trine.t 8 This is apparent in the tendency of numerous courts to embrace,
overtly or covertly, harmless error tests in effectiveness claims. '9 The contin-
ued reliance of appeals courts on such tests, as well as on other forms of
disingenuous legal craftsmanship, 20 together with the Supreme Court's re-
States v. Ramirez, 535 F.2d 125 (lst Cir. 1976); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
17. In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the Supreme Court enunciated a
standard of effective counsel within the context of plea bargaining. The Court sought to deter-
mine the point at which a defense lawyer's performance is so ineffective as to render his client's
plea an unintelligent act, and held that counsel's performance had reached this stage when his
advice to enter a guilty plea fell outside "the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases." Id at 771. Nine of the federal circuit courts of appeal have rejected the farce
test (discussed at note 16 supra) in favor of variations on the "normal competency" standard.
See United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1978); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540
(4th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); Benson v. United States, 552 F.2d 223 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977); United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976); United States
ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); Beasley v.
United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir.
July 10, 1973), option after remand, 20 CRiM. L. REP. (BNA) 2080 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976),
opinion after remand vacated en banc, March 17, 1977, rev'd, 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2365 (D.C.
Cir. July 12, 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 302 (1979) (placing burden of proof on defendant);
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
18. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). "Fundamental fairness" has been rejected as
the applicable rule for other claims premised on the Bill of Rights. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 384-86 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). But see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
The fundamental fairness standard, however, remains the prevalent test in claims of ineffective
counsel. The "farce" tests evolved directly from the old doctrine. See Strazzella, Inctive Assist-
ance of Counsel Claims- New Uses, New Problems, 19 ARiz. L. REV. 443, 446-52 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Strazzella]; Waltz, supra note 2, at 305; Note, Emerging Right, supra note 2; Note, Standards
for Determining Efective Assistance of Counsel, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 927, 934-35 (1976). Though courts
purport to apply a more objective test under the various "normal competency" standards, "the
ultimate question [under either test] is whether the defendant received a 'fair trial.' " Com-
ment, Ineffectiveness Of Counsel-The Duty To Make A Reasonable Pretrial Investigation, 40 Mo. L.
REV. 369, 371 (1975) (footnote omitted). See Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir.
1979); Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1336 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011
(1975); Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon &Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811, 820-21 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Realities]; lnefective Representation, note 15 supra, at 37-48.
19. Invoking the rationale of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), ineffective-
ness claims require a determination by the court as to whether the defendant was prejudiced by
denial of effective assistance of counsel. Compare this with the formula enunciated in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), in which the Court stated that some Bill of Rights guarantees
"might be lost, and justice still be done." 302 U.S. at 325. Such an analysis shifts the focus of
the sixth amendment claim to a fifth amendment due process issue of overall fairness and in the
process conditions the sixth amendment right on the reviewing court's subjective interpretation
of the defendant's culpability.
Citing the inapplicability of harmless error tests in counsel claims, the court in Beasley v.
United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696-97 (6th Cir. 1974), rejected its use. See also Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.
1977) (ruling on prejudice issue revden banc in 586 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 974 (1979)); but see Judge Hufstedler concurring and dissenting, 586 F.2d at 1334-42.
Still, numerous courts continue to sanction harmless error analysis in counsel claims. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Alabama, 596 F.2d 1214, 1221-23 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cooper, 580 F.2d
259, 263 n.8 (7th Cir. 1978); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), opinion after remand, 20 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA)
2080 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976), opiion after remand vacated en banc, March 17, 1977, rev'd, 25 CRIM.
L. REP. (BNA) 2365 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 302 (1979) (placing burden
of proof on defendant); United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115-16 (3d Cir.
1970). See also United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1123 (Ist Cir. 1978) (leaving issue open).
20. Courts have proven willing to indulge in questionable legal gymnastics in order to
avoid the consequences of forthright analysis of counsel claims. Because Chapman v. Califor-
DENVER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:3
luctance to enunciate a standard for counsel effectiveness, 2 1 testifies to the
inappropriateness of appellate review as a means of policing attorneys' day-
to-day performance. Because of the closed nature of plea bargaining, courts
are rarely in a position to observe counsel's performance except in the most
superficial sense, usually at the plea-taking stage. 22 Moreover, the Supreme
nia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), distinguishes the right to counsel as a right the denial of which requires
automatic reversal, id at 23 n.8, those who urge use of harmless error tests for effectiveness
challenges indulge in the proposition that the right to ective assistance of counsel does not in-
here in the right to counsel. "Important as it may be, the right to effective representation is not
as fundamental as the right to counsel. The right to effective representation is a gloss on the
right to counsel, but it is only a gloss." Ine ective Representation, supra note 15, at 76. See also
McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218 (8th Cir. 1974). But see McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) rev'den bane
in 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978), see Judge Hufstedler concurring and dissenting, 586 F.2d at
1334-42. See generally Note, Substantve and Procedural Aspects of the Right to 4ffectite Assistance of
Counsel, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 525, 539-43 (1979).
While the above fiction has recently evolved as a device for insuring finality of convictions
under the purported "more liberal" normal competency tests, courts have for years manipulated
the "state action" doctrine to affirm convictions in private counsel cases. This approach, using a
narrow view of the fourteenth amendment, finds necessary state action only in cases in which
counsel was assigned by the court or when state officials failed "to accord justice" to defendants
with retained counsel. Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 P.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975). See discussions of state action with respect to counsel claims in:
Finer, Inefctive ,4ssistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1077, 1113-15 (1973); Fitzhugh, supra
note 14, at 145-51; Waltz, supra note 2, at 296-301; Ineffcttve Representation, supra note 15, at 53-
71. Though other circuits have recently failed to apply the state action approach, Greenfield v.
Gunn, 556 F.2d 935 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928 (1977); United States ex rel. Williams v.
Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975), the Fifth Circuit contin-
ues to employ the state action formula, see Marino v. United States, 600 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.
1979); Perez v. Wainwright, 594 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court declined to rule
on the Fifth Circuit's double standard in Mansfield v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir.) (unpub-
lished opinion No. 77-2517 Feb. 9, 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978). Regarding the denial
of certiorari in Mansfield, see Mr. Justice White dissenting in the denial of certiorari in Brown
Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 301, 241 S.E.2d 15 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1014,
1017-18 (1978).
21. "[T]he Supreme Court . . . has never enunciated any clear standards for courts to
follow in passing on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result, circuit courts, left
without guidance, have groped for the correct prescription to apply." McQueen v. Swenson,
498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974). The High Court has "eschewed its responsibility to the lower
courts," preferring to "address the problem by persuasion and admonition." Tague, The Attempt
to Improve Criminal Defense Representation, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 109, 110-12 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Tague]. Recently dissenting in the denial of certiorari in Marzullo v. Maryland, 561
F.2d 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978), Mr. Justice White wrote that "[iln refusing
to review a case which so clearly frames an issue that has divided the Courts of Appeals, the
Court shirks its central responsibility as the court of last resort." 345 U.S. at 10 12-13. See also
Mr. Justice White's dissent in the denial of certiorari in Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 144
Ga. App. 301, 241 S.E.2d 15 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1014, 1017-18 (1978). In addition to
Marzullo, the High Court has denied certiorari in leading effectiveness cases of the circuit courts.
Eg., the Court refused to rule on the farce test, Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977); Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977); Dinker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1003 (1975); the confusing standard of United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); and the normal competency test, United States ex rel.
Davis v. Johnson, 495 F.2d 335 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 878 (1974); Benson v. United
States, 552 F.2d 223 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977). Indeed, for petitioners seeking
relief on ineffective counsel grounds, it is a long, long way to certiorari.
22. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973), opinion afler remand
20 CRIM. L. RE'. (BNA) 2080 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976), opinion afler remand vacated en bane,
March 17, 1977, rev'd, 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2365 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 302 (1979); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 739 (3d Cir. 1970); Defense Attorney' Role,
supra note 3, at 1198, 1270; Defective Assistance, supra note 15, at 34; Craig, supra note 2, at 276;
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Court's "quest for finality" 23 of guilty pleas is in direct conflict with the
long-standing assumption that positive reformation of defense performance
can be induced through reversals of convictions. 24 Further exacerbating the
situation are the Court's recent rulings constricting access to collateral re-
view, resulting in almost complete insulation of guilty pleas and some trial
convictions.
2 5
The legal profession's efforts at self-regulation have proven equally un-
productive as a means of monitoring criminal defense lawyers' performances.
The organized bar traditionally has preferred to deal with the problem of
unethical practices while ignoring the issue of professional competence.
26
Moreover, professional grievance procedures are geared to ascertaining the
culpability of practitioners. 27 This preoccupation with fault can be said to
limit, if not preclude, responsible criticism and corrective action by profes-
sional peers. 28 The result is that "the careless, ill-prepared, or ignorant at-
Note, Post-Conviction Rehef From Pleas of Gudty: A Dinishing Right, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 182,
185-86 (1971); Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 564, 579 (1977). Trial judges are expected to preside over entry of the plea and ensure the
voluntariness of the bargain. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Judicial participation in
plea negotiations is, however, officially condemned. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL
JUDGE § 4.1(2) (1974); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 136 (1967). Thus, the trial
judge's ability to spot problems in defense counsel's preparation, especially in the plea bargain-
ing context, is suspect; even when problems are obvious, the court may refuse to acknowledge
them. See Katz, Gideon s Trumpet." Mournful and Muffed, 55 IOWA L. REV. 523, 557-58 (1970).
Even when defense counsel's inadequacies are brought to the attention of the court or occur
during trial, judges are reluctant to intervene. See United States ex rel. Spencer v. Warden,
Pontiac Correction Center, 545 F.2d 21, 22-25 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. De Coster, 487
F.2d 1197, 2000 (D.C. Cir. 1973), opinion after remand, 20 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2080 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 19, 1976), opinion after remand vacated en bane, March 17, 1977, rev'd, 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA)
2365 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 302 (1979); United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d
928, 931 (2d Cir. 1970). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated that "the matter [of ensur-
ing effective assistance of counsel] for the most part, should be left to the good sense and discre-
tion of the trial courts." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). See also Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1124 (1st Cir. 1978);
Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1977); Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334,
1337 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975).
23. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); id at 83-84 (Powell, J., concurring);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 787 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Erickson, The Fial-
ity of a Gudty Plea, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 835, 835-37, 845, 846 n.80, 848-49 (1973).
24. The "reformation through reversal" view is espoused by Realities, supra note 18, at 822
n.51. The prophylactic effect of reversal is questioned by Tague, supra note 21, at 165.
25. Eg., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976);
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771-73 (1970). See
generally Strazzella, supra note 18, at 472-84; Goodman & Sallet, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower
Federal Courts Respond, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1683 (1979).
26. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 15. See Kavanaugh, supra note 15; Committee Report. The
Disposition of Cases of Professional Incompetence in the Grievance System, 32 THE RECORD 130 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Committee Report]. See generally J. CARLIN, LAWYER'S ETHICS: A STUDY OF
THE NEW YORK CITY BAR (1970) [hereinafter cited as J. CARLIN]; ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (CLARK COMMITTEE) (1970) [hereinafter
cited as CLARK COMMITTEE]; Arkin, Self Regulation and Approaches to Maintaining Standards of Pro-
fessionalIntegrity, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 308 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Arkin]; Note, Legal Ethics
and Professionalism, 79 YALE L.J. 1179 (1970).
27. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 15; Kavanaugh, supra note 15.
28. Although failure to inform the regulatory "authority" of "unprivileged knowledge or
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torney who continually produces inadequate legal work is often beyond
effective regulation."
29
Despite current failings, professional self-regulation may have great po-
tential, especially in the criminal justice system. The goal of this article is to
articulate a concept of adversary review. No specific proposals are made;
rather, a critical discussion of the efficacy and potential of one adversary
review system is presented to offer a method and preliminary documentation
for further study of the problem of implementing effective professional self-
regulation.
It should be noted that the assumption that self-regulation by criminal
justice system lawyers will be meaningful is based on the presumption that
individual attorneys would subvert their own desires to win, thereby making
the integrity of the system paramount. This presumption would result, for
example, in a prosecutor telling his opponent that the defense attorney had
performed poorly, even when the prosecutor knew such remarks would result
in an ongoing adversary improving his performance, and possibly winning
the next case. Some of the comments made by individual prosecutors partic-
ipating in the study described below may indicate, however, that subverting
the desire for convictions is, under the present system, extremely difficult for
some assistant district attorneys.
30
II. METHOD
The research for this study was performed in a California county, re-
ferred to in this article as California County. 3 1 The entire staff3 2 of the
county district attorney's office evaluated the performance of defense attor-
neys in criminal cases, with particular emphasis on performance in plea bar-
gaining. The study did not attempt full peer review. While deputy
prosecutors evaluated defense counsel, there was no review of the prosecutors
evidence concerning [the incompetency of] another lawyer or judge" is a disciplinable offense
under the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 1-102(A), -103(A), (B) (1975),
the Code has been ineffective in coercing reports. Committee Report, supra note 26, at 130, 132
n.9, 133 (1977). See Brown, A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibih'to: In Defense of Mediocnto, 16
CATH. LAW. 314 (1970); Note, The Lawyer's Duy to Report Arofessional Misconduct, 20 ARIZ. L.
REV. 509 (1978). In an analysis of complaints filed against California attorneys between 1969-
70 only 37, or about 0.1% of California's 30,672 attorneys, were disciplined or recommended to
be disciplined. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 15, at 214-15. Study of the New York Bar dis-
closed that only 2% of all violators were processed through the bar's regulatory scheme, and that
less than 0.2% of all violators were actually sanctioned by either disbarment, censure, or suspen-
sion. J. CARLIN, supra note 26, at 170. Nationwide, less than 0.1% of practicing attorneys face
official sanction of any kind from the organized bar, according to the ABA Center for Profes-
sional Discipline located in Chicago, Illinois. Due to the bar's traditional disinclination to act
without specific complaint, see CLARK COMMIrrEE, supra note 26 at 60-66; Burbank & Duboff,
supra note 15, at 100-01, this situation is not likely to change in the near future.
29. Kavanaugh, supra note 15, at 960.
30. See note 49 and accompanying text inha.
31. "California County" is a pseudonym. The author preferred not to identify the county
studied. The county is a large rural county with an approximate population of 100,000 to
200,000. In the year of the survey, the county's District Attorney's office filed approximately
1,300 complaints.
32. The legal experience of the staff is set out in Appendix ii.
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by defense attorneys. The method is, therefore, described as "one-sided ad-
versary review."
A. The Research Design
A significant impediment to performance-oriented research is the bar's
traditional disinclination to engage in critical evaluation at the level of par-
ticulars. While most practitioners are willing or even anxious to condemn
incompetency generally, few are inclined to support such statements with
specific criticism. This ubiquitous difficulty was stressed in the Clark Report:
Although lawyers and judges have the necessary background to
evaluate the conduct of attorneys and are far better equipped than
laymen to recognize violations of professional standards, relatively
few complaints are submitted to disciplinary agencies by members
of the profession. This fact has been cited as a major problem by
nearly every disciplinary agency in the United States surveyed by
this Committee.
33
The result, as noted by Judge David J. Bazelon of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, is that "[tihere are no statistics to
illustrate the scope of the problem [of ineffective assistance] because . . the
criminal justice system goes to considerable lengths to bury the problem."
34
This project was designed to collect data to fill this void. The prosecu-
tor's staff agreed to participate in a small-scale experiment in performance
evaluation. For twelve weeks, the deputy district attorneys evaluated oppos-
ing counsel's performance in plea bargaining. To facilitate this evaluation, a
one-page form was designed, in cooperation with the assistant district attor-
neys, 35 which enabled each deputy to evaluate the performance of defense
counsel with minimal demands on prosecutor time. 36 The form is primarily
a device for estimating counsel's preparation, and so is particularly appropri-
ate for analyzing plea bargain results, since it focuses on the most identifi-
able aspect of defense counsel's work. Counsel's duty to investigate,
regardless of the accused's stated desire to plead guilty is clearly mandated in
the A.B.A. Standards.37 Increasingly, appellate courts look to these standards
as "a starting point for the court to develop, on a case-by-case basis, clearer
guidelines for courts and lawyers as to the meaning of effective assistance."
38
Focus on the requirement of investigation is further emphasized by the ABA
33. CLARK COMMITTEE, supra note 26, at 167.
34. Defeciwe Assistance, supra note 15, at 2.
35. Regarding survey-form research, Cicourel has noted that:
[tlhe problem is not that organizational categories, questions, and answers are irrele-
vant, but that surveys and official records typically structure materials, so that the
answer is decided by the form in which the question is posed or formal categories
provided for classification. What is lacking is the actor's conception of the operative
social structures.
A. CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 107 (1968). Involvement of
the deputies in construction of the survey form was an attempt to minimize this problem.
36. The deputies cited lack of time as the major technical problem of the survey.
37. A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 13, § 4.1.
38. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203 n.23, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973), opinion afler
remand, 20 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2080 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976), opinion after remand vacated en
bant, March 17, 1977, rev'd, 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2365 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979), cer. denied,




CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY which provides that the
"[h]andl[ing of a] legal matter without preparation adequate in the circum-
stances" is a disciplinable offense. 39 The idea that preparation can be de-
fined and measured is asserted in the Third Circuit's observation that "[t]he
advocate's work. . . is not readily capable of later audit like a bookkeeper's.
Of course, not all the activity of the advocate has this highly subjective qual-
ity. It is possible to examine the sufficiency of his preparation and the ade-
quacy of his knowledge of the relevant law."
40
B. The Survey Form
On the survey form, 4 1 the deputies could indicate five control charac-
teristics of each case, and, where applicable, evaluate defense counsel's per-
formance with respect to final disposition. In order to make comparisons
without risking participants' anonymity, a coding system to identify deputies
and defense counsel was developed. Identification numbers were randomly
assigned to the seven deputies and approximately seventy-five defense law-
yers. Using the code, each deputy answered questions number one and two
by indicating the proper code numbers for himself and opposing counsel.
The third question indicated defense counsel status: public defender,
appointed, or privately retained. Next, the main charge was indicated. In
an effort to minimize the reporting burden, four classifications of charges
were chosen:42 (1) selected misdemeanors (drunk driving cases), (2) serious
misdemeanors (alternate felony/misdemeanor cases), (3) felonies (all felonies
except those categorized as serious felonies), and (4) serious felonies (various
violent offenses). Finally, the case status was indicated: in negotiation,
charges dropped, and agreement on a guilty plea. Since the deputies were
instructed to fill out forms whenever a "meaningful attempt at negotiation"
occurred, almost half of the returns were reported as "still in negotiation."
While these particular reports are of limited value for this analysis, the "in
negotiation" category encouraged the deputies to examine the preparation
of counsel on a daily basis.
The five control questions were followed by three judgmental questions.
First, the deputies were asked to give a general qualitative rating of defense
counsel's preparation; and, in instances where preparation was judged to be
inadequate, the deputies were asked to indicate whether defense counsel was
informed of the problem. Next, the deputies indicated specific problem
areas for cases in which inadequate preparation had been found. Finally,
the influence of counsel's preparation on the disposition of the case was re-
ported. As an optional step deputies were asked to comment.
Over the twelve-week survey period, 618 completed forms were re-
turned, 348 of which reported dispositions. The prosecutors filled out forms
in 90 to 95% of the applicable cases. After the survey, the prosecutors were
39. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 6-101(A)(2) (1975).
40. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970).
41. See Appendix i.
42. See Appendix iii. The deputies participated in these selections. See note 35 supra.
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asked to complete an open-ended self-evaluation designed to shed light on
the credibility and objectivity of their evaluations.
43
C. Characlerisli's of Caiforni'a Couno
The issue of effective assistance of counsel is especially germane to Cali-
fornia County, because of the heavy use of charge-reduction plea bargaining
by the office of the district attorney. This tactic is pursued by initially
overcharging defendants. As one prosecutor stated in an interview:
I'll charge everything within reason. There are other charges we
could still dream up, but. . . we still employ a "shotgun" charging
system. We do this for two reasons: One, if we're pressed to go to
trial, we want to go in with all the possible charges, because you
never know what a jury will find on. Two, [shotgun charging] fa-
cilitates the negotiation process. It gives you something to move
on.
44
Overcharging is facilitated by CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b)(4). 45 One
prosecutor stated in an interview that section 17(b)(4) "almost encourages
charge reduction bargaining" by specifically allowing some charges to be
filed as either felonies or misdemeanors. If the same crime can be considered
either a felony or a misdemeanor, with jail or prison alternate sentences, the
charge is considered a "wobbler" under section 17(b)(4). The case can be
filed at either level in the deputy district attorney's discretion. The practice
is to charge at the felony level and drop to a misdemeanor to facilitate bar-
gaining.
Another means of expediting the bargaining process is provided in the
liberal definition of "reasonably related" enunciated in People V. Wet.46 Un-
der West, defendants are allowed to enter guilty pleas to a "reasonably re-
lated" offense carrying a mutually acceptable sentence or sanction.
The extensive use of charge-reduction bargaining in California County
becomes statistically evident when the county's felony arrest attrition rate is
compared with that of other counties in California. In the year in which this
study took place, only 22% of felony arrests in California County received a
felony disposition. This is comparable to a state-wide felony arrest/felony
disposition rate of 23%. But, in California County, 73% of felony arrestees
received dispositions at the misdemeanor level, in comparison to 57% state-
wide. At the screening stages, California County law enforcement agencies
showed a low release rate of .55% compared to 6.7% statewide. Also, for the
same period, the California County District Attorney's Office denied only
5.1% of all felony complaints, as opposed to 13.6% statewide. Despite appar-
ent low levels of screening, the county maintained a conviction rate of 64%
for all felony arrests, compared to a statewide figure of 56%.
4 7
43. See Appendix ii.
44. Quoted written comments of California County prosecutors were made on the survey
forms. As indicated in the text, some comments were made during interviews.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b)(4) (West 1979).
46. 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
47. These figures are derived from data reported in the CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFILE.
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While it is possible that California County's low screening percentage is
the result of better quality arrests, this is not likely to be the case. Instead, it
appears that some defendants are deliberately charged as a result of infirm
arrests, with the intention of pushing them into the criminal justice system.
One sheriff candidly stated during an interview:
A lot of times cases are dumped because the case isn't that hot on
the officer's part . . . and they're not going to get a good convic-
tion out of it so they bargain it out to the best they can get. . . . If
I've got a shaky case, I'll go down to the D.A.'s and say, "Hey, let's
try and work it out" . . . If I don't feel good about a case, I'll go
down to the D.A.'s and say, "Hey, if you ever use plea bargaining,
let's use it now." I mean, I don't like the plea bargaining system
• . . but there are times and places for it on weak cases.
Similarly, a police officer who was interviewed stated:
I have no problem with [the exclusionary rule] being used as a tool
[in bargaining]. A U.S. Supreme Court decision that came down
about a year ago stated that the safety of the community has to be
looked at as well as the individual's rights [with respect to] search
and seizure, and sometimes those rights should be overlooked, or
very minimal weight should be given . . . for the safety and secur-
ity of the community.
48
Guilty pleas, most of which are achieved through plea bargaining, are
the primary method of obtaining convictions in California County. 49 To the
extent that such pleas result from manipulation by law enforcement officials
and from the district attorney's overcharging policy, outcomes depend heav-
ily on defense counsel's role as a countervailing agent able to overcome the
influence of infirm arrests and inflated charges. The reality behind this de-
pendence will now be examined.
III. ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE PERFORMANCE IN CALIFORNIA COUNTY
A. Correlation of Charges to Dispositions
Table 1, below, shows a breakdown of both the main charges and the
dispositions which occurred during the twelve-week period. As might be ex-
pected, the percentage of interactions 50 resulting in dispositions decreases
with severity of the charge; an apparent exception in regard to serious misde-
meanors can be explained by the influence of charge-reduction bargaining
under CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 17(b)(4). 5 1
48. The officer was alluding to Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). But see Lefkowitz v.
Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 296 n.3 (1975) (White, J., dissenting); Note, Plea Bargainng and the
Transfornatton ofthe Cnrinal Process, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564, 573 (1977). See generaly Prosecutor's
Role, supra note 3.
49. Guilty pleas account for approximately 95% of the criminal convictions in California
County, supra note 47.
50. "Interactions" include cases reported as "still in negotiation" and cases reported as
"disposition reached."
51. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
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Table I
Status of Case by Main Charge Classification
Main Charge Classification*
Selected Serious Serious
Status of Case Misdemeanors Misdemeanors Felonies Felonies
"In Negotiation" 41.6% 35.6% 60.3% 63.6%
"Final Disposition 58.4 64.4 39.7 36.4
Reached"
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
n=380 n= 129 n=78 n=22
9 observations = missing
*See classifications in Appendix iii
618 total cases in survey
B. Performance Evaluations
In response to the first of three judgmental questions of the survey form,
the deputies evaluated the overall performance of defense counsel. Table 2,
below, shows a breakdown of the deputies' assessments of the quality of this
performance.
Table 2
Performance Evaluations by Reporting Deputy, Disposed Cases
Deputy Nos.
No. I No. 2 No. 3 Nos. 4-7* ALL
Performance
Evaluations
"Excellent" 28.8% 10.0% 57.3% 10.3% 33.1%
"Acceptable" 60.6 60.0 30.8 67.9 49.9
"Inadequate" 10.6 30.0 11.9 21.8 17.0
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
n=66 n=60 n= 143 n=78 n=347
I observation = missing
*While seven deputies were involved in the survey, three handled the bulk of the plea negotia-
tions and dispositions. Deputies 4-7 include: one administrator, two veteran trial attorneys, and
one deputy involved in work mostly outside the scope of the survey.
Analysis of Table 2 suggests that the ratings of performance vary from
deputy to deputy. Because of the distribution of the various courts in Cali-
fornia County, a team of two prosecutors frequently deals with a correspond-
ing team of public defenders and a handful of private counsel. Thus, the
sample from which the evaluations of performance were drawn probably
reflected differences in levels of competence of lawyers in different areas of
the county. For this reason, evaluations that deviate from the norm do not
necessarily indicate unreliability of the deputies' judgments; moreover, such
evaluations are likely to reflect the peculiar characteristics of the county.
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Analysis of data not shown indicates that while defense performances
were inadequate in 17% of dispositions, the deputies showed a marked reluc-
tance to inform opposing counsel of perceived inadequacies, doing so in only
29% of the applicable cases.
52
Table 3
Performance Evaluations by Defense Counsel Status, Disposed Cases
Defense Counsel Status*
Public All Defense
Defender Appointed Retained Attorneys
Performance
Evaluations
"Excellent" 30.1% 33.3% 37.2% 33.2%
"Acceptable" 55.4 33.3 43.9 49.7
"Inadequate" 14.5 33.3 19.0 17.0
100.0% 99.9% 100.1% 99.9%
n=186 n= 12 n= 148 n=346
2 observations = missing
*Further analysis of data not shown reveals that "charge breakdowns" for each defense counsel
status are quite similar. For example, 67.2% of the public defenders' cases were "selected misde-
meanors," compared to 67.6% for retained counsel. Additionally, 2.2% of the public defenders'
cases were "serious felonies," compared with 1.4% for retained counsel.
Table 3 indicates that public defenders were rated favorably more often
than retained counsel. Further, analysis of data not shown reveals that pub-
lic defenders were more frequently informed of the perceived inadequacy
when their performance fell below the accepted minimum.
53
C. Inadequate Preparation
In cases in which defense counsel's performance was found to be inade-
quate, the deputies specified the problem areas of inadequacy. The most
frequent problem was defense counsel's ignorance of case facts. Indeed, this
might have proven to be an even more pervasive problem if the "combina-
tion or all" category were broken down.
52. Analysis of data not shown reveals that this trend holds for all deputies.
53. Public defenders were informed of their inadequacies in 37% of the applicable cases, as
opposed to 27.3% for retained counsel. Further analysis of data not shown indicates that the
deputies' propensities to inform opposing counsel of inadequacies did not increase with the
severity of the charge.
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Table 4
Areas of Inadequate Preparation by Defense
Counsel Status, Disposed Cases
Defense Counsel Status
Public Defender Appointed Retained
Problem Area
Facts of Cases 41.4% 50.0% 26.7%
Witnesses 10.3 0.0 13.3
Statutes 3.4 25.0 0.0
Case Law 10.3 0.0 0.0
Combo/All 34.5 25.0 60.0
99.9% 100.0% 100.0%
n=29 n=4 n=30
Table 4 indicates that retained attorneys were cited as having problems
relating to witnesses and case facts in 40% of their cases, as opposed to 51%
for public defenders. While this distinction may be explained by the heavy
caseloads that public defenders carry the frequent reporting of "combination
or all" problems for retained counsel may suggest that the actual extent of
failure to fully investigate facts is greater than indicated by the percentages
in specific categories.
D. Efect of Counsel's Performance on Case Disposiion
The last question of the form solicited from the deputies a categoriza-
tion of the quality of the case disposition by applying the following seven
descriptive synopses:
1. The case was deemed "routine" by the assistant district attor-
ney and defense counsel; there was no discussion of case particulars,
but a plea agreement was reached.
2. Defense counsel's preparation was adequate/very good, and
the defendant benefited by such representation.
3. Defense preparation was adequate, but for other reasons (such
as a personality conflict between attorneys) the disposition was not
as favorable as it might have been had the defendant been repre-
sented by other counsel.
4. Defense counsel's preparation was inadequate, but the case was
strong and (for this or other reasons unrelated to counsel's lack of
preparation) adequate preparation would have rendered the same
result.
5. Defense counsel's preparation was inadequate and would have
resulted in a less favorable disposition for the defendant, but the
D.A. compensated and granted an equitable bargain.
6. Defense counsel's preparation was inadequate and resulted in a
less than favorable disposition for the defendant.
7. Both inadequate preparation and personality conflicts (be-
tween the assistant district attorney and defense counsel) were key
factors detrimental to the defendant's disposition.
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Analysis of the data shows that defense attorneys were rated inade-
quately prepared in 18.6% of all dispositions. 54 Either because the state's
case was strong or the deputies compensated, counsel's inadequacies were
judged not to have affected the dispositions in 60% of these cases. But 1n 40%
of the cases in which counsel's preparation was judged inadequate, the assistant district
attorney indicated that the disposition was detrimental for the defendant. Thus, the
deputies reported that in 7.4% of the cases there was a result that Judge
Bazelon has characterized as "shocking": "the prosecutor was perfectly will-
ing to let the defendant be victimized by his lawyer's inadequacy. '55 Fur-
ther, analysis of data not shown indicates that, in 17.6% of the cases in which
defense counsel was told of his perceived inadequacy, the defendant still re-
ceived a detrimental disposition. Conversely, in 45.2% of the cases in which
defense lawyers were not informed of perceived inadequacies, deputies either
compensated for counsel's performance or otherwise rationalized the disposi-
tion in such a way that counsel's failings did not penalize the defendant.
Analysis of the quality of dispositions by defense attorney status
5 6
shows, that for the three classifications, there is marked deviation in the inci-
dences of routine dispositions. As might be predicted, 42% of the public de-
fender's cases were labeled routine, as opposed to 8 and 26.4% for appointed
and retained counsel, respectively. Removing these routine cases from the
performance oriented disposition options permits closer analysis of defense
counsel performance.
54. The slight increase in "inadequate" evaluations from the 17% figure reported in Tables
2 and 3 occurred because six cases originally labeled as "acceptable" were deemed "inadequate"
at the disposition stage. See Table 5, infra.
55. Defective Assistance, supra note 15, at 15. Judge Bazelon adds that prosecutors have little
incentive to do otherwise, as there is no serious threat of reversal on ineffective counsel grounds.
With respect to the prosecutor's willingness to "let the defendant be victimized," one dep-
uty maintained that "fatal flaws," (i.e., violations of exclusionary rules) are "screened out," and
do not contribute significantly to dispositions. On the other hand, the same deputy stated that
he "feel[s] no duty to tell [counsel] about ... legal and evidentiary problems. . .[and] flaws in
the case which don't justify a dismissal or rejection of the charge at the outset." The deputy
related two cases to illustrate the point:
I had a "wobbler." [See note 45 supra]. [Defense attorney] called up and said his client
was ready to plead. When he arrived, he had the plea forms all filled out and signed
by his client. He had his man pleading to a felony! Of course, I was expecting to
settle a misdemeanor, but I didn't say anything. I just signed ...
(A highly respected defense attorney] failed to notice a fantastic flaw in our evidence.
He just didn't see it. His client is in prison now. Even the best make mistakes.
A second deputy recalled a similar case:
There were three people being arraigned. One of them was represented by [a public
defender]. The charges against his client were really weak; they were felony bad
checks, but we couldn't have proven it. The checks were three years old, and we
didn't have the key witness. The defendant wanted to plead guilty, but the judge had
assigned her [a public defender]. When she told [the public defender] she wanted to
plead as charged, he said "OK" and filled out the forms. He didn't even attempt to
negotiate. That's incompetence. It's also unethical . ..but, if I have a car worth
$375, and somebody offers me $500, I'll take it. And I took the felony. ...
Another incident related by the second deputy involved an inexperienced attorney:
I was sitting there with the defense, waiting for the judge. [Counsel] leaned over tome
and asked, "Hey, what should I do? Plead guilty now, or ask for a continuance?" I
told him it was his decision. He then asked "what should I plead this guy guilty to?" I
told him to P.A.C. [plead as charged] and he did.
56. See note at Table 3, supra.
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Table 5
Quality of Performance and Outcome of Non-Routine
Dispositions by Defense Counsel Status
Defense Counsel Status




Favorable 71.3% 63.6% 70.7%
Adequate/But Detrimental 1.9 0.0 0.0
Inadequate/But Favorable;
Case Was Strong 12.0 18.2 9.2
Inadequate/But Favorable;
Deputy Compensated 5.5 0.0 7.3
Inadequate/Detrimental
Outcome 9.3 18.2 12.8
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
n=108 n=1 1 n=109
In cases in which counsel's performance was indicated as instrumental
to the disposition, the deputies rated preparation as inadequate in 28% of the
cases. Public defenders were found to be inadequately prepared in 27% of
their cases, but contributed to detrimental dispositions in only 26% of those
cases. Retained attorneys were rated as inadequately prepared in 29% of
their cases, and their inadequate preparation was indicated to have ad-
versely affected dispositions in 41% of those cases.
5 7
Though these categorical analyses are interesting,5 8 such generalized
analysis is of limited use for the purpose of singling out individual attorneys
for closer study. Using other survey data, however, it is possible to analyze
individual counsel's performance while controlling for key variables. For ex-
ample, one defense lawyer, a deputy public defender, handled thirty-eight
dispositions over the twelve-week period. Of these, thirty were selected mis-
demeanors, five were serious misdemeanors, two were felonies, and one was a
serious felony. The deputy public defender was rated inadequate in 31.6% of
the cases, and was informed of the perceived inadequacies only 25% of the
time. No single problem area stands out; the assistant district attorneys cited
"combination or all" to describe 75% of the deputy public defender's prob-
lem cases. Of his thirty-eight dispositions, 52% were labeled routine. In his
57. Analysis of data not shown reveals that "personality conflicts" contributed to five of
retained counsel's "detrimental outcomes." No such conflicts were reported for public defend-
ers or appointed counsel.
58. Superficially, these findings challenge the prevailing assumption that public defenders
render inferior service in comparison to retained counsel. While Table 5 can be interpreted in
this way, such a conclusion is unfounded. Analysis of data not shown reveals little deviation
within quality ratings of public defenders; retained counsel, however, are shown to perform at
highly variant levels of competence. As one deputy prosecutor explained, "public defenders are
mediocre most of the time. On the other hand, some retained counsel are excellent and others
are horrible .... "
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nonroutine dispositions, assistant district attorneys indicated that the deputy
defender rendered acceptable performance and contributed to favorable dis-
positions in 22%. He was rated inadequately prepared in the remaining 78%
of nonroutine dispositions, yielding detrimental dispositions in 35% of these
cases. One deputy who regularly dealt with this attorney wrote:
Defense counsel attempted to enter [a] written guilty plea but after
two attempts had to be instructed by judge on proper method
. . . . Defendant in custody, and lack of preparation prevented
timely hearing of the case . . . . Total lack of familiarity with the
facts of [the] case or applicable legal expectations . . . . Defense
counsel was unaware of effect of plea on defendant's other cases
. . . . The only witness is dead but defense counsel had defendant
plead guilty anyway . . . . Lack of client control . . . . No client
contact . . . . Poor client control . . . . Lack of preparation ....
Lack of familiarity with the case ....
In contrast, another attorney handled ten dispositions during the survey
period, appearing as retained counsel in nine, and as court-appointed in the
other. Five of his cases were selected misdemeanors, two were serious misde-
meanors, and three were felonies. His performance was rated excellent in
nine cases and acceptable in one; no problems were reported. Of his ten
dispositions, one was labeled routine, and nine were categorized as ade-
quate/very good, the highest rating listed. 59
IV. INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS
The findings indicate that a defense lawyer's personality and perform-
ance history affect his interaction with the deputy prosecutor and are, thus, a
major factor in the ultimate quality of the criminal case disposition. 60 In
plea bargaining, prosecutors weigh the strengths, weaknesses, and inadequa-
cies of defense lawyers in their decisions to grant reductions in charge or
sentence. This is borne out by the comments made during interviews with
several deputy district attorneys:
You try to divorce yourself from what personal feelings you might
have about an attorney. But we're human. When he comes
around here, I listen to him, but maybe not as long as I would
listen to other attorneys. I don't want to say it hurts his clients, but
it doesn't help them.
6 '
59. These two examples reflect extremes; see note 58 supra.
60. Previous quantitative research on plea bargaining has not penetrated the bargaining
process and has tended to present an incomplete picture of outcome factors. ie., in J. EISEN-
STEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS
(1977), the authors offer a sophisticated analysis of the relation of length of sentence to selected
characteristics, but were unable to control for the identity of individual defense counsels. Sum-
marizing their data, the authors concluded that "all of the variables commonly thought to be
significant in affecting the length of sentence account for only one-half to two-thirds of the
variance. The effects of the queuing, measurement error, and random or unidentified factors
account for the rest." Id. at 285. Such a conclusion seems ill considered. The exisiting plethora
of quantitative research relating to plea bargaining and the defense attorney's role in that proc-
ess hardly merit defense counsel's designation as an "unidentified factor" affecting the length of
sentence. Indeed, it can be argued that defense counsel is the major determining factor in case
outcomes.
61. Regarding the same attorney, other deputies revealed:
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When [defense counsel] comes in here and threatens to go to trial, I
laugh inside. He'll never let it go to trial. I know it, he knows it,
everybody knows it. It's an empty threat. Now, if [another defense
counsel] comes in here and says "we'll go," then it means some-
thing. I respect his trial ability. Empty threats do nothing to me
Last week, [a private attorney] went up against [a deputy] in trial,
and lost really bad. This week, he went back to [the same deputy]
on a new case and pleaded right away. Then he came to me on
another case. I told him, "well, I've got an open calendar next
week, I'll just take it to trial . . . ." He pled out right here.
Counsel's actual performance in a particular case also determines the
nature of the ultimate disposition of that case, to either the advantage or
detriment of the defendant. Commenting on specific cases, the deputies'
written observations illustrate the influence of counsel:
Investigation into facts by defense counsel resulted in misdemeanor
disposition on felony charge.
Counsel proposed use of a little known statute for guilty plea and it
was to defendant's advantage.
Defense counsel was on top of all of the defendant's pending cases
and was able to work out a disposition covering all cases.
Defense counsel made a point of examining the physical evidence
prior to pre-trial.
Counsel arrived late, did not pre-try, set case for trial that should
have been negotiated, and did not check into reliability of wit-
nesses.
Counsel failed to negotiate the case. . . [and] her client pleaded as
charged when I was willing to negotiate to a lesser charge.
Counsel would not talk to me . . . result: one year in jail rather
than in alcohol program.
Counsel didn't take time to deal with the case.
Counsel didn't do anything.
Counsel is continually unprepared factually and legally.
Defendant could gain [the] benefit of dismissal under applicable
law but counsel refused to use that avenue, insisting on a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea which was denied, leaving conviction on
record.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM
Peer review, though a seemingly radical challenge to the prevailing con-
cept of self-regulation, is not as alien as it first might appear. An informal
system of assessment clearly operates on a daily basis in attorney interac-
tions.62 Furthermore, intra-professional evaluation is presently utilized in
When [a lawyer in private practice who was retained] has a case, you never hear the
end of it. He'll rant and rave and cry and whine and just make you sick. Maybe he
thinks he gets good deals with his clients, but not from me . . ..
When he calls, I just turn him off. He'll go through this b.s. story and cry all over me.
His tactic-is "bug you till you crack." I'm immune to it.
62. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 15, at 204-05.
1980]
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
both large law firms and in non-legal professions. 63 If employed construc-
tively, absent the fault and sanction-dominated machinery of grievance
boards, a peer review system could be a step toward actualizing the legal
profession's claim that it regulates itself.
64
Such a move is both desirable and practical. The need for some peer
review is mandated by the current system's failure to effectively come to
grips with the problem of inadequate performance. 65 Clearly, the possibility
of meaningful peer review, especially in the context of plea bargaining in
which attorneys operate almost exclusively in seclusion, is real. The major
obstacle lies in convincing the bar that peer review need not take on the
customary negative trappings of grievance procedures, but can be performed
in a closed professional atmosphere emphasizing constructive criticism to fa-
cilitate attorneys' improvement.
66
Whether a survey similar to the one that is the topic of this article
would be feasible without initial "grassroots" support of lawyers is doubtful;
indeed, monitoring and prodding the flow of reports in this small-scale sur-
vey proved to be its most difficult feature, calling for both a high level of
diplomacy and continuing management. Still, a large-scale survey is re-
quired to fully test the method of adversary review outlined in this article.
To this end, improvements and modifications of the method must be made.
For example, a large-scale survey should be open, instead of secretive. More-




Given the continued reliance on plea bargaining in the criminal justice
system, its low visibility, and the crucial importance of the defense attorney's
role, some means of performance review is mandatory if justice is to be ap-
proximated. This could be accomplished by (a) a redefinition or liberaliza-
tion of appellate policy, (b) incremental procedural adjustments of the plea
bargaining system, or (c) a system of adversary review applied in a construc-
tive, professional fashion. This article proposes68 that adversary review is
feasible and may serve as a means of effective quality control in the criminal
justice system.
63. See Wolkin, More on a Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61 A.B.A.J. 1064, 1065
(1975) [hereinafter cited as More on a Better Way]; Kavanaugh, supra note 15, at 977.
64. See Wolkin, A Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61 A.B.A.J. 574 (1975); More on a
Better Way, supra note 63; Marks & Cathcart, supra note 15, at 203; Kavanaugh, supra note 15, at
978; Arkin, supra note 26.
65. See notes 15-28 and accompanying text supra.
66. It is suggested that grievance committees should be involved in matters of alleged pro-
fessional incompetence only after the attorney in question displays a chronic inability or reluc-
tance to respond to constructive suggestions of a closed peer review organization. See More on a
Better Way, supra note 63, at 1064-65.
67. As many deputies suggested, placing an evaluation form in each case file would facili-
tate reporting.
68. Here, the wisdom of Judge Bazelon is appropriate: "[Biranding a problem insoluble to
avoid facing it, or a solution utopian to avoid trying it, turns doubts into self-fulfilling prophe-




Defense Counsel Preparation Survey
(l) Deputy DA Id.
(2) Defense Counsel Id
(3) Defense Counsel Status "1" Public Defender, "2" = Appointed, "3" =
Retained.
(1) Math Charge.- "1" = selected misdemeanors, "2" = "serious" misdemeanors,
"3' = felonies, "4" = "serious" felonies.
(5) Case Status: "1" = in negotiation, "2" = continuing negotiation-this case
was reported previously, "3" = disposition reached, charges dropped
or suspended, "4" = disposition reached, agreement on guilty plea,
"5" = (other)
(6) Deputy Analysis ofDefense Preparaton. "I" = excellent, "2" = acceptable, "3"
- inadequate, and the "problem" was brought to the attention of
defense counsel, "4" = inadequate, and defense counsel was not
informed.
(7) Rroblem Area. (BLANK = no problem), "I" = inadequate investigation of
the facts, "2" = inadequate researching of witnesses, testimony, etc.,
"3" = inadequate researching of statutes, "4" = inadequate
researching of case law, "5" = combination or all of the above.
(8) Resulting Disposition" (BLANK = no disposition) IF A DISPOSITION WAS
REACHED, OR IS ALMOST ASSURED, WHICH SYNOPSIS
BEST DESCRIBES THE END?
1. Routine:
"I" = The case was deemed "routine" by DA and defense counsel; there
was no discussion of case particulars, but a plea agreement was
reached.
II. Adequate Preparation Found:
"2" = Defense counsel's preparation was adequate/very good, and the
defendant benefited by such representation.
"3" = Defense preparation was adequate, but for other reasons (such as
a personality conflict between attorneys) the disposition was not as
favorable as it might have been had the defendant been
represented by other counsel.
III. Inadequate Preparation Found:
"4" = Defense counsel's preparation was inadequate, but the case was
strong and (for this or other reasons unrelated to counsel's lack of
preparation) adequate preparation would have rendered the same
result.
"Y' = Defense counsel's preparation was inadequate and would have
resulted in a less favorable disposition for the defendant, but the
DA compensated and granted an equitable bargain.
"6" = Defense counsel's preparation was inadequate; this resulted in a
less than favorable disposition for the defendant.
"7" = Both inadequate preparation and personality conflicts (between
DA and Defense counsel) were key factors detrimental to the
defendant's disposition.
(9) Comment i/desired The thing that struck me most about defense counsel's per-
formance was
1980]
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1. Selected misdemeanors (drunk driving charges)
2. Serious misdemeanors
a) Alternative felony/misdemeanors (wobblers) filed as
misdemeanors pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b)(4) (West 1979) and
disposed of as such
b) Cases filed as felonies but disposed as misdemeanors pursuant to
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b)(5) (West 1979).
3. Felonies
All cases disposed of on a felony basis except those falling in the
category of serious felonies
4. Serious felonies
a) Murder and included offenses
b) Robbery
c) Rape
d) Forcible sodomy and oral copulation
e) First degree burglary
f) Any felony in which use of a firearm is alleged and proved as an
enhancement
g) Any felony in which infliction of great bodily injury is alleged and
proved as an enhancement
h) Any felony in which excessive taking is alleged and proved as an
enhancement
i) Any felony which in addition to admitting or being found guilty
of, the defendant admits or is found to have suffered a previous conviction
j) Any felony punishable by life imprisonment





DELAWARE V PROUSE: DILUTION OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
Since the pronouncement of the exclusionary rule,I the parameters of
fourth amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure have
increasingly required refinement. Grappling with various factual contexts in
which confrontations between police procedures and individual fourth
amendment rights have occurred, the Supreme Court has sought to develop
unifying analytical principles broadly applicable to the myriad of fourth
amendment questions. In the process of delineating the scope of the fourth
amendment, the Court anticipated and expressly reserved 2 the issue
presented by Delaware v. Prouse.3 Prouse is significant because the Court at
last applied its evolutionary fourth amendment analysis to the question,
thereby exposing a new facet of the fourth amendment edifice.
Prouse involved the constitutionality of a seemingly mundane police pro-
cedure-the "random stop" of a motor vehicle by the police for the ostensi-
ble purpose of verifying the validity of the driver's license and the vehicle
registration. The Court analyzed the reasonableness of the random stop pro-
cedure by balancing the state's legitimate interest in enhancing highway
safety against the individual's interest in being free from unreasonable intru-
sions by agents of the state.4 This balancing analysis, which demarcated the
boundary of individual freedom by assessing the relative constitutional
weights of the state and individual interests, is the focus of the following
discussion.
I. THE FACTUAL SETTING
Prouse was both an occupant in and the registered owner of 5 an auto-
1. The exclusionary rule prohibits prosecutorial use of evidence obtained in violation of
an accused's fourth amendment rights. The rule was first recognized in Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914) and was extended to state prosecutions in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
2. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 n.14 (1976); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 n.8 (1975).
3. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
4. The fourth amendment provides in part that "Itihe right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650 n.1. Neither the majority nor the dissent in Prouse
discussed Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Rakas denied standing to certain automobile
passengers to challenge the constitutionality of a search of the vehicle in which they were pas-
sengers. The search yielded the evidence used to convict these passengers of armed robbery.
The Court initially found that the passengers had no possessory interest in the vehicle and had
asserted none in the evidence. Id. at 130. The Court then found that "passengers qua passen-
gers simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy" in the areas from
which the evidence was obtained (the glove compartment and the space under the vehicle's
seat). Id. at 149. The Court concluded that the passengers' personal fourth amendment inter-
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mobile which was "randomly" stopped by a policeman. 6 The officer who
made the stop lacked probable cause to believe that any violations of the law
had occurred; furthermore, the officer had no reason to suspect that illegal
activity was occurring or was imminent. 7 The officer's asserted justification
for the stop was his interest in randomly verifying compliance with state
license and registration laws.8 Although the officer characterized the stop as
"routine," he admitted that the stop was not effected in accordance with any
guidelines promulgated by his superiors to govern such routine stops; in fact,
no such guidelines existed. 9 As the officer approached the stopped vehicle,
he smelled burning marijuana.' 0 The officer subsequently seized marijuana
which was in plain view on the car floor," searched Prouse, and seized addi-
tional marijuana discovered on Prouse's person. 12 Prouse was indicted for
possession but was successful in having the evidence suppressed by the trial
court on the grounds that the marijuana had been obtained in violation of
his fourth amendment right not to be arbitrarily seized. On appeal by the
ests had not been violated by the search of these areas and, thus, that they lacked standing to
constitutionally question the search. Id. at 149-150.
Given Prouse's status as a passenger, Rakas would seem to be relevant to the resolution of
the fourth amendment question in Proause. Thus, it is troublesome, at first glance, that the Proause
Court does not even cite Rakas, particularly since Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court in
Rakas but dissented vociferously in Prause.
Prause and Rakas can be superficially reconciled since Prouse, as registered owner of the
vehicle, had a possessory interest in the automobile sufficient to allow standing under Rakas.
However, a more profound distinction exists. Rakas did not involve the issue central to Proase-
the legitimacy of the original seizure of the automobile and its occupants. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at
130-31. Rather, Raas focused on the validity of a search for and seizure of evidence subsequent
to the stop. Id. While there is an interesting fluctuation between Rakar and Prouse regarding
reasonable expectations of privacy and the fourth amendment, such an inquiry is beyond the
scope of this comment. It is enough here to note that Rakas did not draw into question the basic
principle that all persons have a constitutionally recognized interest which precludes unreasona-
ble seizures of their persons.
6. 440 U.S. at 650.
7. Id. The Court has recognized that the application of the warrant clause of the fourth
amendment to automobile stops would be unrealistic due to the inherent mobility of
automobiles and the consequent likelihood that ongoing or imminent illegalities would escape
prosecution if warrants had to be obtained to seize automobiles in all circumstances. Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925); see Note, Warrantless Searches and Seicures of Automobles,
87 HARV. L. REV. 835, 837-38 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Warrantless Searches].
8. 440 U.S. at 650.
9. Id. In light of the Court's concern with minimizing police officers' discretion in the
regulatory stop context, two views of the regularity of the random stop at issue in Proause are
enlightening. According to the Delaware Supreme Court, the officer "candidly testified . . .
that he regularly made similar stops . State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1361 (Del. 1978),
afdsub noam. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In contrast, the officer had actually
testified: "I have done it before. I wouldn't say often." Transcript of Suppression Hearing,
State v. Prouse, No. 176-12-0213 (Del. Super. Ct., Feb. 15, 1977), reprintedin Petitioner's Petition
for Writ of Certiorari app. A at 9, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (hereinafter cited as Tran-
script). That "routine, random stops" were actually infrequently made by the officer who
stopped Prouse's vehicle underscores both the Court's concern with the potentially arbitrary
application of the procedure, 440 U.S. at 661, and the argument that the extreme difficulty
involved in ferreting out the actual reason why the police make a particular stop militates
against granting police a broad, discretionary right to stop automobiles, Note, Automobile License
Checks and the Fourth Amendment, 60 VA. L. REV. 666, 669 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Automobile
License Checks]; see 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 386 (1978).
10. 440 U.S. at 650.
11. Id.
12. Transcript, supra note 9, at 8-9.
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state, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the suppression.' 3 The United
States Supreme Court also affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that
"persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone
have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of
police officers."
1 4
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BACKGROUND
A. Generally
Even a brief authoritative detention of an automobile and its occupants
is cognizable as a fourth amendment seizure.' 5 Consequently, regulatory
stops of automobiles must be effected by procedures that are reasonable be-
cause "reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular invasion of a
citizen's personal security"' 6 is the "touchstone"' 7 of fourth amendment
analysis. t8
In instances in which the intrusion by a given police procedure falls "far
short of the kind of intrusions associated with an arrest," the constitutional
reasonableness of the procedure is determined by application of a balancing
test. 19 This balancing involves a judicial weighing of the degree to which
the procedure intrudes on individual interests against the degree to which it
promotes legitimate governmental interests.20 To facilitate balancing, objec-
tively measurable facts must be advanced to justify the application of the
procedure to the particular individual in the particular circumstances.
2'
Thus, the burden rests on the state to show that the procedure does further




The law governing police stops of automobiles has long been in flux.
13. 440 U.S. at 651.
14. I. The Court initially rejected the argument that it lacked jurisdiction because of the
existence of an independent and adequate state ground for the decision below. Id. at 651-53.
The Delaware Supreme Court had actually analogized its constitutional provision (DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 6) to the fourth amendment and then had specifically stated that the question
before it was the validity of the random stop procedure under the fourth amendment. State v.
Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1362 (Del. 1978) a§'dsub nom. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
Prouse is thus distinguishable from cases such as State v. Opperman, 89 S.D. 25, 228 N.W.2d 152
(1975), rev'd, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,judgment renstated under staie constutton,
State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976), in which the South Dakota Supreme Court
initially relied solely on the fourth amendment but on remand explicitly reinstated its former
judgment on the basis of the state constitutional provision (S.D. CONST. art. VI, § I1).
15. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); cf. Terry v. Ohio; 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (stopping a pedestrian
constituted a fourth amendment seizure).
16. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
17. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108 (1977).
18. See note 4 supra.
19. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979). Conira, id. at 219-20 (White, J.,
concurring) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654).
20. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977).
21. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
22. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
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While the Court has noted that "the word 'automobile' is not a talisman in
whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears, '2 3 it has
also frankly admitted that "this branch of the law is something less than a
seamless web."' 2 4 As a result, there are no decisive constitutional rules clearly
governing the fourth amendment questions involved in all automobile stops.
Instead, the constitutionality of a given automobile stop depends upon all of
the circumstances. This is particularly so when probable cause did not exist
to justify the stop.
An analytical distinction between residences and automobiles has been
recognized for fourth amendment purposes. 25 Because of their inherent mo-
bility, automobiles and their occupants are subject to warrantless searches
and seizures when probable cause exists to believe that contraband or evi-
dence of crime will be found and exigent circumstances require a warrantless
search and seizure to insure obtaining the evidence.2 6 Even in the absence of
probable cause, warrantless regulatory seizures of automobiles have been
held to be constitutional because states have legitimate interests in inten-
sively regulating automobile use and because the motoring public appar-
ently acquiesces in the procedure.
2 7
Procedures for effecting warrantless regulatory seizures of automobiles
have recently been subjected to fourth amendment analysis. In a series of
border patrol cases,28 the Court distinguished between "roving patrols" and
"fixed checkpoint operations" conducted to curb the transportation of illegal
aliens. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,2 9 the Court recognized the legiti-
mate public interest in curtailing illegal alien traffic but nevertheless invali-
dated roving border patrol stops prompted by the exercise of an individual
officer's discretion rather than by his observation of specific facts which gave
rise to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.30 This holding explicitly
extended the rationale of Teny v. Oht'o31 to roving-patrol regulatory stops of
automobiles. In contrast, in United States v. Martihez-Fuerte32 the halting of all
automobiles at fixed checkpoints to screen for illegal alien traffic was held to
be permissible although reasonable suspicion did not justify the seizure of
each vehicle and its occupants. 33 Factors present in roving patrol stops but
absent from checkpoint operations legitimized the latter procedure. Check-
point operations were held to involve less "subjective intrusion-the generat-
23. Id. at 461-62.
24. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1978).
25. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 147 (1925).
26. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460 (1971); Note, Warrantless Searches, supra
note 7, at 835.
27. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 n. 14 (1976).
28. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
29. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
30. Id. at 878-82.
31. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop of individual and subsequent frisk for weapons reasonable since
the officer, on the basis of articulable facts, reasonably suspected that the individual was con-
templating imminent criminal activity and was illegally and dangerously armed to that end).
32. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
33. Id. at 557-58.
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ing of concern or even fright" and less "discretionary enforcement" than
roving patrols. 34 In addition to upholding the fixed checkpoint procedure,
the Court in Marinez-Fuerte validated "selective referrals" of some vehicles
"on the basis of criteria that would not sustain a roving-patrol stop."3 5
The broad rule of the border patrol cases is that, given a static govern-
ment interest in curbing illegal alien traffic, individual automobiles may not
be selected for a regulatory stop by a roving patrol in the absence of reason-
able suspicion of illegal activity; however, all automobiles passing a fixed
checkpoint may be initially detained and then either allowed to proceed im-
mediately or selected for further investigation, despite the absence of the
reasonable suspicion necessary for a roving-patrol stop. The rationale under-
lying this distinction is that although it is unreasonable under the fourth
amendment to intrude on individual interests without the requisite suspicion
when the application of the intrusive procedure is both measurably dis-
turbing and potentially discriminatory, it is reasonable to utilize a procedure
which is both less disturbing and less arbitrary.
Lower courts which dealt with the legitimacy of random stops for li-
cense and registration checks differed on the constitutionality of the prac-
tice. 36 The rationale for upholding random vehicle stops has generally been
that the police, as protectors of public safety, have inherent authority to ran-
domly stop moving automobiles to verify compliance with license and regis-
tration laws and that individual fourth amendment interests are not
unreasonably infringed by such stops since the public interest is great and
the intrusions, minimal. 37 To the contrary are decisions which required at
least a reasonable suspicion of a violation of applicable laws as a prerequisite
to regulatory seizures because of the inherent potential for arbitrary and ca-
pricious application of the technique.3"
Pro random stop cases usually involved fact situations in which the po-
lice seizures probably could have been justified by Terry's reasonable suspi-
cion analysis.3 9 The judicial willingness to legitimize these automobile stop
procedures on an inherent authority basis rather than a reasonable suspicion
34. Id. at 558-59.
35. Id. at 560. The Court curiously reasoned that selective referrals enhance fourth
amendment interests of the motoring public at large since the selective referral of a few
automobiles for more intensive investigation would free unreferred motorists to proceed after a
brief detention. Id. The Court seemed to suggest that the selective referral procedure is reason-
able since it obviates the need to investigate all motorists. This is difficult to reconcile with the
Court's reasoning that minimal officer discretion is a virtue of checkpoint operations. Id. at 559.
Indeed, the Court's holding that border patrol officers need "wide discretion" in selecting mo-
torists for referral, id. at 564, directly contradicts one of its basic justifications for checkpoint
stops. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, realized that "It]he Court's view that 'selective referrals
• . . tend to advance some Fourth Amendment interests by minimizing the intrusion on the
general motoring public,' .. stands the Fourth Amendment on its head." Id. at 573 n.2 (Bren-
nan, J. dissenting).
36. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 651 n.2, 3 (1979).
37. See Note, Automobile License Checks, supra note 9, at 673-77.
38. See, e.g., People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975); Com-
monwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973).
39. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 379-80.
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rationale lends credence to the conclusion 40 that a reasonable suspicion stan-
dard is essential to curtail police use of automobile stops as pretexts for inves-
tigations of unrelated criminal activity. It is evident that such pretextual use
occurs quite frequently; 4 I however, explicit judicial recognition of pretextual
use has been rare because an individual stop could never disclose any pattern
of abuse to negate the asserted randomness of the stop.4 2 The use of license
and registration checks to mask investigations of unrelated crimes cannot be
reconciled with the fourth amendment; 43 thus, it is alarming that the ran-
dom stop procedure thrived with judicial support.
C. Toward a Resolution
While the border patrol cases provided an impetus for lower courts to
extend the reasonable suspicion requirement to regulatory stops, 4 4 the cases
had actually disclaimed prejudgment of the issue in Prouse. The Court had
warned that the border patrol analysis did not impugn the validity of "state
and local . . . power to conduct such limited stops as are necessary to en-
force laws regarding drivers' licenses, vehicle registration . . . and similar
matters.' '4 ' In juxtaposition, however, the Court had expressly recognized
automobile stops as fourth amendment seizures46 and had thereby assured
the increased application of fourth amendment analysis to license and regis-
tration check stops. With lower court analysis in conflict and reasonable
suspicion analysis gaining acceptance, the issue was ripe for Supreme Court
resolution. Prouse presented a unique opportunity for the Court to clarify
the law regarding the pervasive police practice of random vehicle stops. The
Delaware Supreme Court had outlined a cogent justification for the reason-
able suspicion position while the state had presented a suprisingly glib justifi-
cation for the random stop.
III. RIGHTS IN THE BALANCE
In Prouse, the Court weighed the utility of random stops in promoting
highway safety against the concomitant intrusion on a motorist's reasonable
expectations of privacy. The state's interest in highway safety was acknowl-
edged, but the random stop procedure was found to be insufficiently produc-
tive to justify the inherent risk of discriminatory application. 47 Given a
dearth of evidence relating driver licensing and vehicle registration to safety
benefits,48 the Court refused to conclude that these legal requirements con-
40. See, e.g., People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 416, 330 N.E.2d 39, 41, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 71
(1975); Note, Automobile License Checks, supra note 9, at 673-78.
41. See L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 15 (1967);
Note, Automobile License Checks, supra note 9, at 673-78.
42. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 386-88.
43. Id. at 387.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d at 875, 879 (1977), (citing United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)).
45. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 n.8 (1975).
46. E.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).
47. 440 U.S. at 658-61.
48. Though the Proust dissent argued that random stops aim at "remov[ing] from the road
the unlicensed driver before he demonstrates why he is unlicensed" and that the majority would
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tribute more than an "incremental" or "marginal" increase in safety. 49 Con-
cerned with the " 'grave danger' of abuse of discretion" 50 by police, the
Court decided that individual fourth amendment rights, manifested in rea-
sonable expectations of privacy, outweighed unproven safety benefits.
A. Random Stops. Discretionary Form Serves Discriminatoy Functions
The spectre of the police state casts a long shadow over fourth amend-
ment analysis. As Mr. Justice Jackson aptly noted: "Uncontrolled search
and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of
every arbitrary government." 5' Justice Jackson's concern with limiting po-
lice discretion was based on a realistic view of human nature embodied in
the fact that "the authority .. .to conduct searches and seizures without
warrant may be exercised by the most unfit and ruthless officers as well as by
the fit and responsible . *... ,52 In short, if we are to preserve liberty we
must know what the police are doing and why they are doing it.
In the spirit of Justice Jackson's analysis, Prouse reasserted the impor-
tance of preserving individual freedoms by limiting police conduct to actions
that are objectively explainable. The Prouse result was animated by the real-
ization that an uncontrolled police procedure may become the tool of uncon-
trollable, evil purposes. It is evident that police officers, like all human
beings, are motivated by subjective biases. 53 In form, a random stop is a
discretionary show of authority by an individual policeman; consequently,
the functions served by random stops are as varied as each individual of-
ficer's subjective motivations. Pretextual use of random stops by police has
been a recognized problem 54 with which the courts must deal within the
context of fourth amendment analysis.55 Unfortunately, some courts have
been overly solicitous to pretextual use of the random stop.56 Such police
subterfuge combined with judicial validation of the practice presents a con-
stitutional vilification.
prefer license and registration checks made "as the wreckage is being towed away," 440 U.S. at
666 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), the state did not present evidence linking the incidence of mov-
ing violations or auto accidents to violations of license or registration laws. The State merely
touted random stops as "the only effective means" of assuring compliance with these laws and
proceeded to belittle the stops' intrusions as "mere inconveniences." See Brief for Petitioner at
9-14, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Brieffor Petztner].
49. 440 U.S. at 659-61.
50. Id. at 662 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976)).
51. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 182.
53. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, D. ROTENBERG, supra note 41, at 19. See genera/(y Brief for
Respondent app. A, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
54. See, e.g., 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 386-87.
55. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[A]
search against Brinegar's car must be regarded as a search of the car of Everyman").
56. See, e.g., State v. Kretchmar, 201 Neb. 308, 267 N.W.2d 740 (1978), vacatedmem. and
remandedto Supreme Court afNebrasa for further considteration in light 0fDelaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (1979), Kretchmar v. Nebraska, 440 U.S. 978 (1979). In Kretchmar, a state patrol officer who
had observed Kretchmar driving in compliance with all applicable laws had the "initial reac-
tion" that Kretchmar was possibly an illegal alien driving a stolen auto. 267 N.W.2d at 741-42.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the officer's use of a license check stop for the pur-
pose of investigating his suspicions was proper. Id. at 743. The dissent noted that "[tihe major-
ity here would equate intuition with reasonable suspicion." Id. at 745 (White, J., dissenting).
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Since an unjustified discretionary police procedure is odious because of
the very mystery involved in its application, the random stop seems to have
inherent negative weight on the constitutional balance employed by the
Court. In Prouse the random stop could not be linked to any provable en-
hancement of safety goals.57 Furthermore, random stops in general suffer
from the discretionary form/discriminatory functions defect discussed above.
Therefore, it must be concluded that random stop procedures are produc-
tive, not of a legitimate state purpose, but of an atmosphere conducive to
abuse and harassment. The random stop rises like a hot air balloon when it
is placed on the fourth amendment balance.
B. What is the Real Balance?
In Prouse, the Court was unfortunately reluctant to specifically articu-
late the abusive potential of the random stop. Rather, the Court facilely
sidestepped the constitutional quagmire because the state failed to quan-
tifiably justify the random stop and thereby obviated the need for any pro-
tracted balancing analysis. Indeed, the Court only briefly dwelt on the
fourth amendment rights involved. As Mr. Justice Rehnquist commented,
"[tlhe Court advance[d] only the most diaphanous of citizen interests";
58 if
the individual interest were "diaphanous," the state's proven safety interest
in the random stop was nihilistic.
There is some constitutional solace for civil libertarians in the Court's
use of the balancing approach in Prouse. While the balance required a real
state interest such as proven safety benefits resultant from random stops, the
mere potential for unconstitutional intrusions on individual interests pro-
vided the counterbalance. Of course, this potentiality is as real as the state's
phantom safety benefits would have been had they materialized. However,
it must be admitted that potentiality is very difficult to quantify. Indeed,
the very difficulty inherent in exposing the discriminatory potential of the
random stop procedure had been recognized as a factor which facilitated the
procedure's emasculation of fourth amendment rights. 59 The balancing ap-
proach in Prouse, then, appears to favor individual interests; yet, this is a
necessary result of the rule that the burden is ever on the government of
justify warrantless searches and seizures.
60
If the result of the balancing in Prouse is comforting, the fact that bal-
ancing analysis is employed at all is to an extent disquieting. The balancing
analysis is uniquely suited to the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry
since reasonableness is a concept in flux with facts and circumstances. View-
ing Prouse as an end product of the balancing approach, however, one won-
ders whether it was merely the absence of a sufficiently productive police
procedure that produced the decision favoring individual rights. In its sim-
plest terms, the balancing test implies that a random stop procedure which
57. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
58. 440 U.S. at 666 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. See State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1364 (Del. 1978), afdsub nom. Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979); Note, Automobile License Checks, supra note 9, at 669.
60. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
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had been proven to be devastatingly effective at enhancing highway safety
would have been entitled to great constitutional weight. It is interesting to
use this conclusion as a point of departure into some brief hypothesizing
regarding the nature of balancing.
Has the Court in Prouse spared the motoring public from the arbitrary
indignities of the random stop merely because of a fortuitous lack of causal-
ity between the procedure as it has been employed in the past and quantifi-
able highway safety gains? In answer, it is first arguable that a more
effective random stop procedure would per se entail decreased arbitrariness
since a greater proportion of the population would have to be stopped to
effect measurable safety gains. Thus, while the incidence of intrusion would
rise, discriminatory application would theoretically abate. To the contrary,
it is also arguable that increasing the number of random stops made to a
level productive of safety benefits would only disperse arbitrary intrusions
over an ever-increasing population. In this situation, it is likewise arguable
that increased safety would necessarily lag behind and, therefore, remain
constitutionally subordinate to the increasing intrusion on freedom. Which-
ever scenario is accepted, the fact that the balancing test lends itself to such
prospective calculation forebodes that the test internalizes within fourth
amendment analysis the seeds for result-oriented decisions. 6 I Thus, every
application of the test is accompanied by the danger that an ends-justify-
means analysis will tinge the outcome.
C. Correcting the Imbalance
1. Articulable Reasonableness
Although Prouse's mandate of "at least articulable and reasonable suspi-
cion" of illegal activity to justify roving patrol stops62 is commendable, this
standard may be so vague as to impose no meaningful limitation on police
discretion. It is here submitted that the Prouse standard will effectively and
sufficiently protect individual's fourth amendment interests if it is percep-
tively applied by the courts.
It can be persuasively argued that Prouse roving stop standard is inher-
ently vague and will permit police to continue to make arbitrary stops which
courts will uphold in deference to the judgment of officers in the field.
6 3
This criticism is supported by lower court approval of pretextual stops under
the pro random stop rationale 64 and minimization of the degree of suspicion
necessary under the reasonable suspicion standard. 65 While the vagueness
61. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). The Court, after extol-
ling the virtues of minimally discretionary checkpoint stops, id. at 559, upheld discretionary
selective referrals, id. at 560. With apparent comfort the Court pointed out that such referrals
revealed illegal aliens in 20% of the referred vehicles during a recent period. Id. at 564 n.17.
62. 440 U.S. at 663.
63. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 59.
64. See note 56 supra.
65. See, e.g., People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975): "It
should be emphasized that . . .the degree of suspicion required to justify the stop is minimal."
Id. at 415, 330 N.E.2d at 40, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 69. Compare Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d at 420, 330 N.E.2d at
44, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 74 ("the factual basis . . .for a 'routine traffic stop' is minimal. An actual
violation . . .need not be detectable.") with Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659 ("[tlhe fore-
19801
DENVER LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 57:3
criticism is predictable and somewhat justified, it is not helpful because it
suggests no practical alternatives to principled application of the reasonable
suspicion standard by the courts. Unless the Court desires to overrule Terry V.
0&Oh and impose probable cause requirements on all automobile seizures,
the Prouse standard for roving-patrol stops is clearly the most vigorous that
could have been imposed. If this standard is diligently applied, it should
adequately protect fourth amendment interests in all cases, excluding in-
stances of judicial abdication and/or particularly effective police perjury.
66
Cases which have applied the standard approved in Prouse bear out the
potential for its effective application. Articulable reasonableness has been
found wanting in the following police-stop situations: an automobile en-
countered by police at a late hour (4:00 a.m.);6 7 an older-model automobile
unusual and unique in appearance; 68 a late-model pickup truck generally
fitting a police profile of stolen vehicles; 69 the presence of a black person
driving an expensive automobile in a high crime area; 70 an automobile driv-
ing on a suburban roadway at a noticably slow, though legal, speed. 71 No
definitive collection is intended by the foregoing; however, these decisions
indicate that many apparently routine reasons for.stopping automobiles are
jeopardized by Prouse. A question which can only be answered by further
experience is whether policemen will become more adept at both perceiving
the articulable indicia of legitimate stops and persuading courts of the rea-
sonableness of their reliance on those factors under the circumstances.
Prouse clearly requires that an officer who effects a roving-patrol stop
must be able to articulate specific facts which motivated his action; "inartic-
most method of enforcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations . . . is acting upon observed
violations").
66. It is possible, if not probable, that ouse will have an effect on police perjury analogous
to that of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). A statistical study of the incidence of pre-Mapp
and post-Mapp "dropsy" testimony by narcotics officers (testimony in which the officer claims
that an accused dropped and thereby abandoned narcotics in the officer's presence rendering
the officer's acquisition of the evidence outside the area of fourth amendment seizures and,
therefore, immune from Mapp's exclusionary rule) showed that such testimony increased mark-
edly after Mapp was decided. Comment, Police Perjuly in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases. A New Credibil-
ia Gap, 60 GEORGETOWN L.J. 507, 514 (1971). The study attributed the increase to the
difficulty in making post-Mapp narcotics arrests without the aid of an accused's "abandonment"
of the evidence needed to establish probable cause to arrest. Id. It has been persuasively argued
that the exclusionary rule in fact invites police perjury:
[Ilt has been suggested that the exclusionary rule might often influence only what the
police officer says in court and not what he does on the streets. Moreover, it is indispu-
table that at a suppression hearing a police officer is presented a unique opportunity to
perjure himself and to make his actions seemingly conform to the law.
Id. at 513. See also P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER 183 (1969). This argument and the "dropsy"
data indicate that the application of the reasonable suspicion standard will probably result in
increased police perjury regarding reasonable suspicions of violations of law justifying automo-
bile stops. In applying the reasonable suspicion standard and assessing police testimony there-
under, the judiciary will need to be ever wary of the great temptation that police are under to
conform their conduct to legal requirements after the fact.
67. Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973).
68. People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975).
69. State v. Ochoa, 23 Ariz. App. 510, 534 P.2d 441 (1975), rev'don other grounds, 112 Ariz.
582, 544 P.2d 1097 (1976). See also United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1979).
70. United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971).
71. People v. Brand, 71 111. App. 3d 698, 390 N.E.2d 68 (1979) (citing Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979)).
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ulate hunches" will no longer suffice.7 2 Additionally, a court must find that,
in light of all the cirumstances, 73 the facts articulated by the officer would
warrant a man of reasonable caution to suspect "that a motorist is unli-
censed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or
an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law . . . .74
Given the previously discussed applications of the Prouse standard and the
relatively specific findings required in such applications, and granting that
subjectivity cannot be entirely eliminated, overly pessimistic criticism of the
Prouse roving-patrol analysis is unjustified and premature.
75
2. Roadblock Stops
Roadblocks are an obvious alternative to random stops as a method of
effecting license and registration checks. The asserted constitutional virtues
of roadblocks were, thus, prominent in Prouse's condemnation of random
stops. 76 Consequently, Prouse echoes the rationale of the border patrol anal-
ysis: while groundless roving-patrol stops are unconstitutional, checkpoint
stops are valid because they are less frightening and methodologically less
subject to police abuse than are random stops. 7 7 It seems true that road-
block stops are, at least initially, less frightening than random stops because
many motorists are conspicuously stopped at roadblocks. However, it is
doubtful that the use of roadblocks in the regulatory stop context will really
provide the anticipated rein on police discretion.
At the outset it must be stressed that the qualities of the Court's sug-
gested roadblock alternative were ill-defined in Prouse. While the majority
suggested the "[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops"
as a possibility,7 8 the concurring opinion "assume[d] that . . . other not
purely random stops (such as every 10th car to pass a given point) that
equate with, but are less intrusive than, a 100% roadblock stop" are permissi-
ble. 79 Hence, it could be concluded that a consensus is presently lacking on
the Court as to the essential qualities of permissible regulatory roadblocks.
Although the nature of Prouse-sanctioned roadblocks is unclear, it is cer-
tain that the checkpoint rationale developed in the border patrol context yet
relied upon in Prouse is not suitable for license and registration enforcement.
A glaring analytical dysfunction appears in that while the border patrol con-
72. 440 U.S. at 661 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)); see 3 W. LAFAVE, supra
note 9, at 62.
73. A court may clearly consider the special training and expertise of police officers. 3 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 61.
74. 440 U.S. at 663.
75. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 59.
76. See 440 U.S. at 657 (1979).
77. The dissent was particularly flamboyant regarding this distinction, suggesting that the
Court "elevates the adage 'misery loves company' to a novel role in Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence." Id. at 664 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). While Mr. Justice Rehnquist proceeded to
complain that "a random license check . . . is quite different from a random stop designed to
uncover violations of [unrelated] laws," id., he did not effectively argue that policemen either
can or do make this constitutional distinction in the field. The irony of Justice Rehnquist's
statement is as rich as his rhetoric.
78. 440 U.S. at 663.
79. Id. at 663-64 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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text supports "fixed" checkpoint operations, 80 it is persuasively arguable
thatfired license and registration check roadblocks are inherently doomed to
fail their regulatory purpose because of their easy avoidability.8' As a conse-
quence, temporary roadblocks will evidently be needed in order to achieve
regulatory goals. Moreover, while fixed border patrol checkpoints are con-
stitutionally virtuous, in part, because their locations are determined by offi-
cials charged with and interested in overall enforcement planning,8 2 this
desirable administrative detachment will not necessarily inhere in temporary
regulatory roadblocks. The use of such temporary roadblocks must result in
a movement on the constitutional continuum away from the minimal officer
discretion of fixed border patrol checkpoints toward the danger of unbridled
discretion. The degree of this movement will be gauged by subsequent liti-
gation; however, the fact of the innate shift toward greater individual discre-
tion shows that the extension of the border patrol analysis to license and
registration stops is dubious at best.
Both the location and operation of license and registration check road-
blocks are subject to official abuse.83 The apparent need for temporary
roadblocks and the possibility of the application of Marthez-Fuerte selective
referrals enhance this abusive potential. It is arguable that Prouse requires a
showing of the systematic operation of a roadblock; however, the judicial
view of what is "systematic" is unlikely to be extremely rigid.8 4 The totality
of these considerations indicates that individuals may find themselves in the
untenable position of having to rebut the alleged systematic operation of a
roadblock. It will be recalled that the inherent failure of proof in the analo-
gous random stop situation is a particular evil of that procedure. It is pres-
ently unclear, then, to what extent abuse of official discretion will abate by
application of the roadblock procedure to license and registration stops.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since its endorsement in Terry of a less-than-probable cause justification
for seizures of persons, the Supreme Court has been committed to a balanc-
ing approach to fourth amendment "reasonableness" problems. Balancing
provides great judicial flexibility since it focuses the resolution of fourth
amendment confrontations on the relative weightiness of state and individ-
ual interests in particular circumstances. Flexibility, however, precludes the
recognition of definite parameters to the reasonableness inquiry. The
Court's use of balancing in Prouse produces a laudable result in light of con-
80. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
81. See Brief for Petitioner, at 10; cf United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)
("Motorists . . . are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the loca-
tion of checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere.").
82. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976).
83. Eg., Swift v. State, 131 Ga. App. 231, 206 S.E.2d 51, rev'd, 232 Ga. 534, 207 S.E.2d 459
(1974) (license check roadblock operated on a road leading to a rock festival and manned by a
drug abuse squad and marijuana-detecting dog).
84. See, e.g., People v. Estrada, 68 Ill. App. 3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 128 (1978): "It is not
necessary for a checkpoint to s
t
op every car in order to be systematic but only for officers to be
following some pattern that will minimize their discretion .. Id at 274, 386 N.E.2d at 130.
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tinued commitment to Terry: roving-patrol automobile stops for license and
registration checks are unconstitutional absent "articulable reasonable suspi-
cion" to believe that violations of the pertinent laws exist. Despite this ar-
guably favorable outcome in Prouse, the Court's reliance on balancing is
subject to criticism.
Initially, the extension of Terr's analysis to seizures of automobiles and
their occupants by roving patrols necessitates an almost case-by-case explo-
ration of the scope of the fourth amendment protections implicated in such
seizures. Implicit in Prouse's balancing rationale is the conclusion that statis-
tical proof of the benefits of intrusive procedures may overwhelm fourth
amendment interests of the motoring public. When the focus of analysis can
shift so subtly from the permissibility of the means of police procedure to the
desirability of the ends, the constitutional justification of a police procedure
becomes possible on the basis that the procedure is minimally intrusive on
individual interests while being significantly productive of permissible law
enforcement goals. While courts would not knowingly sanction police-state
tactics, the means/ends dichotomy enhances the possibility of unwitting ju-
dicial condonation of police procedures which clearly achieve legitimate
state goals but also surreptitiously facilitate impermissible police practices.
The danger of arbitrary, discriminatory, pretextual use of roving-patrol
stops, therefore, remains substantial in the wake of Prouse.
The second factor which impugns Prouse's rationale is the Court's gratu-
itous validation of ill-defined roadblock stops as the alternative to random
stops. This dictum constitutes a wholesale retreat from any idea of ever re-
quiring that a standard, reasonable suspicion or otherwise, justify roadblock
seizures of automobiles for license and registration checks. Such a retreat is
difficult to reconcile with the Court's veiled castigation of the lack of docu-
mentation supporting the effectiveness of existing random stop procedures.
Since the state clearly did not undertake to prove the effectiveness of road-
block procedures, the Court has apparently foregone its opportunity to re-
view roadblock stops on their merits.
The Court's roadblock alternative is also assailable on the basis of its
erroneous incorporation, by implication, of the border patrol analysis of
roadblocks. It is clear that vastly different governmental interests inhere in
license and registration stops and border stops. The license and registration
roadblock procedures may, therefore, be subject to a balancing which differs
radically from that involved in analysis of border patrol roadblocks; specifi-
cally, the great public interest in preserving the integrity of national borders
is undoubtedly deserving of being accorded greater constitutional weight
than the states' interest in verifying compliance with license and registration
laws. Nevertheless, application of the roadblock procedure to license and
registration enforcement entails a dilution of constitutional protections, the
magnitude of which is presently in doubt.
The Court's infatuation with the balancing analysis has proven to be
both jurisprudentially stimulating and constitutionally challenging. In the
abstract, balancing is perfectly suited to an analysis of reasonableness; thus,
abandonment of balancing is unlikely as well as undesirable from the
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Court's perspective. Analysis of the nature of balancing, however, suggests
that this analytical tool is subject to abuse and must be carefully monitored
by the courts that employ it. Only by maintaining the proper perspective on
what is being balanced and why balancing is being utilized can courts en-
gage in principled application of standards such as "articulable reasonable
suspicion" in a balancing framework. The burden is heavy on both the
courts and litigants to cultivate an enlightened appreciation of balancing's
limitations and dangers.
David C Halford
A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX: CANNON V
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
"The search for significance in the silence of Congress is too often the
pursuit of a mirage."I
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of implication provides a basis for a court to allow an
individual who has been injured by another's violation of a federal statute to
maintain a private action for vindication of his rights when the statute itself
does not expressly authorize such a remedy. The traditional justification for
the doctrine has been that it permits a court to fill gaps left by Congress in a
statute's enforcement scheme. By insuring complete and comprehensive en-
forcement a court thus assists in effectuating the purposes underlying the
statute.
2
When it enacted title IX of the Education Amendments of 19723 to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex by federally funded educational
programs and activities, 4 Congress left just such a gap. While taking care to
authorize the federal departments and agencies that administer educational
funds to enforce the statute and regulations promulgated under it, 5 Congress
did not explicitly grant similar powers to individuals aggrieved by violations
of the statute. It was not until Geraldine Cannon sought and was denied
admission to the medical schools of the University of Chicago and North-
western University that the gap was filled.
This comment will look briefly at the positions taken by federal courts
of appeals and district courts that considered whether to allow a private
right of action under title IX prior to the United States Supreme Court's
1. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, II (1942) (Frankfurter, J.).
2. A survey of the evolution of and rationale for the implication doctrine is beyond the
scope of this comment. For such an examination, see Note, Implyitg Civil Remedies From Federal
Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963); Note, Implication of Private Actions From Federal
Statutes.- From Borak to Ash, I J. CORP. L. 371 (1976); Comment, Private Rights ofAction Under
Amtrak and Ash; Some Impliationsfor Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392 (1975); Note, Implied
Private Actions Under Federal Statutes- The Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 429 (1976).
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1683 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as title IX).
4. Section 901 of title IX states that "[n]o person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance ...... 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1976).
5. Section 902 of title IX provides in part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any education program or activity . . . is authorized and di-
rected to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title . . . by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders ... which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives
of the statute . . . . Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this sec-
tion may be effected (1) by the termination of. . . assistance . . . to any recipient as
to whom there has been an express finding . . . of a failure to comply with such re-
quirement, . . . or (2) by any other means authorized by law . ...
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
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decision in Cannon v. Un'versity of Chtcago.6 It will then examine the rationale
underlying the Court's implication of a private action in Cannon and suggest
how the Court might have structured an essentially meritorious decision on a
firmer foundation.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE ACTION
In 1974 Geraldine Cannon applied for admission to the 1975 entering
classes of the medical schools at the University of Chicago and Northwestern
University. Cannon was thirty-nine years old at the time, and her chances of
gaining admission were virtually eliminated by reason of her age. Both
schools had express policies against admitting individuals over the age of
thirty who did not have advanced degrees. 7 Notwithstanding her purported
objective qualifications,8 Cannon did not receive a place in the entering class
at either medical school. She sought reconsideration and explanations from
admissions officials. Unsatisfied with their responses, she submitted a com-
plaint to the Chicago office of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW), alleging that the medical schools, recipients of federal
funds, had denied her admission on the basis of her sex in violation of title
Ix.
In July 1975, having received only an acknowledgment from HEW of
its receipt of her complaint, Cannon brought suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 9 That court dismissed the
6. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
7. Id at 680 n.2.
8. The complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois alleged that the average score on the Medical School Admission Test for applicants
admitted to the 1974 entering class was 575 and the average grade point average was 3.2. Can-
non stated that her test score was 585 and her grade point average was 3.53. Appendix to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6-7.
In an affidavit offered to support the University of Chicago's motion to dismiss the com-
plaintJoseph Ceithaml, Director of Admissions and member of the medical school's admissions
committee, stated that Cannon's grade point average in the basic sciences was 3.17 compared
with a science average for the 1974 entering class of 3.7. He stated further that 51% to 60% of
the other applicants had scored higher than the plaintiff on the science portion of the Medical
School Admission Test and 81% to 90% had achieved higher math scores. Ceithaml concluded
with the observation that at least 2,000 applicants better qualified than Cannon were not of-
fered one of the 104 places available in the 1975 entering class. Appendix to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 26-27. See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1067 & n.2 (1976).
It would appear that there is some basis for challenging the sufficiency of Cannon's objec-
tive qualifications.
9. Cannon claimed violations of her rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-6, 2000c-8, as amended by title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1683 (1976); the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1976); and the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 292d (1976). Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (1976).
The original complaint named only the University of Chicago and Northwestern Univer-
sity as defendants. After learning from HEW that there would be some delay in investigating
her complaint, Cannon amended her pleading to include the Secretary and Region V Director
of HEW as defendants and a request for injunctive relief compelling HEW to complete its
investigation. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 680-82. The federal defendants
ultimately sided with Cannon in her contention that title IX does allow a private right of ac-
tion. Id. at 1952 n.8.
The title IX claim was premised on a theory that the age criterion employed by the medi-
cal schools has a disproportionately adverse effect on women, the students whose higher educa-
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action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and for failure to state
a claim for relief.'0 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the deci-
sion. I
On appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioner Cannon confined the issue
for resolution to whether a private plaintiff, allegedly discriminated against
on the basis of sex by an educational institution receiving federal financial
assistance, could maintain an action for relief under title IX. The Supreme
Court reversed the two lower courts after finding sufficient grounds for the
implication of a private right of action.12
II. THE LAW BEFORE CANNON
Plaintiff Cannon was not the first to assert the right established in title
IX as a basis for relief from alleged sex discrimination. Several individuals
had earlier brought suits under the Act, but all were unsuccessful for a rea-
son other than the absence of a private right of action. Following the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision in Cannon v. Universio of Chicago, only two other
federal courts had occasion to consider directly the private right of action
question.
A. The Early Decisions
In Trent v. Perrtlt'3 a young male plaintiff challenged his school's groom-
ing regulations, which restricted male hair styles but not those of females, as
discriminatory treatment of similarly situated individuals violative of title
IX. The court dismissed the action, declaring that recipients of federal funds
are not required to erase all differences between the sexes. It found that the
discrimination alleged by the plaintiff did not fall within the purview of sec-
tion 901 and was unrelated to the educational purposes for which federal
money had been allotted.
14
The plaintiff in Stewart v. New York Unzversity15 was a white female who
was denied admission to the defendant's law school. She sued to challenge
the school's minority admissions policy, basing her claims on title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 196416 and on title IX. Her right to maintain an action
under these statutes was not challenged. Rather, the court found that she
was required to show that the federal funds received by the law school con-
stituted "more than a de minimus" portion of its annual revenue'
7 to sup-
tion is more likely to be interrupted. Cannon argued that the age restriction thus had the effect
of excluding otherwise qualified female applicants from consideration by the medical schools.
441 U.S. at 680 n.2.
10. 406 F. Supp. at 1260.
1I. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1067 (1976), aJd on rehearing, 559
F.2d 1077 (1977).
12. 441 U.S. at 688-89.
13. 391 F. Supp. 171 (S.D. Miss. 1975).
14. Id at 171-73.
15. 430 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976). Section 2000d states that "Inlo person . . .
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."
17. Stewart v. New York University, 430 F. Supp. at 1314.
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port her contention that the school was a recipient of federal funds. Further,
it was incumbent upon her to establish a material connection between the
federal assistance and the allegedly discriminatory admissions policy. 8 Not
having met these burdens, she failed to state a valid claim under either stat-
ute, and her action was dismissed.
Not until the case of Piasczk v. Cleveland Museum of Art t 9 did a court ex-
pressly consider the existence of a private right of action under title IX. The
question arose in an employment discrimination context and was not raised
by either party to the litigation; the court alone explored the issue in a
lengthy footnote to its opinion.20 The plaintiff had charged the defendant
with rejecting her application for employment as a museum guard solely
because of her sex. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff had an express
private remedy for discriminatory hiring practices in title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19 64.
2 1 Nevertheless, it also concluded that title IX supplied a
cause of action. The court reasoned that an implied private right of action
would be consistent with the congressional intent, evidenced by its enact-
ment of the statute, to eliminate sex-based discrimination in all facets of
educational programs and activities receiving federal funds.
22
B. The Impact of the Seventh Circuit's Cannon Decisizn
After the court of appeals' affirmance of the district court's finding in
Cannon that no private right of action could be maintained under title IX,
18. Id. "[T]he cases indicate that a private claimant must show greater government in-
volvement with the defendant when that defendant is a nongovernmental entity, than when the
private claimant sues the governmental entity directly, or when the government itself institutes
the action." Id at 1313.
19. 426 F. Supp. 779 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
20. Id at 780 n.1.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-5 (1976). Section 2000e-5 provides, in pertinent part, that
"a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge [filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or
(B) . . . by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5()(l) (1976).
22. 426 F. Supp. at 780 n.I. Despite her "well pleaded § 1681 claim," the plaintiff did not
succeed in proving herself a victim of discrimination. Id. at 781.
Although notable for its consideration of the role of a private action in furthering congres-
sional purposes, Piascik now has very little, if any, strength in the wake of several recent deci-
sions. A U.S. district court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D.
Mich. 1977), aJ'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979), declared invalid the employment regulations
promulgated by HEW pursuant to the authority granted in 20 U.S.C. § 1682. The court deter-
mined that "§ 1681 . . . addresses itself only to sex discrimination against the participants in
and the beneficiaries of federally assisted education programs" and felt "constrained to read this
language as a prohibition on sex discrimination against students and only students." d at
1031, 1032. This position was followed in Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 866
(D. Me. 1978), affd, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1979).
Likewise, in McCarthy v. Burkholder, 448 F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan. 1978) the court found that
the plaintiffs exclusive remedy for discrimination in employment lay in title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). It also noted that the plaintiff had, in any event,
failed to state a claim under title IX for the reasons that she had not joined HEW as a defend-
ant in the action and that she sought damages, a form of relief not provided by the statute. 448
F. Supp. at 43. It appears from the court's analysis that the problem was not with implication
of a private right of action under title IX but rather with the plaintiff's standing as an employee.
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the federal 23 courts confronted by the question did not uniformly apply the
Seventh Circuit's decision.
Female high school basketball players in Tennessee and Oklahoma
challenged the game rules issued by their secondary school athletic associa-
tions on the grounds that the rules violated both the equal protection
clause2 4 and title IX.2 5 The Tennessee court, relying on Cannon, ruled that
the plaintiff had no title IX action for the allegedly discriminatory treat-
ment. It also observed that even if a private right of action did exist, the
plaintiff would have to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in sec-
tion 902 before she could seek relief in court. 26 The Oklahoma court con-
ceded that the plaintiff might fall within the scope of section 901 of title IX
and would thus be entitled to bring a private action to protect her rights
were it not for the "elaborate system of administrative enforcement and judi-
cial review" established in section 902. It concluded by citing Cannon for the
proposition that no private right of action exists under the Act.2 7 Implicit in
both rulings is a finding that the statute creates no individual rights deserv-
ing protection.
Two other federal courts did not feel constrained to follow the Seventh
Circuit's lead, however. In Alexander v. Yale Unz'ersily28 the district court
found after a thorough analysis 29 that implication of a private action was
not only justified but was necessary to advance the congressional goals un-
derlying title IX. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the other hand,
merely distinguished Cannon, rendering it "an authority of limited signifi-
cance," in De La Cruz v. Tormey. 3° Without directly deciding whether the
language and purposes of title IX permit the inference of a private right of
action, the court concluded that section 901 does establish in individuals a
right to be free from sex discrimination in federally funded educational pro-
grams. 31 It found that where discriminatory conduct constitutes state ac-
tion, that right may be enforced in a suit brought under a section of the Civil
23. See also Williams v. Owen, 241 Ga. 363, 245 S.E.2d 638 (1978) (state court, relying on
Seventh Circuit's decision, refused to allow plaintiffs to maintain action based on title IX).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
25. Cape v. Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn.
1976), rev'don other grounds, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977); Jones v. Oklahoma Secondary Schools
Activities Ass'n, 453 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
26. 424 F. Supp. at 738.
27. Jones v. Oklahoma Secondary Schools Activities Ass'n, 453 F. Supp. 150, 153 (W.D.
Okla. 1977). Accord, Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1120
(E.D. Wisc. 1978) (dictum). See genera{y Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic Ass'n,
415 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (female athlete brought action for preliminary injunction
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 20 U.S.C. § 1681; no discussion of theory on which court al-
lowed action to proceed).
28. 459 F. Supp. I (D. Conn. 1977).
29. The court adopted the prior decision of the magistrate, who had applied the four-
pronged test for implication of a private right of action adopted by the Supreme Court in Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See text accompanying notes 37-57 nfa. The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit did not apply the Cort analysis in its initial decision in Cannon and on
rehearing gave it only a cursory consideration.
30. 582 F.2d 45, 60 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979).
31. 582 F.2d at 60.
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Rights Act of 1871.32 Thus the plaintiffs in De La Cruz were able to assert
alleged title IX violations in the context of their section 1983 action against a
state college system. Although it recognized the existence of a federal right
worthy of federal protection, the Ninth Circuit did not suggest how a plain-
tiff such as Geraldine Cannon might secure that right from invasion by pri-
vate entities.
With the lower courts divided, it was left for the Supreme Court to
determine finally whether title IX does create a cognizable right and, more
importantly, whether it affords individual citizens an independent means to
enforce that right.
III. A RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX: THE SUPREME
COURT'S RATIONALE
In analyzing whether implication of a private right of action under title
IX is warranted, the Supreme Court in Cannon v. Uversi, of Chicago applied
the test it had earlier set down in Cori v. Ash. 33 Cori was the culmination of
attempts by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to limit, without
extinguishing, the judiciary's authority to create private remedies by impli-
cation. 34 Its four-part test was an effort to define a methodology for a consis-
tent and uniform application by the courts of the implication doctrine.
Although the Cori analysis has been frequently used by federal courts to
imply private actions under a variety of statutes,35 only the federal court in
Connecticut applied it in a thorough fashion to the title IX implication ques-
tion.36 Thus, the Supreme Court's examination of the statute in Cannon in
the light of the four Cori factors was the first and, seemingly, most exhaus-
tive.
The initial inquiry under Cori requires a review of the statute in ques-
tion to determine whether it in fact creates a right. The test asks if the plain-
tiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted"
3 7
and requires identification of the principal beneficiaries of the act.3 8 The
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 states:
Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
This section was not available to plaintiff Cannon because she sued private institutions. Can-
non v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1068-71 (7th Cir. 1976).
33. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
34. Se, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National
R.R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Calhoon v.
Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940); Texas
& Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
35. In his dissenting opinion in Cannon, Justice Powell noted that "no less than 20 decisions
by the Courts of Appeals have implied private actions from federal statutes" in the four short
years since the Cart decision. 441 U.S. at 741. See cases cited therein at 741-42.
36. Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. I (D. Conn. 1977). See text accompanying note
29 supra.
37. 422 U.S. at 78 (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
38. One commentator has challenged the Court's limitation of the benefited class to princi-
pal beneficiaries, finding no reason for so narrow an interpretation as long as the plaintiff does
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language itself may clearly state the right, but in the absence of such a decla-
ration, evidence of a "pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship
between the plaintiff class and the defendant class," 39 which may be gleaned
from the statute as a whole or from its legislative history, will suffice.
Looking at the words of section 901 of title IX, 4 0 the Supreme Court
found in Cannon that the law was enacted to benefit persons discriminated
against because of their sex and concluded that the petitioner was a member
of the class of persons benefited by the Act.4 ' In reaching this decision the
Court relied upon the "right-creating language" 42 in which section 901 is
phrased to identify the persons whom Congress wished to protect or assist by
enacting the statute.
43
Having found that title IX does create a right in favor of private indi-
viduals, the Court advanced to the second criterion and scrutinized the stat-
ute's legislative history for evidence of congressional intent, "explicit or
implicit, either to create. . . a [private] remedy or to deny one."' 44 It is not
necessary to find explicit indications that Congress intended to allow a pri-
vate right of action; however, any finding that Congress clearly opposed such
a remedy is determinative.
45
Far from finding a legislative purpose to deny a private action, the
Court concluded in Cannon that title IX's history "plainly indicates" Con-
gress wished to create such a remedy.46 The basis for the Court's conclusion
was the statute's similarity to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
41 Cit-
ing comments of title IX's Senate sponsor,48 the Court found an explicit
assumption by the congressional draftsmen that "Title IX . . . would be
interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the preceding eight
years." 49 And, title VI had been construed by several federal courts as per-
mitting individuals aggrieved by alleged violations of that statute to main-
tain an action for appropriate relief.50 The Court considered it reasonable
to assume that the legislators knew of this construction and intended title IX
to profit from it. Moreover, the Court pointed to the inclusion in the pack-
age of statutes enacted simultaneously with title IX of a section authorizing
not prove to be merely an incidental beneficiary. Note, Impceaton of Prrwate Actionsfrom Federal
Statutes. From Borak to Ash, supra note 2, at 384.
39. 422 U.S. at 80-82.
40. See note 4 supra.
41. 441 U.S. at 694.
42. Id. at 690 n.13.
43. Such language is to be contrasted with the prohibitory language of criminal statutes or
the directive language of laws granting authority to agencies or other entities. Id. at 690-93.
44. 422 U.S. at 78.
45. 441 U.S. at 694.
46. Id.
47. See notes 4, 5, 18 supra. Compare 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a), 1682-1683 (1976) with 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000d to 2000d-2 (1976).
48. 441 U.S. at 694 n.16, 696 n.19.
49. id. at 696.
50. The principal decision the Court relied on was Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370
F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967). In that case the court of appeals deter-
mined that black school children were entitled to assert their right to equal educational oppor-
tunities in a private action under § 601 of title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Id. at 851, 852.
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. Connolly, 331 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Mich.
1971) and Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967) explicitly
adopted the position taken by the Fifth Circuit in Bossier Parish.
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awards of attorney's fees to parties prevailing in suits against governmental
educational agencies to compel compliance with, among other laws, title VI.
The Court treated this provision5 as direct evidence that Congress pre-
sumed a private action was available for enforcement of title VI. Finally,
the Court noted an absence of legislative action to change the prevailing
assumption that title VI, and hence title IX, created a private remedy for
victims of discrimination as a clear indicator of the requisite congressional
intent.
52
The third inquiry in the Cort analysis asks whether it is "consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply . . . a [private]
remedy for the plaintiff."'53 In Cannon the Supreme Court counseled against
implication if a private remedy would frustrate or interfere with the purpose
of the statute. If the remedy would be "at least helpful" in effectuating con-
gressional objectives, however, then implication may be justified.
54
The Court first identified the purposes for which title IX was enacted.
In the history of the statute it found, as a primary aim, a desire on the part of
Congress to avoid funding discriminatory activities with federal resources
and, as an additional objective, an interest in protecting individuals against
sex-based discrimination. The express statutory sanction of termination of
funds, while useful in accomplishing the first purpose, is severe, and the
Court concluded that it would not be an appropriate means to redress indi-
vidual grievances. Furthermore, the administrative enforcement mechanism
established in title IX and its companion regulations 55 does not include par-
ticipation by private complainants. No true administrative remedy is avail-
able, and the Court determined that an individual may be entirely at the
mercy of the funding agency should that agency decide not to investigate a
complaint.
The position taken by HEW throughout the Cannon litigation also per-
suaded the Court that implication of a private action would be consistent
with title IX's policies and objectives. The agency advocated such a remedy
as valuable in assisting federal enforcement and assuring compliance by pri-
vate institutions.
56
The fourth Cort criterion was easily met by the Court. That inquiry
tests whether the cause of action is one "traditionally relegated to state law
. . . so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely
51. Education Amendments of 1972, § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976). Section 718 provides:
Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the United States against a local
educational agency, a State..., or the United States..., for ... discrimination on
the basis of race, color, or national origin in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, or the fourteenth amendment . . . as they pertain to elementary and
secondary education, the court, in its discretion, upon a finding that the proceedings
were necessary to bring about compliance, may allow the prevailing party ... a rea-
sonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
52. 441 U.S. at 703.
53. 422 U.S. at 78.
54. 441 U.S. at 703.
55. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976), 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6-11, 86.17 (1978).
56. "The availability of a private right of action under Title IX would contribute substan-
tially to effective implementation of the statute's goals." Brief of Federal Respondents at 6. See
aLso Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 708 n.42.
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on federal law." 57 Declaring that the federal courts and the federal govern-
ment have traditionally been the chief guardians against discrimination and
noting the involvement of federal monies, the Court concluded that implica-
tion of a private action would not conflict with state interests.
Having analyzed title IX in terms of the four Cori factors, the Supreme
Court was satisfied that individuals allegedly discriminated against by edu-
cational institutions receiving federal funds should have their day in court.
With a parting admonition that the "far better course" is for Congress to
specify its intent with respect to private rights of action, the Court ruled that
petitioner Cannon could maintain her lawsuit against the medical schools. 58
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING
The Supreme Court's holding in Cannon v. Uniwerszty of Chicago is signifi-
cant because it furnishes one more weapon in the arsenal available to women
as they pursue equal opportunities in contemporary society. There is, how-
ever, a notable lack of precision in the conclusions the Court drew from its
evaluation of title IX under the Cori criteria. Additionally, certain of its
findings rest on weak foundations. Such flaws do not directly affect the re-
sult in Cannon, but they may well impair the case's value as a precedent for
implication of private actions under other civil rights statutes similar in
structure and effect to title IX. Finally, the Court neglected some policy
considerations respecting application of the implication doctrine which were
made necessary by virtue of agency involvement in and congressional activ-
ity subsequent to the enactment of title IX.
57. 422 U.S. at 78.
58. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 717. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stewart, endorsed the majority's closing comments and urged that
the Court should in the future be "extremely reluctant" to imply private rights of action in the
wake of congressional silence. Id at 718.
Three justices opposed the majority's decision and two filed dissenting opinions. Justice
White, joined by Justice Blackmun, found in the legislative history and in the general scheme of
title IX clear indications that Congress did not intend to allow a private right of action. He
further contended that a private action to enforce title VI could not be justified, and he chal-
lenged the holding in Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 911 (1967), as well as the Cannon majority's reliance on the attorney's fee provision in
§ 718 of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976). See text accompanying
note 51 supra. Justice White concluded that Congress chose to omit a private enforcement
scheme from title IX, and its choice required the Court to abstain from implying one. 441 U.S.
at 7 18-30.
Justice Powell agreed with Justice White that title IX contains no implied private right of
action. He also took the opportunity to challenge the doctrine of implication as an unconstitu-
tional exercise of judicial power. "By creating a private action, a court of limited jurisdiction
necessarily extends its authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to resolve.
[citations omitted] This . . .conflicts with the authority of Congress under Art. III [of the U.S.
Constitution] to set the limits of federal jurisdiction." Id at 746. He urged that only the "most
compelling evidence" of congressional intent to permit suits by private plaintiffs would justify
applying the doctrine of implication, and he voiced great "reluctan[ce] ever to permit a federal
court to volunteer its services for enforcement purposes" when a statute expressly provides an
enforcement mechanism of some type. Ad at 749. In closing, Justice Powell also cited, as sup-
port for his attack on the implication doctrine, a need to encourage Congress to anticipate and
resolve by itself the policy questions its legislation creates. Id
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A. The Nature of the Right Created
The Court was singularly imprecise in its analysis of the right created
by title IX. The first step in the Cort approach, 59 involving identification of
a federal right that a potential plaintiff may vindicate in a private lawsuit,
subsumes four specific inquiries. First, what is the purpose of the statute?
Second, what, if any, is the right it creates? Third, who is intended to enjoy
that right? And, finally, does the plaintiff in question come within the class
of intended beneficiaries?
In Cannon the Court delayed consideration of the purpose of title IX. It
did, however, make an oblique reference to a "benefit" the statute confers
and identified the beneficiaries of the statute as "persons discriminated
against on the basis of sex . . "60 On the strength of these findings the
Court concluded that petitioner Cannon was a member of the class benefited
by title IX.
The exact nature of the benefit bestowed by title IX is unclear, how-
ever. Further, neither the words of the statute nor their peculiar right-creat-
ing quality, on which the Court relied,61 support the Court's definition of
the class of persons Congress intended to protect by enacting the statute. If,
as the Court suggested, the benefited class consists of victims of sex discrimi-
nation, then no need arises for a private right of action under title IX. To
come within the Court's characterization of the statute's beneficiaries, one
would have to show that discrimination has occurred. In fact, what the typi-
cal title IX plaintiff alleges is a violation of a right to equal educational
opportunities. What is sought from the statute is a forum in which to prove
the violation and obtain relief.
62
It would seem, after a consideration of the purpose of title IX, as articu-
lated in its legislative history, 63 and from a careful reading of the language
in section 901,64 that the character of the benefited class is not so restricted
as the Supreme Court proposed, however inadvertently, in Cannon. A nar-
row interpretation indicates that the statute was designed to assure women
pursuing an education of freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex
and, therefore, of equal access with men to educational programs and insti-
tutions. A broader reading, and one consistent with the words of the act,
59. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
60. 441 U.S. at 694.
61. See i. at 690-93. See also text accompanying note 42 supra.
62. The Court's reasoning, properly applied, would exclude Geraldine Cannon from the
class of persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted. She has not yet had an opportunity
to prove that her exclusion from the medical schools at the University of Chicago and North-
western University was based on her sex.
63. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 30403 (1971) (Sen. Bayh: "Today I am submitting an
amendment . . . which will guarantee that women, too, enjoy the educational opportunity
every American deserves."); id at 39252 (Rep. Mink: "If we really believe in equality, we must
begin to insist that our institutions of higher learning practice it .... "); 118 CONG. REc. 5806-
07 (1972) (Sen. Bayh: "[Title IX] is a . . . measure which I believe is needed . . . to provide
women with solid legal protection as they seek education and training .. "); H.R. REP. No.
554, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52, reprtbtedmn [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2462, 2511-12.
64. See note 4 supra.
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indicates that this guarantee of equal educational opportunities extends to
everyone.
Whatever the benefit it perceived in title IX and whatever the class of
persons it intended to designate as recipients of that benefit, what the Court
articulated in Cannon was an imprecise description of an important right and
an inaccurate identification of the holders of that right. Its pronouncement
is clearly at odds with the legislative intent it later tried so diligently to dis-
cern.
B. The Search for Congressional Intent
1. The Intent to Create a Private Right of Action
The Supreme Court's search through the legislative history of title IX
for signs of intent either to create or deny a private right of action, the sec-
ond step in the Cori analysis, 65 should have yielded insufficient evidence to
support its firm conclusions. This is not to say that the Court's ultimate
holding is incorrect. Rather, it is to suggest the Court should not have relied
so extensively on meager and often amorphous expressions of intent.
Too much of the Court's analysis of Congress' intent with respect to
creation of a private right of action focused on an unexamined conclusion
that title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196466 and its history support the
implication of such an action. From this premise it was an easy jump to the
conclusion that title IX, which was intentionally patterned after title VI,
6 7
likewise affords a private remedy. The propriety of implying a private cause
of action from title VI has never been thoroughly considered in the detailed
manner encouraged by the Cori v. Ash analysis. 68 On the strength of Bossier
Parish School Board v. Lemon 69 alone, federal courts have adjudicated viola-
tions of title VI rights. If, as several commentators have suggested7 ° and as is
implicit in the concurring opinion 7 l accompanying the Cannon decision, the
Supreme Court has been moving in a conservative direction and restricting
the application of the doctrine of implication, then it should be reluctant to
65. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
66. See note 16 supra.
67. See 117 CONG. REC. 30404, 30407-08 (1971).
68. In a separate opinion filed in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 379
(1978), Justice White had the following to say with respect to a private right of action under
title VI:
I write separately concerning the question of whether Title VI . . . provides for a
private cause of action. Four Justices are apparently of the view that such a private
cause of action exists, and four Justices assume it for purposes of this case. I am un-
willing merely to assume an affirmative answer. . . . As I see it, if we are not obliged
to do so, it is at least advisable to address this threshold jurisdictional issue. [citation
omitted] Furthermore, . . . it is at least questionable practice to adjudicate a novel
and difficult statutory issue without first considering whether we have jurisdiction to
decide it.
Id at 379-80. Justice White ultimately concluded that a private action is consistent with
neither the letter nor the spirit of title VI. Id at 387. His is not the prevailing view.
69. See note 50 supra.
70. Note, Imphiahon of Private Actionsjiom Federal Statutes.- From Borak to Ash, supra note 2;
Note, Imphed Przwate Actions Under Federal Statutes, supra note 2.
71. See note 58 supra.
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rely on a largely unscrutinized deduction. Arguably, the existence of a pri-
vate right of action should not be merely assumed.
Too much of the Court's rationale in Cannon also rested on presump-
tions that the legislators who enacted title IX were aware of the construction
placed on title VI favoring an action for private plaintiffs. The committee
reports and the debates on title IX furnish little evidence that Congress con-
sidered the matter of private lawsuits or anticipated problems that might
later arise in that regard. 72 That the Court misconstrued the workings of the
collective congressional mind is apparent from the debates precipitated by
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. 73 Congress itself was
uncertain in 1976 about the intentions of its predecessors with respect to
private rights of action based on title VI and title IX. It attempted to re-
solve the dilemma by adopting the attorney's fees act for use in the event
that the courts at some future date eliminated the confusion.
74
Contrary to the Supreme Court's assertion in Cannon,75 the legislative
history of title IX does not "plainly indicate" a wish or even a vague inten-
tion to create a private right of action under the statute. The record does
not give explicit evidence that Congress contemplated the matter, and reli-
ance on a presumed right of action under title VI does not strengthen the
Court's conclusion.
Perhaps the Court was trying to avoid relying directly on the legislative
history, given its limited utility and its susceptibility to varying interpreta-
tions. Rather than straining to interpret the congressional silence and rely-
ing on assumptions about the legislators' understanding of title VI, however,
the Court would have done better to acknowledge the absence of any expres-
72. The matter most on the minds of the legislators was the propriety of further involving
the federal government in the affairs of private educational institutions. See, e.g., 117 CONG.
REC. 30412, 39248-49, 39253-54, 39255 (1971).
There was concern about enforcement mechanisms during the consideration of title VI.
The debate focused not on private enforcement actions, however, but on the perceived potential
for arbitrary terminations of funds by federal agencies. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 1520, 5252-55,
6544-45, 7059-60, 7076-78, 7103 (1964).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The act authorizes courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees
to parties prevailing in suits to enforce certain civil rights statutes, including title VI and title
Ix.
74. Some members of Congress did envision private enforcement of all the civil rights laws.
See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 31471, 31832, 35118, 35128 (1976). The prevailing attitude is best
captured, however, in the following remarks by Representatives Drinan and Railsback:
Mr. Drinan. We accept preexisting law, whatever it is, and simply state that the
routine . . . language on through the U.S. Code giving to the prevailing party . . .
reasonable attorneys' fees shall be applied to title IX.
Mr. Railsback. I have been informed . . . that under title VI of the Civil Rights
Act and title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 there exists a serious question
as to whether an individual complainant . . . has the right to sue as a private plaintiff.
[He then referred to the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Cannon v.
University of Chicago].
It has been brought to my attention that by granting attorneys' fees to prevailing
parties . . . , Congress might implicitly authorize a private right of action under title
VI and title IX. This is not the intent of Congress. This bill [Attorney's Fees Awards
Act] merely creates a remedy in the event the courts determine that an individual may
sue under these statutes.
Id. at 35116, 35124.
75. 441 U.S. at 694.
[Vol. 57:3
PRIV TE ACTION UNDER TITLE IX
sions of intent and then to examine the legislative history of title IX for
evidence of the purposes underlying the statute.76
2. The Objectives of Title IX
The Supreme Court's analysis in Cannon, in conjunction with the third
Cori inquiry, 77 of the purposes underlying title IX suffers from the same im-
precision afflicting the conclusions reached in its evaluation of the right cre-
ated by the statute. Moreover, in its effort to identify purposes the Court
was unnecessarily specific. Those it does articulate are, arguably, too narrow
to justify implication of a private right of action, and rather than ends, they
seem more to be means for the achievement of some broader goal. A private
action under title IX is consistent with the purposes underlying the legisla-
tive scheme but not with the purposes perceived by the Court.
78
Two problems are apparent in the Court's declaration of the objectives
of title IX. First, it would seem that creation of a private right of action
would do little to assist the government with depriving discriminatory edu-
cational programs of federal financial assistance. The typical plaintiff would
not be likely to sue to terminate federal funds, a remedy recognized as severe
and one to be used after all other attempts to achieve compliance with the
statute have failed. 79 Rather, an aggrieved individual would, like Geraldine
Cannon, be seeking relief more personal in nature and more appropriate to
redress the grievance.
The second problem arises from the Court's statement of the second
objective. Had Congress had as a central purpose in enacting title IX the
desire to provide protection to individuals, it would probably have been ex-
plicit about the means it contemplated to achieve such protection. In other
civil rights statutes it took care to detail enforcement mechanisms available
to individuals for vindication of their rights. 80 There is little, if any, evi-
dence in title IX that Congress considered specific ways to relieve personal
76. One criticism of the Cort approach to implication of private rights of action is that its
second criterion encourages exactly the kind of analysis used by the Supreme Court in Cannon.
See Note, Implied Private Actions, Under Federal Statutes: From Borak to Ash, supra note 2, at 450-54.
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), decided shortly after Cannon, the
Court declined to infer that § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(q)(a)(1)
(1976), allows damages actions by individual plaintiffs. After declaring that the four Cort fac-
tors are not necessarily entitled to "equal weight" in the Court's deliberations, 442 U.S. at 575,
the majority's opinion asserted that "the ultimate question is one of congressional intent .
442 U.S. at 578.
Although the judicial aim is, apparently, to be objective, this relentless quest for congres-
sional intent is likely to yield more strained and inconsistent analyses of federal statutes. Per-
haps, as Justice Powell suggested in his Cannon dissent, 441 U.S. 742, 749, the Cort scheme is not
adequate to overcome the problems and hazards inherent in judicial attempts to discern legisla-
tive intent.
77. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
78. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
79. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 1661, 5254-55, 7067 (1964) (severity of enforcement scheme in
title VI).
80. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1976) (private suits for violations of Equal Pay Act); 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1976) (private suits for relief from racial discrimination in public accommo-
dations); 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-8 (1976) (private suits for relief from racial discrimination in public
1980]
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injustices. 8 ' It appears that the Court created purposes in order to justify
implication of a private right of action rather than identifying the principal
congressional purposes that motivated the enactment of the statute and then
determining whether a private right of action would, at the very least, assist
in accomplishing them.
An analysis based on the third Cori factor more accurate than that used
by the Supreme Court would first ascertain the "broad remedial purposes"
8 2
behind title IX and then evaluate whether a private right of action would be
consistent with them. This approach reveals as a primary goal the elimina-
tion of gender-based discrimination, particularly the invidious forms it has
taken in academe.83 The language of section 90184 points to this purpose as
do the statutes and amendments the title IX package contained 85 and the
legislative history when considered in its entirety and not in isolated seg-
ments.8 6 These sources further indicate that conditioning use of federal
funds in educational activities on assurances of nondiscrimination was
viewed as a means to eradicate discrimination based on sex and secure equal
academic opportunities for all individuals. The sanction of terminating
financial assistance could be effectively supplemented by private lawsuits
challenging procedures at educational institutions. Successful actions by in-
dividuals would complement title IX's administrative enforcement scheme
by giving notice to federal agencies of potentially pervasive discriminatory
practices within certain educational programs. The two mechanisms to-
gether may have a powerful deterrent effect as well.
Finally, as the Court itself noted, creation of a private right of action
may be necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose of the statute. HEW,
the agency with primary enforcement responsibilities, has asserted that it is
ill-equipped to police the numerous recipients of federal funds.8 7 Thus, so
long as it operates in addition to and not instead of the administrative
education); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) (private suits for violations of Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act).
Six months after delivering the Cannon decision, a majority of the Court refused to find a
private right of action for damages in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I
to -21 (1976). Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979). It is
interesting that the Court not only justified the holding on the basis of the statutory means
available to the Securities and Exchange Commission for achieving compliance with the Act, ld
at 247, but it also relied on the provisions for private suits contained in other securities laws. Id
& n.10. The latter evidence, the Court reasoned, clearly revealed that Congress knows how to
provide individuals with a right of action when it wishes to do so. Id at 248. Borrowing from
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Cannon, the Court concluded that "it is highly improbable
that 'Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action' " in the Invest-
ment Advisers Act. (d. at 247. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 572.
81. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
82. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
83. See 117 CONG. REC. 30403, 30405-06 (1971) (excerpts from the Report of the Presi-
dent's Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities).
84. See note 4 supra; J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964).
85. See H.R. REP. No. 554, supra note 62, at 2512, 2566-67; S. CONF. REP. 798, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 221-22, repnhtedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2462, 2671-72.
86. See 117 CONG. REC. 30399-415, 39248-63 (1971); 118 CONG. REC. 5803-15, 18831-63
(1972).
87. 441 U.S. at 706-07, 708 n.42. Some of this responsibility has been transferred to the
new Department of Education which may eventually be better able to handle the burden. See
Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668 (1979).
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scheme, a private remedy could advance the goal of title IX and, perhaps,
promote some efficiency in the implementation of the statutory enforcement
mechanism.
Implication of a private right of action from title IX can be justified
under the Cori v. Ash analysis.8 8 The Supreme Court simply failed in Cannon
to make thorough and effective use of the language and the origins of the
statute.
V. THE EFFECT OF CANNON
The decision in Cannon v. Uniersio of Chicago is consistent with the
emerging national policy toward eliminating discrimination based on sex.
Its role as a civil rights case may even excuse the inexact analysis of the basis
for implying a private right of action under title IX.
The Court should, however, have been more attentive to certain
problems inherent in its application of the implication doctrine. It is un-
likely that Congress is now unaware of the controversies that have arisen
over implying private rights of action from its statutes, but various legislative
colloquies, as recently as 1976,89 indicate that Congress is willing to let the
courts continue their struggle to interpret its customary silence on the ques-
tion. 90 At some point Congress will have to accept responsibility for framing
legislation complete with clearly articulated rights and comprehensive reme-
dies. 9 1 While maintaining some degree of flexibility in its schemes, it will
have to anticipate the increasingly familiar implication issue.
Given its wider significance, Cannon was perhaps not the appropriate
case for the Supreme Court to insist that Congress be specific and complete.
The federal legislators may do well, however, to heed the subtle warning
that concludes the opinion in Cannon.
9 2
One additional potential problem deserved notice in connection with
the Court's decision to imply a private right of action under title IX. Con-
gress is not the only entity that might ignore or overlook its responsibilities as
long as courts will fill the gaps it leaves. The federal agencies too can profit
when the judiciary creates new rights of action. It is possible that in the
wake of the Cannon decision HEW will see fit, faced as it is with the crush of
other tasks, to abdicate by mere inaction the statutory duties bestowed by
title IX, leaving enforcement of the act to private plaintiffs. Lurking, there-
fore, in the Court's finding of a private right of action may be a concomitant
obligation upon individuals to oversee HEW and other agencies that provide
financial assistance to educational institutions. The courts likewise should be
attentive and responsive to citizens' suits brought to compel agencies to act
in accordance with the statutory scheme. In the final analysis, the govern-
88. See also Comment, Prvate Rights of Action Under T~t/e IX, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
425 (1978).
89. See note 73 supra.
90. Justice Frankfurter once observed that "[l1oose judicial reading makes for loose legisla-
tive writing." Frankfurter, Some Refctt'ons on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 545
(1947).
91. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting).
92. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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ment, with its power to terminate funds, wields one of the strongest weapons
in the fight against sex-based discrimination.
CONCLUSION
In Cannon v. Uniersiy of Chicago, the Supreme Court used the implica-
tion doctrine to find a private right of action under title IX. Its holding
followed an ostensibly thorough analysis, which closer scrutiny reveals to be
tenuous and inexact. Despite the Court's effort to discern congressional in-
tent so as to effectuate legislative goals, it ultimately succeeded only in em-
bracing a mirage.
Diane L. Burkhardt
ILLEGITIMATES AND EQUAL PROTECTION:
LALLI v LALLI-A RETREAT FROM
TRIMBLE V GORDON
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade the United States Supreme Court has reviewed state
statutues which allegedly discriminated against illegitimate children in the
fields of wrongful death,' workmen's compensation, 2 welfare and support,
3
social security, 4 and intestate succession. 5 In dealing with the equal protec-
tion problems6 raised in those cases, the Court used an ad hoc approach
rather than articulating a clear standard of review. Thus, except for the
specific holdings of the decided cases, the law on the subject of equal protec-
tion for illegitimate children is still unsettled.
7
Lal/i v. Lalh,8 the Court's most recent decision on the rights of illegiti-
mates, upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring an order
of filiation to establish paternity during the putative father's lifetime before
a child born out of wedlock could inherit intestate from the father.9 To
evaluate the emerging standard of equal protection review for illegitimates,
the significance of Lalh lies in its rationale rather than its narrow holding.
The purpose of this comment is to ascertain the judicial standard of
review currently applicable to equal protection issues concerning the rights
of illegitimate children. To do so, the paper presents an analysis of the
Supreme Court's prior decisions involving discrimination against illegiti-
mates, examines the Court's analytical approaches to the equal protection
issues raised in those cases, and discusses the rationale of Lalh', which signals
a retreat from the equal protection standard articulated in Trmb/le v.
Gordon 10 less than one year earlier.
1. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73 (1968).
2. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
3. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411
U.S. 619 (1973).
4. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974);
Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), aJ'd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974); Davis v. Richard-
son, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn.), aJ'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
5. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
6. The equal protection guarantee is found in the fourteenth amendment: "No state shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
7. For a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions on illegitimacy, see generally
Note, lllegitmnacy and Equal Protecton." Two Tiers or An Analytical Crab-Bag?, 7 Loy. CHi. L.J. 754
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Two Trs]; Note, Illegtnimacy And Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV.
479 (1974); Note, Const. Law.- Equal Protection for lllegitimates, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 392 (1978).
8. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
9. Id. at 261-62, 275-76. For the text of the New York statute, see note 68 infa.
10. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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I. ILLEGITIMACY AND EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
During the sixties the Supreme Court developed a "two-tier" approach
to equal protection. The first tier approach, the rational basis test, is used in
determining the validity of state statutes which deal with economic and so-
cial welfare legislation.'' The Court generally holds such statutes valid on
the theory that they do not violate federal constitutional guarantees so long
as they bear any reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative pur-
pose.' 2 Chief Justice Warren best articulated this approach in McGowan v.
Maland13 when he said: "The constitutional safeguard is offended only if
the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
State's objective . . . .A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."'1 4 On the other
hand, where a fundamental right' 5 is threatened or a suspect classification
such as race, 16 alienage,17 or ancestry' 8 is involved, the second tier test of
strict scrutiny is applied. Under that test, the government is required affirm-
atively to show that it is pursuing a "compelling" or "overriding" goal.
Under such circumstances the classification will not be sustained unless it is
apparent that it is necessary to promote that compelling end, interest, or
purpose.
Certain areas of discrimination including classifications based on illegit-
imacy defy such neatly packaged categorizations.' 9 Thus, the strict scrutiny
test has not generally been applied to cases involving illegitimates because
that test is reserved for suspect classifications. The first tier approach or ra-
tional basis test is also inappropriate because illegitimacy involves personal
rights which deserve greater consideration than those involved with mere
commercial factors. For these troublesome classifications, it has been sug-
gested that the Supreme Court move to a middle-level scrutiny, such as Mar-
shall's balancing approach 20 or Gunther's "means-focused" scrutiny. 2 '
11. This test was set forth in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79
(1911).
12. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
13. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
14. Id at 425-26.
15. Fundamental rights include the right to vote (Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966)); the right to procreate (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)); criminal procedural
rights (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)); the right to travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969)). Seegenerally Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1127-31 (1969).
16. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
17. Oyama v. California, 322 U.S. 633 (1948).
18. Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
19. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). The difficulty with the two-tiered approach to equal protection is that it
can deal adequately with the extremes which are clearly socio-economic or clearly fundamental
but fails to work effectively in those cases that fall in between.
20. Justice Marshall discusses his balancing approach in his dissents to San Antonio In-
dependent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78,
90 (1971); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970). See generally Wilkinson, The
Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L.
REV. 945 (1975); Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479 (1974); Note, The
Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication. An Analysis, A Justiftcaton and Some Criteria,
27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Less Restrictive Alternative].
21. Gunther, The Supreme Court /97/ Teirm-Forward In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
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Gunther's relatively narrow ground of decision requires the showing of
a substantial relationship between an asserted state interest and the means
used to achieve it in order to sustain a statute's constitutionality. The test is
more demanding than the traditional rational basis test because the Court
assesses the means in terms of a stated legislative objective rather than mere
conjecture. 2 2 This strengthened rational basis test has the Court doing more
to assure rationality of means without unduly infringing upon legislative
prerogatives regarding ends.
23
In contrast, Justice Marshall has urged the adoption of his sliding scale
model, under which the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize
particular classifications "depends upon the Constitutional significance of
the interest affected and the invidiousness of the particular class."'24 Once
the appropriate level of review is determined, it is applied to the examina-
tion of three factors: the legitimacy of the state interest, the reasonableness
of the means used, and the availability of alternatives. 25 Until the Lal deci-
sion, the trend in illegitimacy equal protection cases seemed to favor adop-
tion of Marshall's balancing approach.
Prior to 1968 the Supreme Court did not apply the equal protection
guarantee of the fourteenth amendment to statutory classifications based on
illegitimacy.2 6 In 1968, however, in Levy v. Louisiana27 and its companion
case Glona v. American Guarantee &Surety Co. ,28 the Court held it to be a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause to deny illegitimate children the right to
maintain an action for their mother's wrongful death or to deny a mother
the right to recover for the wrongful death of her children born out of wed-
lock. Unfortunately, the theoretical basis for those two decisions was not
made entirely clear by the Court. Certain language came close to character-
izing illegitimacy as a suspect classification; nevertheless, other language ap-
parently utilized the rational basis standard. In Lev,, Justice Douglas
described discrimination against illegitimates as "invidious. . . when no ac-
tion, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was
done the mother."' 29 However, in Glona, the Court held that the state had no
rational basis to believe that denying recovery to the mother of illegitimates
would tend to reduce illegitimate births. 30 The contrasting language used in
Levy and Glona illustrates the difficulty the Court had in applying the tradi-
Court. A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Gunther).
22. See id at 20.
23. Note, Illegiimacy andEqual Protecton, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 479, 490 (1974); See Two Trs,
supra note 7, at 758.
24. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 99 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
25. 7he Less Restnctive Alternatlwe, supra note 20, at 1008.
26. See Krause, Equal Protectionfor the lllegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REx'. 477, 478-82 (1967).
Professor Krause reported no cases in which the issue of discrimination against illegitimates had
been discussed in equal protection terms. However, he found one case in which the equal pro-
tection challenge had been made and dismissed, Brown v. Brown, 183 Va. 353, 32 S.E.2d 79, 81
(1944).
27. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
28. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
29. 391 U.S. at 72.
30. 391 U.S. at 75.
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tional "two-tiered" analysis to statutes which discriminated against illegiti-
mates. It is not unnatural, therefore, that other courts, in subsequently
applying those decisions, interpreted them in different ways.
3 1
Despite the seemingly progressive views enunciated in Levy and Glona,
three years thereafter the Court refused to adopt a similar rationale in Labhe
v. Vincent. 32 That case involved a Louisiana statute which entitled an ac-
knowledged illegitimate child to inherit from his father, but only to the ex-
clusion of the state. The Labihe Court applied a policy of total deference to
the state legislation, emphasizing that the choice reflected by the intestate
succession statutes was within the power of the state to make. The Court
only alluded to a standard of review in a brief footnote, stating "even if we
were to apply the 'rational basis' test . . . that statute clearly has a rational
basis in view of Louisiana's interest in promoting family life and directing
disposition of property left within the State."' 33 Thus the Court seemed to
suggest that it would accord total deference to state legislation in areas of
probate administration on the theory that such matters are traditionally
within the regulatory power of the individual states.
Justice Brennan's dissent clearly showed the fallacy in the reasoning of
the majority. He pointed out that although no one disputed Louisiana's
right to pass laws dealing with inheritance, that fact did not make the equal
protection clause of the constitution inapplicable. 34 In testing the validity of
such laws he said: "It is precisely state action which is subjected by the Four-
teenth Amendment to its restraints."
'35
One year later, in Weberv. Aetna Casualty &Surety Co. ,36 the Court invali-
dated a Louisiana workmen's compensation law that granted full recovery to
parents of legitimate and acknowledged children but limited the scope of
such benefits in the case of unacknowledged illegitimates. In doing so the
Court enunciated a standard of review for equal protection analysis of ille-
gitimacy cases for the first time. Justice Powell, advocating Marshall's bal-
ancing approach in this area of discrimination, stated: "[W]hen state
statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights,
this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny . . . .The essential inquiry [is], how-
ever, inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the classifica-
tion promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger?" 37 However, Powell's decision was not predicated on any such
31. For a discussion of various state court interpretations of Levy and Glona, see Krause,
Legtnnate and Illegitimate Ofpring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions on Equal Protection and Pater-
n'ty, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 338 (1969).
32. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
33. Id at 536 n.6. In justice Brennan's dissent, he applied his own fourteenth amendment
analysis to the subject and concluded that even under the rational basis test the statute was not
constitutional because unmarried parents would not conform to societal ways just to avoid pos-
sible discriminatory treatment their future offspring might receive. Id at 548 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
34. Id at 549. See Petrillo, Labtne v. Vincent: I/legitimates, Inheritance, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 75 DICK. L. REv. 377 (1971).
35. 401 U.S. at 549.
36. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
37. Id at 172-73. Justice Powell apparently accomplished Marshall's balancing test in one
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balancing test.38 Instead, he apparently relied upon a lower level scrutiny,
similar to Gunther's "means-focused" test.3 9 He stated that it "cannot be
thought here that persons will shun illicit relations because their offspring
may not one day reap the benefits of workmen's compensation. 4 0 Thus the
statute was invalidated because inferior classification of dependent, unac-
knowledged illegitimates bears no significant relation to the legitimate state
purpose of promoting family relations. In accordance with Gunther's
"means-focused" approach, the Court required rationality in fact-the legis-
lative means must substantially further the articulated legislative ends.4 '
Nevertheless, by stating one standard and applying another, the Court in
Weber left unanswered the question of exactly where between the rational
basis and strict scrutiny tests the correct analysis lies.
In subsequent cases, there was no clarification as to the proper standard
of judicial scrutiny in cases involving discrimination against illegitimates.
4 2
In one such case, Gomez v. Per'z,4 3 the issue was whether a Texas statute
could constitutionally grant legitimate children a judicially enforceable right
to support from their natural father and at the same time deny that right to
illegitimate children. Relying on Levy and Weber, the Court made the fol-
lowing broad statement: "[A] State may not invidiously discriminate against
illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children
generally."'44 Although the Court recognized that a legitimate state purpose
existed in preventing fraudulent paternity suits and that such problems
could not lightly be brushed aside, it nevertheless concluded that "neither
can they be made into an impenetrable barrier that works to shield other-
wise invidious discrimination."'45 This was the first time in considering such
cases that the Court appeared to be utilizing the balancing approach.
46
Under either the traditional rational basis test or Gunther's "means-focused"
approach, the Texas statute could have been upheld since the denial of sup-
port to illegitimate children could, in fact, further the state's objective to
prevent the assertion of fraudulent claims. Instead of using either of these
standards, the Court balanced the importance of the interest threatened
(support to illegitimates) against the importance of the state goal sought to
step, wherein he balanced all the relevant factors. The Less Restrc/we Alernatlze, supra note 20, at
1009.
38. See 52 TUL. L. REV. 406, 411 (1978).
39. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
40. 406 U.S. at 173.
41. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
42. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). In this case the Court invali-
dated a social security provision which barred recovery by illegitimate children born after the
onset of the worker's disability. Without articulating a standard of review, the Court found no
reasonable relationship between the classification and the governmental purpose of discourag-
ing spurious claims. In New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973), the
Court struck down a New Jersey program which provided welfare only to low income family
units consisting of married couples with either natural or adopted children. The Court seemed
to employ a rational basis test to determine whether the program was a means for achieving the
stated objective.
43. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
44. Id at 538.
45. Id
46. Two Ters, supra note 7, at 762.
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be achieved (preventing fraudulent paternity claims) and came to a decision
that was "logical" and "just."
'4 7
Levy's early intimation that illegitimacy might be a suspect class was
finally firmly rejected by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Lucas.48 The
challenged statute, which dealt with eligibility requirements for receiving
social security benefits, granted a presumption of dependency to legitimate
children and illegitimates who were entitled to inherit from the decedent
under state law. Other illegitimates would receive benefits only if they could
establish dependency by providing evidence of cohabitation or support by
the wage earner at the time of death. In Lucas, the illegitimate children
were unable to prove dependency at the time of their father's death because
he died following an extended absence from home. The Court held the stat-
utory classification permissible because the presumptions were reasonably
related to the likelihood of dependency at death.
49
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Blackmun stated that the
appropriate level of scrutiny was "less than [the] strictest . . . [but] not a
toothless one."' 50 Then, after acknowledging the substantial relationship be-
tween a statutory presumption of dependency and administrative conven-
ience, he stated that the validity of such statutes depended upon whether
"the statutory classifications . . . [are] reasonable empirical judgments that
are consistent with a design to qualify entitlement to benefits upon a child's
dependency at the time of a parent's death."'5 ' Following an extended re-
view of the factors involved, he concluded that the statute was valid because
it "does not broadly discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates with-
out more, but is carefully tuned to alternative considerations."'52 Thus, Jus-
tice Blackmun utilized Marshall's balancing process 53 by checking the
relationship between statutory objectives and means and by testing whether
the statute was designed to ensure that the factors giving rise to a presump-
tion of dependency substantially related to the likelihood of actual depen-
dency.
Trimble v. Gordon,54 decided less than a year before La/l', provided fur-
ther clarification of the Court's evolving equal protection framework in deal-
ing with state statutes regarding illegitimates. Deta Mona Trimble, the
illegitimate child of Sherman Gordon, was openly acknowledged and sup-
ported by her father in accordance with a paternity order. When Mr.
Gordon died in 1974 without leaving a will, Deta Mona was unable to in-
herit from him because under Illinois intestacy law an illegitimate child's
parents must intermarry and the child must have been formally acknowl-
edged before she (or he) could inherit.
47. 409 U.S. at 538.
48. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
49. Id at 510-11.
50. Id at 510. The Lucas Court noted that illegitimates do not suffer the political
powerlessness characteristic of classes which traditionally receive strict scrutiny. Id at 506 n. 13
(citing San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
51. 427 U.S. at 510.
52. Id at 513.
53. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
54. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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An analysis of Justice Powell's decision holding the Illinois statute un-
constitutional makes it evident that the Court was tending to favor an equal
protection approach in the area of discrimination against illegitimates
closely tailored to Marshall's balancing approach.5 5 At the outset of his
opinion Justice Powell in effect rejected the reasoning in Labize. He stated
that while judicial deference is appropriate when the challenged statute in-
volves a "substantial state interest" in providing for the prompt determina-
tion of those entitled to a distribution of a decedent's property, "there is a
point beyond which .. .deference cannot justify discrimination. ' 56 In dis-
cussing the Labihe case he said: "lit is difficult to place [that case] in the
pattern of this Court's equal protection decisions and subsequent cases have
limited its force as a precedent." 5 7 Instead, he cited Weber and Lucas as ap-
propriate precedents, stating: "The Court demands more than rational ba-
sis, but less than compelling state interest when classifications approach
sensitive and fundamental personal rights .... "58
Justice Powell's treatment of the state's main argument in defense of the
statute exemplifies the Court's shift from its previous ad hoc approach to a
balancing approach. The state argued that its interest was to establish a
method of property distribution unencumbered by difficulties in proof of
paternity and dangers of fraudulent claims. 5 9 Answering that contention,
Justice Powell explained that serious problems of proof of paternity might
justify a more demanding standard for illegitimates claiming under their fa-
ther's estate than that required for illegitimates claiming under their
mother's estate, but that difficulty did not justify total statutory disinheri-
tance for illegitimates whose fathers die intestate. 60 He held that the consti-
tutional flaw in the Illinois statute was that it did not fit its intended purpose
closely enough: "The court failed to consider the possibility of a middle
ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case deter-
mination of paternity. For at least some significant categories of illegitimate
children . . . [whose paternity could clearly be established] inheritance
rights can be recognized without jeopardizing . . . [estate] settle-
ment[s] .... -61
In holding the Illinois statute invalid, Justice Powell reaffirmed the view
expressed by the Court in Lucas that the statute must be "carefully tuned to
55. See note 20 supra. But see 43 Mo. L. REV. 116, 119 (1978); 52 TUL. L. REV. 406, 411
(1978); 17 WASHBURN L.J. 392, 397 (1978).
56. 430 U.S. at 767 n.12.
57. Id.
58. Id at 766-67.
59. The other state interests sought to be achieved were encouraging family relationships
and discouraging casual liasons. The Court could not find a rational relationship between de-
nying illegitimate children the right to inherit from their fathers and discouraging casual liasons
or promoting family relations. 430 U.S. at 768-70. As the Court had previously declared in
Weber, "imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrong-
doing." 406 U.S. at 175. See generally 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 609 (1977); 18 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 822 (1978).
60. 430 U.S. at 774.
61. Id at 770.
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alternative considerations."'62 He held that the Illinois statute did not meet
this standard because it "extend[ed] well beyond its asserted purposes."
6 3
Accurate and efficient disposition of the father's property would not have
been compromised by allowing his illegitimate child's claim under the cir-
cumstances.
In a footnote, Justice Powell explained that states were free to prescribe
different forms of proof of paternity; they need not accept inaccurate and
inefficient methods. By way of illustration, he indicated that prior adjudica-
tion or formal acknowledgement of paternity were forms of proof that would
not be constitutionally invalid. 64 Justice Powell was, however, careful to
point out that a statute which promotes a legitimate state interest can ex-
clude illegitimate children only when it is "carefully tailored to eliminate
imprecise and unduly burdensome methods of establishing paternity."
65
The Trbmble court thus examined the substantiality of the state interest,
the reasonableness of the means adopted, and the availability of alternatives,
since a final determination of the statute's constitutionality depended upon a
balancing of the importance of the interest threatened against the impor-
tance of the goals sought to be achieved and the efeclieness of the statute in
achieving them.
66
The decisions from Levy to Trmble exemplify the diverse approaches the
Supreme Court has taken in applying the equal protection clause in the case
of illegitimates. If one could prognosticate after an analysis of the Court's
meandering approach, it would seem that Marshall's balancing approach
would be the preferred analysis in future cases. In Trimble, Justice Powell
went a step further and not only required that the statute be designed to
achieve its stated purposes, but also investigated the means imposed by the
statutory scheme to accomplish its valid state objective.
II. LALLIv. LALLI
Only eight months after the Supreme Court in Trbmble declared the Illi-
nois statute unconstitutional, the Court in Lal/hv. La//i 6 7 upheld the consti-
tutionality of a New York statute which required that an order of filiation be
obtained during the lifetime of the putative father as a condition precedent
for an illegitimate child to inherit intestate. How does the decision in Lal/i
fit into the Supreme Court's evolving equal protection framework? Is La/l a
logical extension of the holdings in Trimble or a retreat from the views ex-
pressed therein? A comparison of the Court's analysis of the two statutes
involved shows some logic in the seemingly inconsistent results.
Both cases dealt with illegitimates claiming the right to inherit intestate
from their respective fathers. Robert Lalli, like Deta Trimble, had been
publicly acknowledged and supported by his putative father; but Lalli, un-
62. Id at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976)).
63. 430 U.S. at 772.
64. Id at 772 n.14.
65. Id
66. See Note, I/egizhmagy and Equal Arotectan, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 479 (1974).
67. 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (5-4 decision).
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like Deta Trimble, received that support without any judicial support order.
When Mario Lalli was murdered in 1974, Robert Lalli petitioned the Surro-
gates Court for a compulsory accounting, claiming that he was entitled to
inherit from Mario as his son. The petition was opposed on the ground that
even if Robert were in fact Mario's child, he was not a lawful distributee
under the New York statute of intestate succession, which provided that an
illegitimate child could not inherit intestate from his father unless an order
of filiation had been obtained during the putative father's lifetime.68 Robert
Lalli contended that the statute violated the fourteenth amendment. The
evidence established conclusively that Mario Lalli had acknowledged openly
and often that Robert was his son. Despite that uncontroverted fact, the
New York courts upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Robert Lalli
appealed that determination to the United States Supreme Court. The
Court initially remanded the case for further consideration in light of its
decision in Trmble. Upon remand, the New York Court of Appeals once
more upheld the constitutionality of its statute. When the case again
reached the United States Supreme Court, it declared that the New York
statute did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
Justice Powell, writing for the Lalh majority, reaffirmed Trmble as set-
ting the appropriate standard for review. However, a careful scrutiny of the
rationale clearly shows that in reaching his conclusion that the New York
statute was valid, Powell used Gunther's "means-focused" approach rather
than the balancing approach employed in Trzmble. 69 In the first part of the
Lalh" opinion, he stated that there was a substantial relationship between
New York's legitimate state interest in providing "for the just and orderly
disposition of property at death" and its statutory requirement for the ob-
taining of an order of filiation during the father's lifetime before an illegiti-
mate child could inherit intestate. 7° He found a state interest to be directly
involved because of the clear possibility, among other reasons, that spurious
claims of paternity might be filed. In addition, he pointed out that problems
in the administration of estates, such as cite and service of unknown illegiti-
mate children, would be alleviated. Justice Powell then proceeded to con-
sider whether the means adopted by New York State substantially furthered
its interest. He came to the conclusion that the requirement for a paternity
proceeding during the lifetime of the father was not constitutionally invidi-
68. Section 4-1.2 of N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW (McKinney 1967) in its entirety
provided:
(a) For the purposes of this article:
(I) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his mother so that he and his
issue inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred.
(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his
issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime
of the father made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted
during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child.
(3) The existence of an agreement obligating the father to support the illegiti-
mate child does not qualify such child or his issue to inherit from the father in the
absence of an order of filiation made as prescribed by subparagraph (2).
69. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
70. 439 U.S. at 268.
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ous because it would promote accuracy and reliability, and would permit the
alleged father to defend himself and his reputation.
Up to this point in the Lali decision, Justice Powell's reasoning was
consistent with the rationale of Trimble. However, the departure from Trim-
ble becomes apparent when the appellant's contention and Powell's answer
thereto are considered. As a basis for his appeal, Robert Lalli argued that:
[Section] 4-1.2, like the statute at issue in Trimble, exclude[d] "sig-
nificant categories of illegitimate children" who could be allowed
to inherit "without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of their in-
testate fathers' estates." He urge[d] that . . . "known" illegitimate
children who, despite the absence of an order of filiation .. .can
present convincing proof of paternity--cannot rationally be denied
inheritance as they pose none of the risks § 4-1.2 was intended to
minimize.
7 1
In response, Justice Powell stated: "Our inquiry under the Equal Protection
Clause does not focus on the abstract 'fairness' of a statute, but on whether
the statute's relation to the state interests it is intended to promote is so tenu-
ous that it lacks the rationahy contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
'7 2
He then added, "we have no basis to question ...[the statute's] detail be-
yond the evident consistency and substantiality.
'73
Thus the Court failed to employ the analysis utilized in Trimble, for the
"rationality contemplated" in Trmble was a balancing process where the
least restrictive alternative was an important consideration. 74 The balanc-
ing standard implicitly must consider the "fairness" of a statute by compar-
ing the state's justification for the statutory scheme with the means employed
to realize it. According to Trimble, if the means are "carefully tailored to
eliminate imprecise and unduly burdensome methods of establishing pater-
nity," while still achieving the state objective, the two interests are bal-
anced.
75
Consistent with Marshall's balancing approach, the Court in Lucas had
upheld a statutory classification because it was "reasonably related to the
likelihood of dependency at death."'76 Similarly, the Court in Trimble had
struck down the Illinois statutory classification because it was "overly broad"
and extended "well beyond the asserted purposes."' 77 However, the Court in
Lal refused to extend its analysis that far. Without substantiation for his
conclusion, Justice Powell stated: "This is not a requirement that inevitably
disqualifies an unnecessarily large number of children born out of wed-
lock."
78
If the Court had inquired into the effectiveness of the means employed
71. Id. at 272.
72. Id at 273 (emphasis added).
73. Id at 274 (quoting from Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 515-16 (1976)).
74. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
75. Note, II CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 352, 353 (1977).
76. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976). See notes 50-53 and accompanying text
supra.
77. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772-73 (1977). See notes 54-66 and accompanying
text supra.
78. 439 U.S. at 273.
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to determine whether significant categories of illegitimate children could be
allowed to inherit intestate without compromising the state interest, it could
well have found that the number disqualified under the New York condition
precedent was indeed large.7 9 As Justice Brennan observed in his dissent, "it
is difficult to imagine an instance in which an illegitimate child, acknowl-
edged and voluntarily supported by his father, would ever inherit intestate
under the New York scheme."'8 0 Realistically viewed, the failure to obtain
an order of filiation might have been due to the fact that the putative father
was supporting the child and had acknowledged paternity; therefore, ob-
taining such an order would have served no real purpose. Justice Brennan
pointed out that where children are being supported by the alleged father,
institution of a paternity proceeding is unlikely to occur for two reasons: (1)
most individuals are unaware of the necessity for initiating such a proceed-
ing, and (2) the failure to institute such a judicial proceeding might result
from the fear that the support might be withheld or that the relationship of
the parties might thereby be disrupted.8 ' In addition, mothers may be un-
willing to bring an action against the putative father for fear of public em-
barrassment. Thus, the practical effect of the New York statutory scheme
was to forfeit an acknowledged and freely supported illegitimate child's fu-
ture right of inheritance.8 2 If such a forfeiture resulted from a lack of proof,
it would of course be justified; but certainly there are less drastic means of
79. See Note, I I CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 352, 353 (1977), where it states that "fewer than 50
percent of illegitimate children are acknowledged or adjudicated."
80. 439 U.S. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In May of 1979, however, the New York
legislature amended the former statute in an attempt to take into account the "willing" fathers
who voluntarily support their illegitimate children. The statute presently provides that a father
may voluntarily sign an acknowledgment of paternity within ten years after the birth of the
child. The writing must be signed in the presence of a witness and acknowledged by such
witness before a notary public. The new legislation also establishes a central registry in the
Department of Social Services for filing such acknowledgment. The registry will serve to pro-
vide notice to personal representatives of the existence of the illegitimate. 1979 N.Y. Laws, ch.
139.
Nine months after the La//" decision, the Surrogate's Court of New York decided Estate of
Herbert Rodriguez, 420 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1979). In that case, the evidence conclusively estab-
lished that the petitioner, Herbert's mother, and the decedent were the infant's parents. Al-
though the original birth certificate did not list anyone as the father, two years later both
decedent and petitioner executed a form provided by the Bureau of Vital Statistics naming the
decedent as the father. Their signatures on the corrected birth certificate were sworn to before a
commissioner of deeds. Since there was no judicial determination during the decedent's lifetime
as to the child's paternity, however, the court was constrained under the holding of La//i to
conclude that the child was not a distributee under the decedent's estate.
Although the new provision of the New York statute liberalizes the rights of illegitimate
children to inherit from the paternal side of the family, it would not have changed the outcome
of Rodnrguz, because the birth certificate was neither executed with the formalities required by
the amended statute nor filed with the Department of Social Services. The result of La//i is
clear: only by compliance with the explicit terms of a state statute can an illegitimate child
become a distributec of his father's intestate estate even where evidence conclusively establishes
that the decedent was in fact the father of the child.
81. 439 U.S. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. The Court never addressed whether it was constitutional to require an order of filiation
to be commenced within the first two years of the child's birth as stated in § 4-1.2 because the
appellant had never commenced a paternity proceeding at any time. Thus, the Court chose to
limit its ruling to the narrower issue of whether the requirement that a judicial order of filiation
be issued during the lifetime of the father of an illegitimate was constitutional. See 439 U.S. at
267 n.5.
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screening fraudulent claims of paternity and assuring accuracy in adminis-
tering estates than the absolute bar laid down in the New York statute.8 3 As
Justice Brennan pointed out, to serve the state interest New York could have




The Court in Lali failed to recognize or refused to consider the issue of
"alternative considerations" and retreated from the Trmble balancing ap-
proach to a lower level scrutiny,85 similar to Gunther's "modest interven-
tionism . . . which permits the state to select any means that substantially
further legislative purposes."8 6 As the Lalh decision illustrates, there may be
a valid state interest which a classification does in fact substantially further;
but by employing Gunther's "means-focused" test, the Court will allow the
burden imposed by a statutory classification to go beyond the quantum nec-
essary to accomplish the desired goal.87 Because of this potential overinclu-
siveness of the "means-focused" approach, many commentators suggest that
Marshall's balancing approach as exemplified in Trimble is the preferred ju-
dicial standard in illegitimacy cases. 88 As a test for the constitutionality of
any statute which distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate children,
the balancing approach is stricter than the "means-focused" rationale of
Lal: it would mandate that the means chosen to achieve a state objective
be "carefully attuned to alternative considerations."
From Levy to Lalh, however, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
adopt any consistent mode of analysis in equal protection cases involving the
rights of illegitimate children. In place of any definitive guidelines, the
Court has preferred an ad hoc approach. With the "means-focused" ration-
83. Eleven states have adopted some version of the Uniform Probate Code provision which
allows an illegitimate child to inherit from his father if his parents subsequently marry each
other, or if paternity is adjudicated before his father's death or established afterward by clear
and convincing proof. The states include Alaska, Ariz., Colo., Del., Fla., Idaho, Ind., Mont.,
N.D., S.D., and Utah. 32 ARK. L. REV. 120, 130 (1978).
A conflict exists in the Colorado statutes between the Colorado Probate Code, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 15-11-109 (1973) and the Uniform Parentage Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-103, 105
(1973). Under the Colorado Probate Code, for purposes of intestate succession a person born
out of wedlock is the child of the father only if the parents marry before or after the child's birth
or if paternity is established by adjudication before death of the father or after his death by a
preponderance of the evidence. However, the Uniform Parentage Act totally eliminates the
concept of illegitimacy and does not qualify inheritance on subsequent legitimization of the
child.
In five states (Cal., Iowa, Kan., Md., and Vt.) open and notorious recognition of an illegiti-
mate child by the father will establish inheritance rights. 32 ARK. L. REV. 120, 130 (1978).
84. 439 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. The retreat from Trmble may be attributable to differences in the impact of the Illinois
statute, which the Court held unconstitutional in Trimble, and the New York statute upheld in
Lalh. The language of the Illinois statute presented an absolute bar to any action to establish
or acknowledge paternity other than marriage between the mother and father. The New York
statute was not an insurmountable barrier, however, because paternity could at least be estab-
lished in a judicial proceeding in lieu of marriage. Id. at 266-68.
86. See Gunther, supra note 21, at 21 (emphasis added).
87. Id at 47-48.
88. See note 20 supra.
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ale of Lal/ following the balancing approach of Trnmble by less than a year,
there is no way to prognosticate the analytical approach courts will choose in
reviewing this area of equal protection.
Jane Guern

